Why not both useful beliefs and useful emotions?

Why privilege beliefs?

This solution only works if you are in the special position of being able to make institutional design changes that can't be undone by potential future enemies. Otherwise, whose "right things" will happen depends on who is currently in charge of institutional design (think gerrymandering).

Here is what I think is a better example of the Gettier problem, and a subsequent reason the Gettier problem is flawed in its definitions of truths.

You are driving down the highway, passing what appear to be several dozen barns. Unknown to you, all but one of these barns is a stage prop cutout. You decide to stop at one of these barns and by luck it is the only real one. You now have a belief (which is that the barns you see are real), which is justified, and in this case, true. But it cannot be called knowledge. Why? Because the belief is imprecise and leaves room for vagaries. A belief should describe the fundamental mechanisms of the universe. i.e. the presence of light patterns in format X indicates structure Y, because light interacts in ways Z. In this case the belief about the barns is unjustified and untrue, because there is an additional way format X could be created, by structure Y2 and light interaction Z2 (the cutout). Discovery of the real barn is only weak evidence for the belief that format X indicates a real barn, as the discovery proves the possibility thereof, but does not eliminate the alternative (cutouts). Under this new definition of belief, a concept of the universe fundamental mechanisms, as opposed to informal correlations, only accurate and precise beliefs that allow prediction generation constitute knowledge.

But this is not how we think. And for very good reason. Typically a scenario in which all options appear identical to cursory examination, and in which detailed examination provides some conclusion about one option, it can be a huge waste of time and effort to generate all theoretically possible contradictory scenarios and test them, not to mention the possibility that you may not think of or be able to test all such options. So our brain takes a mental shortcut. Barns appear to be same? Check. Barn 10 is a 3d barn? Check. Therefore all barns are 3d. Though nothing was falsified, it is a useful informal deduction which only fails us in extreme circumstances such as the problem listed above. But there is a very good reason that we don't use such logic in scientific experimentation. When we have not repeatedly experienced a phenomenon and have no hard-set reason to believe a correlation indicates causation, falsification is all we can trust. We don't have the huge backdrop of everyday data to fall back upon. Oftentimes we have a hard time realizing this though, and make assumptions as if we have such a backdrop when we don't.

Scientific Method: Don't do that.

What's a perfect agent? No one is infallible, except the Pope.

The fact that so many people believe in God is strong evidence that some sort of God is real.

I don't believe in male bisexuality, though I do believe in it for women.

I believe I'm immortal (and so is everyone else). This is from a combination of a kind of Mathematical Platonism (as eujay mentions below) and Quantum Immortality.

This believing in 'all possible worlds' and having a non-causal framework for the embedding of consciousness means that just because of the anthropic principle and perhaps some weird second-order effects, it is quite possible that we will experience rather odd phenomena in the world. Hence, things like ghosts, ESP and such may not be so far-fetched.

Also, I am not a Bayesian. I simply do not think the mind really operates according to such quantitatively defined parameters. It is fuzzy and qualitative. I, for one, have never said I believed in something at, say, 60% probability - and if I did, I would be lying.

I don't think what I'm about to post is strictly in keeping with the intended comment material, but I'm posting it here because I think this is where I'll get the best feedback.

The majority of humans don't have a concrete reason for why they value moral behavior. If you ask a human why they value life or happiness of others, they'll throw out some token response laden with fallacies, and when pressed they'll respond with something along the lines of "I just feel like it's the right thing". In my case, it's the opposite. I have a rather long list of reasons why not to kill people, starting with the problems that would result if I programmed an AI with those inclinations. Also the desire for people not to kill and torture me. But where other people have a negative inclination to killing people, flaying them alive, etc. I don't. Where other people have an neural framework that encourages empathy and inconsequential intellectual arguments to support this, I have a neural framework that encourages massive levels of suffering in others and intellectual arguments restricting my actions away from my intuitive desires.

On to my point. Understandably, it is rather difficult for me to express this unconventional aspect of myself in fleshy-space (I love that term). So I don't have any supported ideas of how common non-conventional ethical inclinations are, or how they're expressed. I wanted to open this up for discussion of our core ethical systems, normative and non-normative. In particular I am interested in seeing if others have similar inclinations to mine and how they deal / don't deal with them.

Here's one on a very different topic:

England's offenses against the American colonies did not justify the American Revolution.