Comment author: randallsquared 02 September 2009 03:46:10PM 1 point [-]

Sorry for taking so long on this; I forgot to check back using a browser that can see red envelopes (I usually read lesswrong with elinks).

I think if nanotech does what its greatest enthusiasts expect, the minimum size of the industrial base will be in the 1-10 ton range. However, if we're assuming that level of nanotech, anyone who wants will be able to launch their own expedition, personally, without any particular help other than downloading GNU/Spaceship. If nanotech works as advertised, it turns construction into a programming project.

Also, if we limit ourselves to predictions made in the 50s with no assumptions of new science, I think we'll find that the predictions are reasonable, technically, and the main reason we don't have nuclear cars and basement reactors now involve politics. Molecular manufacturing probably cannot be contained this way, since it doesn't require a limited resource that's easy to detect from a distance.

Others have defined singleton, so I assume you're happy with that. :)

Comment author: Simon_Jester 09 September 2009 10:03:14AM 0 points [-]

Re: Nanotech That's exactly my point: if nanotech performs as advertised by its starriest-eyed advocates, then interstellar colonization can be done with small payloads and energy is cheap enough that they can be launched easily. That is a very big "if," and not one we can shrug off or assume in advance as the underlying principle of all our models.

What if nanotech turns out to have many of the same limits as its closest natural analogue, biological cells? Biotech is great for doing chemistry, but not so great for assembling industrial machinery (like large solar arrays) in a hostile environment.


As for the "nuclear cars and basement reactors" being out of the picture because of politics and not engineering, that's... really quite impressively not true, I think. Fission reactors create neutrons that slip through most materials like a ghost and can riddle you with radiation unless you stand far away or have excellent shielding. Radioactive thermal generators require synthetic or refined isotopes that are expensive by nature because they have to be [i]made[/i], atom by atom... and they're still quite radioactive if they're hot enough to be a useful power source.

The real problem isn't the atomic power source itself, it's the shielding you need to keep it from giving you cancer. There's no easy way to miniaturize that, because neutron capture cross-sections play no favorites and can't be tinkered with.

This stuff is not a toy, and there are very good reasons of engineering why it never made the leap from industrial equipment to household use, except in the smallest and most trivial scales (such as americium in smoke detectors). It's not just about politics.

Comment author: Gavin 30 August 2009 09:53:53PM *  1 point [-]

The ultimate goal of physics is to break things down until we discover the simplest, most basic rules that govern the universe.

The goals of biology do not lead down what you call the "indirect route." As you state, Biology abstracts away the low-level physics and tries to understand the extremely complicated interactions that take place at a higher level.

Biology attempts to classify and understand all of the species, their systems, their subsystems, their biochemistry, and their interspecies and environmental interactions. The possible sum total of biological knowledge is an essentially limitless dataset, what I might call the "Almanac of Life."

I'm not sure quite where you think we disagree. I don't see anything in our two posts that's contradictory--unless you find the use of the word "Almanac" disparaging to biologists? I hope it's clear that it wasn't a literal use -- biology clearly isn't a yearly book of tabular data, so perhaps the simile is inapt.

Comment author: Simon_Jester 31 August 2009 11:15:05PM 1 point [-]

The way you put it does seem to disparage biologists, yes. The biologists are doing work that is qualitatively different from what physicists do, and that produces results the physicists never will (without the aforementioned thousand tons of computronium, at least). In a very real sense, biologists are exploring an entirely different ideaspace from the one the physicists live in. No amount of investigation into physics in isolation would have given us the theory of evolution, for instance.

And weirdly, I'm not a biologist; I'm an apprentice physicist. I still recognize that they're doing something I'm not, rather than something that I might get around to by just doing enough physics to make their results obvious.

Comment author: Gavin 30 August 2009 08:12:44AM 0 points [-]

Biology is a special case of physics. Physicists may at some point arrive at a Grand Unified Theory of Everything that theoretically implies all of biology.

Biology is the classification and understanding of the complicated results of physics, so it is in many ways basically an almanac.

Comment author: Simon_Jester 30 August 2009 11:02:31AM 0 points [-]

This is profoundly misleading. Physicists already have a good handle on how the things biological systems are made of work, but it's a moot point because trying to explain the details of how living things operate in terms of subatomic particles is a waste of time. Unless you've got a thousand tons of computronium tucked away in your back pocket, you're never going to be able to produce useful results in biology purely by using the results of physics.

