In response to Modal Chicken
Comment author: SilentCal 22 December 2015 08:00:46PM 2 points [-]

Per AlexMennen, I'd rename CarefulBot-as-formulated to something like BoldBot, and apply the name CarefulBot to "swerve unless it's proven the other bot swerves."

I think (I'm an amateur here, full disclosure; could be mistakes) we can capture some of the behavior you're interested in by considering bots with different levels of proof system. So e.g. CBn swerves unless it can prove, using PA+n, that the opponent swerves.

Then we see that for n > m, CBn(CBm) = D. Proof: Suppose CBn doesn't swerve. In PA+n, it is an axiom that provability in PA+m implies truth. Therefore PA+m cannot prove that CBn swerves. In a contest between CarefulBots, the stronger proof system wins.

Now consider BoldBot. We can see that BBn does not swerve against BBn, because by symmetry both agents prove the same thing; and if they both proved their opponent does not swerve, they would both swerve, and both have proven a falsehood.

Analyzing BBn vs. BBm is proving difficult, but I'm going to try a bit more.

In response to comment by SilentCal on Modal Chicken
Comment author: SilentCal 22 December 2015 09:03:50PM 0 points [-]

Actually, I notice that BBn vs. BBm is isomorphic to CBn vs. CBm! Just interchange 'swerve' and 'don't swerve' in the specification of one to convert it into the other. This implies that BBn swerves against BBm, and BBm does not swerve, if my proof about CBn vs. CBm is valid. I'm no longer so sure it is...

In response to Modal Chicken
Comment author: SilentCal 22 December 2015 08:00:46PM 2 points [-]

Per AlexMennen, I'd rename CarefulBot-as-formulated to something like BoldBot, and apply the name CarefulBot to "swerve unless it's proven the other bot swerves."

I think (I'm an amateur here, full disclosure; could be mistakes) we can capture some of the behavior you're interested in by considering bots with different levels of proof system. So e.g. CBn swerves unless it can prove, using PA+n, that the opponent swerves.

Then we see that for n > m, CBn(CBm) = D. Proof: Suppose CBn doesn't swerve. In PA+n, it is an axiom that provability in PA+m implies truth. Therefore PA+m cannot prove that CBn swerves. In a contest between CarefulBots, the stronger proof system wins.

Now consider BoldBot. We can see that BBn does not swerve against BBn, because by symmetry both agents prove the same thing; and if they both proved their opponent does not swerve, they would both swerve, and both have proven a falsehood.

Analyzing BBn vs. BBm is proving difficult, but I'm going to try a bit more.

Comment author: Lumifer 16 December 2015 01:26:01AM *  0 points [-]

Given that we observe the same thing no matter how we model the rock, I'm not sure what that proves.

Comment author: SilentCal 16 December 2015 07:28:05PM *  1 point [-]

The rock wins at chicken, for any model that accurately describes its behavior. One such model is as an agent with a game-appropriate utility function and zero intelligence. Therefore, an agent with a game-appropriate utility function and zero intelligence wins at chicken (in the case as constructed).

It proves that we can construct a game where the less intelligent player's lack of intelligence is an advantage. OP shows the same, but I find the rock example simpler and clearer--I especially find it illuminates the difficulties with trying to exploit the result.

Comment author: Lumifer 15 December 2015 10:29:50PM 0 points [-]

stupidity can be an advantage. A literal rock can defeat any intelligent opponent at chicken, if it's resting on the gas pedal

The advantage of a rock is not that it is stupid. The advantage of a rock is that it has nothing to lose -- it is indifferent between all outcomes.

Comment author: SilentCal 15 December 2015 11:11:28PM 4 points [-]

We can model a rock either as having no preferences, but we can also model it as having arbitrary preferences--including the appropriate payout matrix for a given game--and zero ability to optimize the world to achieve them. We observe the same thing either way.

Comment author: SilentCal 15 December 2015 09:58:54PM 3 points [-]

Yes, stupidity can be an advantage. A literal rock can defeat any intelligent opponent at chicken, if it's resting on the gas pedal (the swerve-to-avoid-collision version, rather than the brake-closer-to-the-cliff-edge version).

