Not directly related to the book, but a question I've been thinking about lately is: If I don't feel any desire to raise children and I believe it would have a strongly negative impact on my quality of life, are there any reasons why I should still consider doing so? Either moral reasons or self-interested ones (ie. the possibility that I'm wrong about the net utility to me). Another factor is that it's quite likely that I could end up in a long-term relationship with a (female) partner that does want children, and refusing could either result in the end of the relationship or a decrease in the partner's life satisfaction.

I don't know if there is enough evidence, looking up what evidence exists requires significant work, and making up my mind without doing that would be irresponsible.

I strongly object to throwing around "it's obvious that" lightly, except when you really expect everybody to agree that yes, it is obvious (which includes pretty much nothing in discussions of macroeconomics, technical progress, and history). Otherwise it just comes off as an attempt to make people who disagree look stupid.

I'd say that our pace of innovation is still very obviously struggling to keep up with the pace our reproduction.

That's not "very obvious" to me at all.

I believe Caplan's reply is basically that choosing to have kids affects the margin very little because any abdication on your part will be picked up by developing countries, and that having a kid is a net benefit because the more people there are, the more innovations and whatnot are created (positive externalities).

I've commented more extensively on the scientific and logical basis for Caplan's ideas elsewhere, including my serious concern about his reliance on separated-at-birth twin studies, but I'll limit my comments here to something a little more subtle.

While some of his data about intelligence and physical health seemed pretty sound, I remember his conclusions about personality and happiness seeming a lot sketchier. Which makes sense since the psychological health of any given individual is extremely difficult to quantify (much less the effect of one person's psychological health on another's). But I think it's these aspects that good parents are most concerned with: Will my child live a life that is largely stress free? Will I pass on my bad habits? How can I teach my child to be able to form strong and healthy emotional connections to others?

When I (non-scientifically) observe the reasonably sane parents I know, my general fear is not that they're making their children stupid or that they're sabotaging their child's future health. My fear is that they're passing on a host of much more insidious problems - body image issues, co-dependency, repression of anger, etc. When adults go into therapy, it's usually not because they're worried about their lack of income or talent or intelligence, it's because they're struggling with complex issues relating to self-esteem, trust, and identity.

Now I admit that these are extremely fuzzy concepts - the "science" of psychological health is still extremely young and hard data is difficult to obtain - but I'm not the one writing a book on parenting. What I'm trying to get at is that while I agree that the modern trend of "tiger-parenting" is useless at best and damaging at worst, that doesn't mean there might not be some less-cartoonish improvements that parents ought to adopt. And Caplan's book doesn't just present the research for your consideration, he makes a point of boldly telling you to just stop worrying. I think his evidence doesn't justify such boldness, and that he's trying to take the air out of a question which still deserves a great deal of cultural attention.

I don't believe LW is a cult, but I can see where intelligent, critical thinking people might get that impression. I also think that there may be elitist and clannish tendencies within LW that are detrimental in ways that could stand to be (regularly) examined. Vigilance against irrational bias is the whole point here, right? Shouldn't that be embraced on the group level as much as on an individual one?

Part of the problem as I see it is that LW can't decide if it's a philosophy/science or a cultural movement.

For instance, as already mentioned, there's a great deal of jargon, and there's a general attitude of impatience for anyone not thoroughly versed in the established concepts and terminology. Philosophies and sciences also have this problem, but the widely accepted and respected philosophical and scientific theories have proven themselves to the world (and weren't taken very seriously until they did). I personally believe there's a lot of substance to the ideas here, but LW hasn't delivered anything dramatic to the world at large. Until it does so it may remain, in the eyes of outsiders, as some kind of hybrid of Scientology and Objectivism - an insular group of people with a special language, a revered spokesperson, and who claim to have "the answers".

If, however, LW is supposed to be a cultural movement, then I'm sorry, but ”ur doin it wrong". Cultural movements gain momentum by being inclusive and organic, and by creating a forum for people to express themselves without fear of judgment. Movements are bottom up, and LW often gives the impression of being top down.