Therefore, the actual study of biology is largely separate from physics, except for the very indirect route of quantum physics => molecular chemistry => biochemistry => biology. Most of the research in the field has little to do with those paths, and each step in the indirect chain is another level of abstraction that allows you to ignore more of the details of how the physics itself works.

Comment author: Simon_Jester 29 August 2009 10:23:11AM *  1 point [-]

I wouldn't have assigned much of a prior probability to either of those common sociobiological beliefs, myself. It would hardly surprise me if they were both complete nonsense.

So what do you mean when you say that these beliefs are "standard" or "widely held?" Obviously, I am not a representative sample of the population, so I may have no opinion on a widely held belief. But I'm not aware of strong evidence that these beliefs are widely held, or at any rate are more widely held than the evidence would warrant.

Or, with tongue firmly in cheek, I claim that I'm presenting counterevidence for the common belief that [insert proposition here] is a common belief...

Comment author: taw 28 August 2009 02:34:01PM 4 points [-]

I must disagree with premise that biology is not making progress while physics is. As far as I can tell biology is making progress many orders of magnitude larger and more practically significant than physics at the moment.

And it requires this messy complex paradigm of accumulating plenty of data and mining it for complicated regularities - even the closest things biology has to "physical laws" like the Central Dogma or how DNA sequences translate to protein sequences, each have enough exceptions and footnotes to fill a small book.

The world isn't simple. Simple models are usually very wrong. Exceptions to this pattern like basic physics are extremely unusual, and shouldn't be taken as a paradigm for all science.

Comment author: Simon_Jester 29 August 2009 10:16:59AM 2 points [-]

The catch is that complex models are also usually very wrong. Most possible models of reality are wrong, because there are an infinite legion of models and only one reality. And if you try too hard to create a perfectly nuanced and detailed model, because you fear your bias in favor of simple mathematical models, there's a risk. You can fall prey to the opposing bias: the temptation to add an epicycle to your model instead of rethinking your premises. As one of the wiser teachers of one of my wiser teachers said, you can always come up with a function that fits 100 data points perfectly... if you use a 99th-order polynomial.

Naturally, this does not mean that the data are accurately described by a 99th-order polynomial, or that the polynomial has any predictive power worth giving a second glance. Tacking on more complexity and free parameters doesn't guarantee a good theory any more than abstracting them out does.

Comment author: thomblake 26 August 2009 04:59:54PM 1 point [-]

Excellent points, but I think:

The fact that Montezuma's Aztecs made no use of the wheelbarrow, rickshaw, or hand cart is hardly more remarkable than the fact that Charlemagne's Franks didn't, either.

and:

it's quite mysterious that those civilisations invented the wheel, and then didn't bother to use it.

are not inconsistent, and are both true.

Comment author: Simon_Jester 28 August 2009 08:36:37AM 1 point [-]

From a social psych standpoint, it's very interesting: why do people come up with something, then fail to use it in ways that we would consider obvious and beneficial?

I think a lot of it is hidden infrastructure we don't see, both mental and physical. People need tools to build things, and tools to come up with new ideas: the rules of logic and mathematics may describe the universe, but they are themselves mental tools. Go back to Hellenic civilization and you find a lot of the raw materials for the Industrial Revolution, what was missing? There are a lot of answers to that question: "cheap slaves messing up the economy," "no precision machining capability," "no mass consumption of timber, coal, and iron in quantities that force the adoption of industrial methods," and so on. They all boil down to "something subtle was missing, so that intelligent people didn't come up with the trick."

I speculate that one of the most important missing pieces was the habit of looking at everything as a source of potential new tricks for changing the world.

Comment author: TBA 25 August 2009 01:52:35PM 3 points [-]

A wheelbarrow is a very useful thing. You don't need an animal to pull a cart in order for it to be worthwhile. I actually think it's quite mysterious that those civilisations invented the wheel, and then didn't bother to use it.

Comment author: Simon_Jester 26 August 2009 09:54:01AM 3 points [-]

I know of no confirmed historical evidence of wheelbarrows being used until around the time of the Peloponnesian War in Greece, and as I understand it they subsequently vanished in the Greco-Roman world for roughly 1600 years until being reintroduced in the Middle Ages. Likewise, wheelbarrows are not evident in Chinese history until the first or second century AD.

So wheelbarrows are an application of wheels, but they're a much later application of the technology, one that did not arise historically for two to four millennia after the invention of the two or four-wheeled animal-drawn cart.

