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The research indicates that most people's responses to any social science result is "that's what I would have expected," although that doesn't actually seem to be true; you can get them to say they expected conflicting results. Have there really been no studies of when people say they think studies are surprising, comparing the results to what people actually predicted beforehand (I know Milgram informally surveyed what people expected before his study, but I don't think he did any rigorous analysis of expectations)? Perhaps people are as inaccurate in reporting what they find surprising as they are in reporting what they expected. It would certainly be interesting to know!
In response to
Cross-Cultural maps and Asch's Conformity Experiment
There are studies on hindsight bias, which is what I think you're talking about.
In 1983, researcher Daphna Baratz asked undergraduates to read 16 pairs of statements describing psychological findings and their opposites; they were told to evaluate how likely they would have been to predict each finding. So, for example, they read: “People who go to church regularly tend to have more children than people who go to church infrequently.” They also read, “People who go to church infrequently tend to have more children than people who go to church regularly.” Whether rating the truth or its opposite, most students said the supposed finding was what they would have predicted.
From her dissertation.
(I couldn't find a pdf of the dissertation, but that's its page on worldcat).
As for your specific question:
Have there really been no studies of when people say they think studies are surprising, comparing the results to what people actually predicted beforehand
I have no idea, but I want them.
In response to
Cross-Cultural maps and Asch's Conformity Experiment
Do people who are genuine dissenters predict that more people will dissent than people who genuinely conform?
Genuine dissenters generally predict that most people will conform, largely because it's a lot easier to notice people conforming when you disagree with the thing they're conforming to.
Is there any evidence to support this in general?
Also, a dissenter in one area (religion, for example) might be a conformer in another. I think it's worth looking at whether someone who actively protests racial discrimination (in a non-conforming way, so maybe someone from the early civil rights movement) would dissent in Asch's experiment. Does willingness to dissent in one area of your life transfer over to a larger willingness to dissent in other areas of your life?
In response to
Cross-Cultural maps and Asch's Conformity Experiment
I think it probably matters a lot what people are conforming about. If it's about perception (which line is the same, which color is different) and several people all say the same thing that's different from what I thought I saw, I can see myself starting to doubt my perception. If it's about memory (what is the capital of Rumania?) I'd start thinking I must have misremembered. But if 4 people all said that 2+2=5, I'd realise the experiment wasn't about what they said it was.
Baring a fault in our visual cortex or optical systems - an optical illusion, in other words - how is determining that Black is Black or that two lines are the same length any different from mathematical statements? There's a bit in the sequences on why 2+2=4 isn't exactly an unconditional truth. The thought processes that go into both include checking your perceptions, checking your memory, and checking reality.
Maybe 2+2=4 is too simple an example, though; it would be downright Orwellian to stand in a room and listen to a group of people declare that 2+2=5. On the other hand, imagine standing in a room with a bunch of people claiming that there aren't an infinite amount of prime numbers - it might be easier to doubt your own perceptions.
Anyone else want to weigh in on this? Does Asch's methodology effect conformity?
In response to
Recommended Reading for Evolution?
John Maynard Smith's Evolutionary Genetics is a classic textbook. The second edition has simulation/programming exercises after every chapter. Have fun :)
I'm looking it up on Amazon now. Thanks.
In response to
Recommended Reading for Evolution?
What do you actually want to know about evolution? How much genetics do you know?
I'll try to summarize:
1) I want to know enough about the low-level mechanics of gene transfer to be able to model it accurately enough (not necessarily for a scientific paper) with mathematics. This has to have been done before - links to how would be appreciated, or I could start from scratch.
2) I want to know enough about how it works on the macro level to simulate that too, perhaps with the lower level mechanics working behind the scenes.
3) I am very interested in how evolution started - Dawkins references a soup of chemicals, and then the creation of the first replicator mainly by chance over a very long period of time. Is that accurate?
How did evolution work in the beginning? Dawkins mentioned that there were other explanations than the one he gave - what are they? How do I find them?
My training is in engineering/programming, and my genetics knowledge doesn't much exceed anything taught at the high school level. I am, however, prepared to read college-level textbooks on the subject.
Thanks.
In response to
Which ideas from LW would you most like to see spread?
Understanding the distinction between the map and the territory. And understanding that there are different levels of maps.
I think if you go to CFAR's webpage, and (I think) look at one of Michael Smith's interviews, he says that that's the one thing he wants people to take away from CFAR.
In response to
Which ideas from LW would you most like to see spread?
An idea that I think would be very helpful to people - and relatively simple to grasp - is the idea of tribalism, and how much it really motivates us, even to this day. Not just that politics is the mindkiller, but why. I think if more people were able to take a step back every once in a while and think, "Hey, I don't even care about or like this idea...why am I defending it? Because it's an idea that I think a group I consider myself a part of holds, and by attacking one idea of my tribe, it seems like you're attacking every idea of my tribe? Does this make sense?" then the world would be a much more friendly place, at least.
In response to
Leaving LessWrong for a more rational life
I'm relatively new here, so I have trouble seeing the same kinds of problems you do.
However, I can say that LessWrong does help me remember to apply the principles of rationality I've been trying to learn.
I'd also like to add that - much like writing a novel - the first draft rarely addresses all of the possible faults. LessWrong is one of (if not the first) community blogs devoted to "refining the art of human rationality." Of course we're going to get some things wrong.
What I really admire about this site, though, is that contrarian viewpoints end up being some of the most highly upvoted - people admire and discourse with dissenters here. So if you truly believe that LessWrong isn't the best use of your time, then I wish you the best with whatever efforts you pursue. But I think if you wrote a bit more on this subject and found a way to add it to the sequences, everyone would only thank you.
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Notice that their territory is different from yours. Just that would make you expect their map to be different.
One question that you may ask is whether the bias (the difference between the territory and the map) is a function of the territory: do people in collectivist cultures mis-estimate the prevalent conformity in a different way from people in individualist cultures?
It is not. Consider, for example, one of the issues in political studies: why repressive regimes which present a solid and impenetrable facade tend to collapse very rapidly when the first cracks in the facade appear? One of the answers is that it's a consequence of available information: a lot of people might be very unhappy with the regime but as long as they believe that they are a powerless minority they will hide and do nothing. The first cracks basically tell these people "you're not alone, there are many of you*, and the regime collapse follows soon thereafter.
Note the parallels to estimating the conformity of other people.
Thank you for putting that so clearly.