The catch is that you making yourself dumber to harvest this advantage has the same issues as other ways of trying to precommit.

Comment author: AlexMennen 12 December 2015 12:26:44AM *  14 points [-]

From their website, it looks like they'll be doing a lot of deep learning research and making the results freely available, which doesn't sound like it would accelerate Friendly AI relative to AI as a whole. I hope they've thought this through.

Edit: It continues to look like their strategy might be counterproductive. [Edited again in response to this.]

Comment author: SilentCal 14 December 2015 07:20:01PM 3 points [-]

Their statement accords very well with the Hansonian vision of AI progress.

Comment author: SilentCal 30 November 2015 07:34:12PM 2 points [-]

In the original context, the alleged desirable ambiguity was the ability to concisely omit information--that is, to say "people" instead of "men and women". Tabooing 'ambiguity', I'd frame this as a matter of having words for large sets rather than requiring speakers to construct them out of smaller sets, and say that this is a good thing if those sets are commonly referred to.

On a similar note, there can be intensions whose extensions are not agreed upon--"good" and "right" spring to mind. At first I thought it would be necessary to have words for these, but upon reflection I'm not sure. Could we replace them with more specific words like "right according to classical utilitarianism" or "right according the ethics of the person this word relates to"?

Comment author: Creutzer 21 November 2015 11:31:52AM *  4 points [-]

The term you will want to use in your Google search is "Bayesian cognitive science". It's a huge field. But the short answer is, yes, the people in that field do assume that the brain does something that can be modelled as keeping and updating a probability distribution according to Bayes' rule. Much of it is computational-level modelling, i.e. rather removed from questions of implementation in the brain. A quick Google search did, however, find some papers on how to implement Bayesian inference in neural networks - though not necessarily linked to the brain. I'm sure some people do the latter sort of thing as well, though.

Comment author: SilentCal 23 November 2015 11:18:38PM 1 point [-]

That said, being a statistical or philosophical Bayesian does not require one to believe this cognitive science hypothesis. If Bayesian cognitive science were soundly disproven tomorrow, http://www.yudkowsky.net/rational/bayes/ would still stand in its entirety.

Comment author: jsteinhardt 03 November 2015 05:07:33PM 3 points [-]

Thanks for writing this; a couple quick thoughts:

For example, it turns out that a learning algorithm tasked with some relatively simple tasks, such as determining whether or not English sentences are valid, will automatically build up an internal representation of the world which captures many of the regularities of the world – as a pure side effect of carrying out its task.

I think I've yet to see a paper that convincingly supports the claim that neural nets are learning natural representations of the world. For some papers that refute this claim, see e.g.

http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6199 http://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6572

I think the Degrees of Freedom thesis is a good statement of one of the potential problems. Since it's essentially making a claim about whether a certain very complex statistical problem is identifiable, I think it's very hard to know whether it's true or not without either some serious technical analysis or some serious empirical research --- which is a reason to do that research, because if the thesis is true then that has some worrisome implications about AI safety.

Comment author: SilentCal 09 November 2015 07:19:42PM 2 points [-]

http://rocknrollnerd.github.io/ml/2015/05/27/leopard-sofa.html is also relevant--tl;dr Google Photos classifies a leopard-print sofa as a leopard. I think this lends credence to the 'treacherous turn' insofar as it's an example of a classifier seeming to perform well and breaking down in edge cases.

Comment author: SilentCal 05 November 2015 11:34:23PM 3 points [-]

I was wondering about the state of the deterrence in place against nuclear weapons usage, having always assumed it to be massive, and I can't tell if there's actually any formal international treaty about the use of nuclear weapons in war.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_weapons_of_mass_destruction_treaties has arms-reduction, non-proliferation, and test ban treaties, but apparently nothing about who you actually nuke. I think Geneva says you can't target civilians with any weapon, but does anything prohibit nuking your enemy's army?

View more: Prev | Next