If we use a broader definition of wheelbarrow as "hand cart," we have older evidence stretching back at least to the ancient Indus Valley some time in the second or third millennium BC.

But if we stick only to inventions we have historical evidence of, there's still a gap of thousands of years between the invention of the wheel and the invention of the hand cart throughout Eurasia. The fact that Montezuma's Aztecs made no use of the wheelbarrow, rickshaw, or hand cart is hardly more remarkable than the fact that Charlemagne's Franks didn't, either.

Comment author: Christian_Szegedy 23 August 2009 09:05:37PM *  0 points [-]

Hmmm, it seems that most of your arguments are in plain probability-theoretical terms: what is the expected utility assuming certain probabilities of certain outcomes. During the arguments you compute expected values.

The whole point of my example was that assuming a many world view of the universe (i.e. multiverse), using the above decision procedures is questionable at best in some situations.

In classical probability theoristic view, you won't experience your payoff at all if you don't win. In a MWT framework, you will experience it for sure. (Of course the rest of the world sees a high chance of your loosing, but why should that bother you?)

I definitely would not gamble my life on 1:1000000 chances, but if Omega would convince me that MWI is definitely correct and the game is set up in a way that I will experience my payoff for sure in some branches of the multiverse, then it would be quite different from a simple gamble.

I think it is a quite an interesting case where human intuition and MWI clashes, simply because it contradicts our everyday beliefs on our physical reality. I don't say that the above would be an easy decision for me, but I don't think you can just compute expected value to make the choice. The choice is really more about subjective values: what is more important to you: your subjective experience or saturating the Multiverse branches with your copies.

"Finally, your additional motivation raises a question in its own right: why haven't we encountered an Omega Civilization yet?"

That one is easy: The assumption I purposefully made that going omega is a "high risk" (a misleading word, but maybe the closest) process meaning that even if some civilizations went omega, the outsiders (i.e. us) will see them simply wiped out in an overwhelming number of Everett-branches, i.e. with very high probability for us. Therefore we have to wait a huge number of civilizations going omega before we experience them having attained Omega status. Still, if we wait too long, (since the probability of experiencing it is nonzero) some of them will inevitably manage in our Everett-subtree and we will see that civ as a winner.

Comment author: Simon_Jester 26 August 2009 09:42:57AM 0 points [-]

To make this calculation in a MWI multiverse, you still have to place a zero (or extremely small negative) value on all the branches where you die and take most or all of your species with you. You don't experience them, so they don't matter, right? That's a specialized form of a general question which amounts to "does the universe go away when I'm not looking at it?"

If one can make rational decisions about a universe that doesn't contain oneself in it (and life insurance policies, high-level decorations for valor, and the like suggest this is possible), then outcomes we aren't aware of have to have some nonzero significance, for better or for worse.


As for "question in its own right," I think you misunderstood what I was getting at. If advanced civilizations are probable and all or nearly all of them try to go Omega, and they've all (in our experience, on this worldline) failed, it suggests that the probability must be extremely low, or that the power benefits to be had from going Omega are low enough that we cannot detect them over galaxy-scale distances.

In the first case, the odds of dissenters not drinking the "Omegoid" Kool-Aid increase: the number of people who will accept a multiverse that kills them in 9 branches and makes them gods in the 10th is probably somewhat larger than the number who will accept one that kills them in 999999999 branches and makes them gods in the 10^9th. So you'd expect dissenter cultures to survive the general self-destruction of the civilization and carry on with their existence by mundane means (or trying to find a way to improve the reliability of the Omega process)

In the second case (Omega civilizations are not detectable at galactic-scale distances), I would be wary of claiming that the benefits of going Omega are obvious. In which case, again, you'll get more dissenters.

Comment author: randallsquared 24 August 2009 07:01:31PM 0 points [-]

For a machine-phase civilization, the only one of these that seems plausible is 3c, but I can't think of any reason why no one in a given civilization would want to leave, and assuming growth of any kind, resource pressure alone will eventually drive expansion. If the need for civilization is so psychologically strong, copies can be shipped and revived only after specialized systems have built enough infrastructure to support them.

It seems far more likely to me, given the emergence of multiple civilizations in a galaxy, that some technical advance inevitably destroys them. Nanomedicine malfunction or singleton seem like the best bets to me just now, which would suggest that the best defenses are spreading out and technical systems' heterogeneity.

