Heat has to do more with equilibrium than kinetics.

A=A is not a tautology.

Usually the first A is taken broadly and the second A narrowly.

The second, as they say, carries a pregnancy.

``Why do I think I can avoid literary effects and reason directly instead?''

The AI hallucination, peculiar to males, would be another example.

As for the regular questions, Wittenstein was aiming to show the way out of the fly-bottle, as he put it; by showing what the words in the question ordinarily mean, and how they come to seem profound exactly when they go empty, ``on holiday'' as he put it.

As for reading Philosophical Investigations, Stanley Cavell _The Claim of Reason_ makes it interesting by elaborating it further.

Then there's Edmond Jabes, on freedom and how words come to mean anything.

You will find that the need to nail things down is mostly a male thing. Women are more driven to add complexity, as more interesting to them.

http://home.att.net/~rhhardin9/vickihearne.womenmath.txt

And ``algorithm'' is a picture in Wittgenstein's sense.

It must be a Princess Diana effect.

"If we let ethical considerations get in the way of scientific hubris, then the feminists have won!"

Back when science was fun :

`` Watson, repeating similar experiments [to Pavlov], noted the ``transference'' aspect of such conditioning. Having found that the violent striking of an iron bar produced fear in an infant, he noted that he could give a ``fear'' character to some hitherto neutral object, such as a rabbit, by placing it before the child each time the iron bar was struck; he next demonstrated that this conditioned fear of the rabbit was transferred with varying degrees of intensity to other things having similar properties(such as fur coats or cotton blankets).''

- Kenneth Burke, _Permanence and Change_ p.11

Apple(X) <==> [ Green(X) or Red(X) ] and Edible(X) and Size(X, medium), etc.

The criteria for ordinary language making something count, or fit the case, are ordinary language criteria, not mathematical criteria, of counting or fitting.

That is, ordinary language rules the operation of ordinary language, using the ordinary meanings of count and fit, not the mathematical ones.

Ordinary concepts (nice red apple) are not less precise than mathematical concepts ; but they give precision a certain shape.

The philosopher (not the mathematician!) wants to say that ordinary langauge lacks something that mathematics has. The philosopher however is not curious about why he thinks this.

What does a word point to? See an essay on words as labels in Stanley Cavell _The Claim of Reason_ p.175

In the background is always : what is this fantasy about? Meaning in this context the AI fantasy.

Actual robot fantasies begin around p.403