G,

Welp, I've only been reading this blog for 2007. Silly me. I just read the post and all the comments. I have to say that Philip Bricker has the upper hand.

Bricker suggested the option that you advocate, by the way. But he dismisses it. Here's why, I think: If you suspend judgment in response to reasonable disagreement, you're going to have to suspend judgment about basically all philosophical theses. By doing so, you're going to run yourself into quite a few problems.

Note: By 'old-fashioned', I meant that the view advocated in the post relies on epistemological ideas that most epistemologists reject. I sure *hope* that has something to do with whether it's true. Although, maybe it doesn't.

It just seems so old fashioned to think that it is courageous to be willing to doubt any of your beliefs. Here's a nice reflection on the matter with regard to the epistemic propriety of religious belief:

http://comp.uark.edu/~senor/wrong.html