I think for me the problem is that I'm not being Bayesian. I can't make my brain assign 50% probability in a unified way. Instead, half my brain is convinced the hotel's definitely behind me, half is convinced it's ahead, they fail to cooperate on the epistemic prisoner's dilemma and instead play tug-of-war with the steering wheel. And however I decide to make up my mind, they don't stop playing tug-of-war with the steering wheel.

Anyone have a better procedure for fixing this than the following?

1. Notice the feeling.
2. Treat it as a signal that your S1 wants you to search for cheaper ways to figure out which option is right than continuing to drive. Search for cheaper ways and execute them. Make it a thorough search and show your S1 the thoroughness of your search. Acknowledge the awfulness of "drive back and forth in an expensive search pattern" and only choose that as a last resort.
3. If you don't immediately become much more certain of which way the hotel is in, and the "go 30mph" feeling does not go away, treat it as a signal that your S1 thinks the thought process by which you chose (under evidence-starvation) is wrong, which does not necessarily mean that the conclusion is wrong.
4. List the ways your S1 thinks you're biased which are screwing up your evidenced-starved reasoning.
5. Perform sanity-inducing rituals to counter those biases. (Think about your actual goal of getting to the hotel as soon as possible, forgive yourself for maybe driving past it, imagine all 4 outcomes (60mph forward, 60mph backward) x (get to hotel on next try after this, don't get to hotel on next try after this) and how you would feel about them)
6. If the feeling is still there, this procedure has failed.

The process of revival is imperfect, and pieces of memories are frequently missing. None of your loved ones remember you, and some of them are in permanent Alzheimers-like states. One person claims to have been close to pre-revival you, but you don't remember them. Having felt the pain of being rejected by your closest friend, you decide to trust them. That turns out to be an elaborate scam, possibly motivated by pure sadism, and you're now alone in a world you don't recognize and where you have to be suspicious of everyone you meet.

Playing off of #2: The process of revival also allows for essentially infinite cloning. Unable to reconcile this with a desire for uniqueness, people decided that revived humans aren't quite real, and don't have legal rights. Thousands of copies of you are cloned or simulated for human experimentation, which has become extremely common now that it can be accurately done without hurting "real" humans. No version of you is ever revived in a context you would enjoy, because after all, you don't count as real.

One approach I've been working with is sharing models rather than arguments. For example, nbouscal and I recently debated the relative importance of money for effective altruism. It turned out that our disagreement came down to a difference in our models of self-improvement: he believes that personal growth mostly comes from individual work and learning, while I believe that it mostly comes from working with people who have skills you don't have.

Any approach that started with detailed arguments would have been incredibly inefficient, because it would have taken much longer to find the source of our disagreement. Starting with a high-level approach that described our basic models made it much easier for us to hone in on arguments that we hadn't thought about before and make better updates.

I found my motivation to frequently depend much more on external factors than the task itself. For example, I worked on Math for essentially every waking hour at Berkeley (and completed all the Master's courses when I was 19 as a result), and I worked on programming/data science tasks 80 hours/week at one job. But I've had very similar types of tasks in different environments and found it quite difficult to put it anything near the same number of hours.

I've found that my motivation seems to be constraint-based: if I feel like I'm getting enough sleep, enough socialization, enough food etc. then I find it very easy to work a lot. But if any one of these is lacking then my motivation plummets. In particular, all the environments where I worked exceptionally hard were ones where I was surrounded by people who felt like part of "my tribe": simply being around people whom I like isn't enough.

That suggests one way to motivate yourself to do something is to surround yourself with other people who are doing it badly.

I don't believe you can obtain an understanding of the idea that "correlation does not imply causation" from even a very deep appreciation of the material in Statistics 101. These courses usually make no attempt to define confounding, comparability etc. If they try to define confounding, they tend to use incoherent criteria based on changes in the estimate. Any understanding is almost certainly going to have to originate from outside of Statistics 101; unless you take a course on causal inference based on directed acyclic graphs it will be very challenging to get beyond memorizing the teacher's password

If you say paper do you mean real physical paper? If so do you digitize it someway?

I've noticed a related phenomenon where, when someone acquires a new insight, they judge its value by how difficult it was to understand, instead of by how much it improves their model of the world. It's the feeling of "Well, I hadn't thought of that before, but I suppose it's pretty obvious." But of course this is a mistake because the important part is "hadn't thought of that before," no matter whether you think you could've realized it in hindsight. (The most pernicious version of this is "Oh, yeah, I totally knew that already. I just hadn't make it so explicit.")