I'm not saying that a choice has to be made or even can be made, merely that there are conflicting currents here. I don't know if I have any great suggestions. I guess the one thing I can say is that while I've observed (am observing) a lot of debate and self-examination internally, there's still a strong outward impression of having found “the answers”. Perhaps if this community presented itself a little more as a forum for the active practice of critical thinking, and a little less as the authoritative source for an established methodology for critical thinking.

And if that doesn't work, we could always try bus ads.

While I personally agree that "personality can and does change" and that such changes have the potential to trump so-called "external" factors, the research cited in this article doesn't seem to pack much of a punch.

Furthermore, I think that there are some major obstacles in the way of this kind of research in general. The average person's concept of what shapes one's personality is still heavily influenced by poorly understood notions of genetic determinism, philosophically naive definitions of free-will, and lingering ideas about human beings possessing a "soul" (even if such ideas are subconscious or secularly re-imagined).

Until there is a significant paradigm shift in those respects, I don't think we'll see the support or funding necessary to produce studies that yield actionable data.

But in the same way, The Craft of Musical Composition is about the content of the field of musical composition. It's about the mathematics of musical notes, the various tonal and atonal structures available, the dynamics of moving from one structure to another, different approaches to counterpoint, etc... Right?

I think you need to dissolve the question "Am I my hat?" as well as the "us vs. them" issue.

See points 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 29 and then play a game of taboo.

Yes, almost exactly, though perhaps the question to dissolve is "what is me/self/I". "Am I my hat?" is just one, purposely bad, example of trying to do that.

Now, say you created an exact copy of yourself, or me, or any other hat wearing person, only one of these two identical people was without headwear; would it still be the same person?

"making an exact copy" or "exact copy sans hat" seems to require already knowing the answer to "what is me/self/I". I.e. If the definition of "me" includes a specific set of atoms, then it's not even possible, on the other hand if "me" is just a collection of thought processes, then hats are not required. The precision needed is of course, dependent on the definition used, and ultimately the purpose. I'd say I'm most often thinking about it when the idea of making a copy comes up, as in, would that really be a copy.

Hope that helps :)

Indeed, playing Taboo, or rather, thinking about how I would play Taboo was surprisingly helpful.

I've recently tried thinking of myself as a pattern which likes reproducing imperfect copies of itself. This as a goal, (I would want more imperfect copies like me developed in the future) and not a bug of trying to produce exact copies of myself and failing at it.

Interesting, I never considered defining the me in terms of goals I'm attempting to accomplish, yet now that you mention it, it seems obvious. hindsight bias in action
And it also brings to mind similar categories;
who I know,
who I'm friends with,
social standing,
ownership (gah, define one horribly fuzzy concept with yet another) ...
HungryTurtle mentioned the roles one plays.

I tend to agree that anyone who denies the tendency to rationalize is either in denial or has a different definition for the word "rationalize". In fact I would argue that rationalization is the default for human beings, and that anything else requires either focused effort or serious mental re-programming (which is still probably only partially effective).

I absolutely relate. I totally would have said that a week ago. Evidence has smashed my belief's face quite solidly in the nose, though.

One possible way to try to elicit an understanding for any given individual's capacity for rationalization is to ask them about the last time they did something they knew was a bad idea (perhaps a comrpomise they felt uncomfortable making, or an indulgence they knew they were going to regret), and then to ask them what excuses went through their brains to justify it. If someone still denies ever having had such an experience then they are beyond redemption.

That's a good idea, and we did it several times. They sincerely do deny having such experience, but not in a knee-jerk way. It's more like a, "Huh. Hmm. Um... Well, I honestly can't think of something quite like that, but maybe X is similar?" And "X" in this case is something like, "I knew eating a cookie wasn't good for me, but I felt like it and so I did it anyway." It's like the need for justification is just missing, at least in their self-reports.