Comment author: Simon_Jester 26 August 2009 09:25:50AM 0 points [-]

A machine-phase civilization might still find (3a) or (3b) an issue depending on whether nanotech pans out. We think it will, but we don't really know, and a lot of technologies turn out to be profoundly less capable than the optimists expect them to be in their infancy. Science fiction authors in the '40s and '50s were predicting that atomic power sources would be strongly miniaturized (amusingly, more so than computing devices); that never happened and it looks like the minimum size for a reasonably safe nuclear reactor really is a large piece of industrial machinery.

If nanotech does what its greatest enthusiasts expect, then the minimum size of industrial base you need to create a new technological civilization in a completely undeveloped solar system is low (I don't know, probably in the 10-1000 ton range), in which case the payload for your starship is low enough that you might be able to convince people to help you build and launch it. Extremely capable nanotech also helps on the launch end by making the task of organizing the industrial resources to build the ship easier.

But if nanotech doesn't operate at that level, if you actually need to carry machine tools and stockpiles of exotic materials unlikely to be found in asteroid belts and so on... things could be expensive enough that at any point in a civilization's history it can think of something more interesting to do with the resources required to build an interstellar colony ship. Again, if the construction cost of the ship is an order of magnitude greater than the gross planetary product, it won't get built, especially if very few people actually want to ride it.

Also, could you define "singleton" for me, please?

Comment author: Christian_Szegedy 22 August 2009 03:51:59AM *  0 points [-]

(2)Possible, but I can still imagine large civilizations of people whose utility function is weighted such that "99.9999% death plus 0.0001% superman" is inferior to "continued mortal existence."

You have to keep in mind that subjective experience will be 100% superman. The whole idea is that the MWI is true and completely convincingly demonstrated by other means as well. It is like if someone would tell you: you enter this room and all you will experience is that you leave the room with one billion dollars. I think it is a seducing prospect.

Yet another analogue: Assume that you have the choice between the following two scenarios:

1) You get replicated million times and all the copies will lead an existence in hopeless poverty

2) You continue your current existence as a single copy but in luxury

The absolute reference frame may be different but the relative difference between the two outcomes is very similar to those of the above alternative.

Possible additional motivation could be given by knowing that if you don't do that and wait a very very long time, the cumulative risk that you experience some other civilization going superman and obliterating you will raise above a certain threshold. For single civilizations the chance of experiencing it would be negligible but for a universe filled with aspiring civilizations, the chance of experiencing at least one of them going omega could become a significant risk after a while.

Comment author: Simon_Jester 23 August 2009 05:49:02AM 0 points [-]

Your aliens are assigning zero weight to their own death, as opposed to a negative weight. While this may be logical, I can certainly imagine a broadly rational intelligent species that doesn't do it.

Consider the problems with doing so. Suppose that Omega offers to give a friend of yours a wonderful life if you let him zap you out of existence. A wonderful life for a friend of yours clearly has a positive weight, but I'd expect you to say "no," because you are assigning a negative weight to death. If you assign a zero weight to an outcome involving your own death, you'd go for it, wouldn't you?

I think a more reasonable weighting vector would say "cessation of existence has a negative value, even if I have no subjective experience of it." It might still be worth it if the probability ratio of "superman to dead" is good enough, but I don't think every rational being would count all the universes without them in it as having zero value.

Moreover, many rational beings might choose to instead work on the procedure that will make them into supermen, hoping to reduce the probability of an extinction event. After all, if becoming a superman with probability 0.0001% is good, how much better to become one with probability 0.1%, or 10%, or even (oh unattainable of unattainables) 1!

Finally, your additional motivation raises a question in its own right: why haven't we encountered an Omega Civilization yet? If intelligence is common enough that an explanation for our not being able to find it is required, it is highly unlikely that any Omega Civilizations exist in our galaxy. For being an Omega Civilization to be tempting enough to justify the risks we're talking about, I'd say that it would have to raise your civilization to the point of being a significant powerhouse on an interstellar or galactic scale. In which case it should be far easier for mundane civilizations to detect evidence of an Omega Civilization than to detect ordinary civilizations that lack the resources to do things like juggle Dyson spheres and warp the fabric of reality to their whims.

The only explanation of this is that the probability of some civilization within range of us (either in range to reach us, or to be detected by us) having gone Omega in the history of the universe is low. But if that's true, then the odds are also low enough that I'd expect to see more dissenters from advanced civilizations trying to ascend, who then proceed to try and do things the old-fashioned way.

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