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Wouldn't donating a symbolic dollar create even stronger psychological effect?
Only if they actually do it. It seems to follow that anyone willing to donate a symbolic dollar is already fairly likely to stay the course and therefore a low-priority target, whereas the people who wouldn't donate the symbolic dollar are also the easiest to alienate.
In response to
Celebrating All Who Are in Effective Altruism
I wouldn't judge anyone for donating more or less per se. It's just weird to hear people describe themselves as "effective altruists" if their current level is "actually, as a student I don't have any income, so I never really donated anything, but a few years later I am totally going to donate". It makes you wonder how large is exactly the set of effective altruists who have already donated at least one cent. Also, it cheapens the meaning of the words.
Perhaps mathematically speaking, the difference between donating 0 and donating 1 is much smaller than between donating 1 and donating 1000. But psychologically it is probably the other way round. The person who has already donated $1 to a GiveWell charity has already overcome the trivial inconveniences; all that is necessary is to repeat the same steps again with a different number. But the difference between 0 and 1 is the difference between "all talk, no action" and making the first step.
Hardcore EAs -- awesome; softcore EAs -- still very good; zerocore EAs -- please stop using the label.
I wonder what is the real distribution among people who publicly identify as EAs.
Maybe there could be some verification system, like a website that would publicly certify that you have donated at least $1 to an effective charity. (Or maybe multiple tiers, but this is already more or less what James_Miller suggested. Just saying that the minimal amount could be small, but definitely nonzero.)
On one hand, I agree at least somewhat about the importance of preventing free riders. On the other hand, claiming that someone isn't a "real" effective altruist makes them believe they're less of an effective altruist, which makes them less committed to the cause. Conversely, every time a non-donating EA proclaims their EAness, it becomes a more integral part of their identity, raising their level of commitment to donating when they get income.
I don't think I understand this quote. What is a "temporally contingent worldview"? It can't simply mean any worldview that wasn't widely held in the past, because that would mean distancing oneself from pretty much all science. What, then?
Also, while I agree that the truth of a statement (that doesn't include spatio-temporal indexicals, either implicit or explicit) is not a function of time or place, widespread knowledge of a true statement usually varies with time and place. Not saying this justifies adoption of a temporally contingent worldview (since I'm not sure what is), but there does seem to be a bit of a non-sequitur in that quote.
Without doing much in the way of research, which would spoil the game, I think the quote is urging people not to privilege the beliefs of the culture they live in. For example, many popular beliefs of the 1900's are clearly incorrect when viewed in hindsight; the logical conclusion is that, in a hundred years, many popular beliefs today will be seen as clearly incorrect by those future generations.
I can think of a few likely candidates off the top of my head. And sorry for the sesquipedalian loquaciousness. I keep trying to stop, but I can't!
In response to
2014 Less Wrong Census/Survey
Uh, did the survey a few days ago. Bit late to the punch, I suppose.
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[Survey Taken Thread]
Let's make these comments a reply to this post. That way we continue the tradition, but keep the discussion a bit cleaner.
I have taken the survey.