In canon, Bellatrix Lestrange is married to Rodolphus Lestrange and does not have a child. In MoR, Bellatrix Black is unmarried, but has a child- Lesath Lestrange, the acknowledged bastard of Rastaban Lestrange. (In canon Rodolphus' brother's name was Rabastan, but I'm assuming that's a typo.) Lesath is currently a fifth year, so he was born in either '75 or '76. Bellatrix was actively leading attacks as a Death Eater in '71. Presumably a pregnancy would require some amount of maternity leave from the whole 'going on raids, fighting Aurors' thing.

So. Why would Voldemort allow / order one of his most powerful servants to have a child?

As a trilingual, I would still advise against doing learning a newer language for the sole sake of gaining rationality skills. There are much better and cost-efficient ways to improve rationality besides learning a newer language, which would likely take years, or depending on the language, decades, to fully master.

To answer your question, strangely enough, now that this topic has been brought up, I do have a slight change in personality whenever I switch to a different language conversationally, although I might have to experiment further if it affects whether I am more or less rational.

HPMOR is making me rethink human nature -- because of how people react to it. This is a story full of cunning disguises, and readers seem reluctant to see past those disguises. RL rkcerffrq chmmyrzrag ng ubj many readers took forever to decide Quirrell = Voldemort; I think I now know why.

I suggest that humans are instinctive "observation consequentialists." That is, we think someone is competent and good if the observed results of their actions are benign. We weigh what we observe much more strongly than what we merely deduce. If we personally see their actions work out well, we'll put aside a great deal of indirect evidence for their incompetence or vileness.

In HPMOR, Quirrell's directly observed actions are mostly associated with Harry getting to be more of what he thinks he wants. Even rescuing Bellatrix amounts to Harry getting to save a broken lovelorn creature in terms of what we directly observe. To believe Quirrell evil we have to bring in all kinds of expected consequences to weigh against those immediate positive observations.

Does the resistance to saying Quirrell=Voldemort maybe reflect a broader unwillingness to overlook what we directly witness in favor of abstract deduction? If it does, this implies some interesting predictions about human behavior:

• if you can be kind and moderate in your personal behavior, you can get away with incredible amounts of institutionally-mediated violence and extremism, especially to anyone who feels like they "know" you. Hypothesis: the most dangerous people are those who can give us the illusion of "knowing" them while they command an institution whose internal operations we don't see.

• More generally, an institution "wired" to do us harm can get away with it much longer than an individual doing it personally and directly. Faceless corporate evil, faceless societal evil, and faceless government evil are much more deadly than our emotional impulses realize. Hypothesis: we are biased to confuse the institutions with our attitude toward their leaders, or to refuse to act against the institutions because of the outward manners of their leaders.

• if this 'observation consequentialism' bias is heuristic, then maybe it evolved as an anti-gossip function. In that case we should expect that people are too quick to believe outrageous things about people they can't observe. Hypothesis: the further away someone is from your understanding, the less likely you are to think of them as mostly a typical human being, and the quicker you are to believe them a saint, a monster, or something similarly exciting.

• And, alas for EY, hypothesis: telling a story about cunning disguises, in which the protagonist of the story does not see through those disguises, is almost always going to lead to lots of readers also not seeing through those disguises.

My personal experience is that I've attached different parts of my personality to my different languages. I'm currently fluent in three and passable in two others. I notice that the part of my personality I attach to a given language depends on a variety of factors, but I can have a marked impact on it by focusing on my associations while learning the language. This is particularly true when I take the language from the classroom to an an experience of immersion.

In this regard I've also noticed that languages of the same root (for me: Danish, English and German) have a tendency to invoke related frames of minds whereas new language families (French, Arabic and Polish) allow me greater freedom in what kind of thoughts are likely to occupy my mind when I use them and hence what kind of person I am in this tongue. It's worth noting that the Polish me is closer to the French me than both the Arabic and Danish parts. I suspect a likeliness in grammar and syntax to have played a role in this.

Now the funny thing is that I didn't really notice this phenomena myself. While living in France I was visited by my parents. Both my dad (who was fluent in French) and my mum (who isn't and wasn't) noticed that everything from my tone of voice, to my subject matter to the way I gestured and moved changed when I changed between languages. American friends, independently, later made remarks in the same direction.

I must admit though that I haven't tried it regarding decision making. It's definitely worth a try and as it is, I'd predict that thinking in French will help me visualise a given situation, Danish would be preferred for extracting the emotional response, English for both estimating it's likeliness of happening as well as turning the given situation into a joke whereas my Polish and Arabic are not quite yet at the same level of abstraction. I'm prone to being extremely flirtatious in Polish and my Arabic has a tendency to call on my altruistic and carefree sides.

The outlines of the performance theory seem good, and it feels introspectively correct as well. But if happiness is a high-status marker, why is it unattractive to women?

I took a look at the paper, and in particular the sample image they include:

My first impression was a lot more attraction to the female 'pride' picture than any of the other female images - while pride in females was found to be highly unattractive. Now I want to determine whether my preferences differ from some norm or whether this picture is an unusual case.

I do allow that much of my preference may have been determined simply due to the combination of hideously unflattering t-shirts and arms being up in the air compensating for that and actually making breasts evident. If giving all the people ghostly shirts was supposed to be some clever attempt to isolate the influence of clothing then it seems somewhat shortsighted. (Mind you if males were consistently not attracted to the 'pride' female despite it being the only one with apparent breasts then that is just all the more significant!)

Azkaban is commentary on Muggle prisons. I really hope people got that.

I think it has to be cold-blooded murder, not a utilitarian sacrifice.

Now we can make the Death Eaters bind trivial Unbreakable Vows over and over again until they lose all of their magic. So now Azkaban is unnecessary and the initial problem with Unbreakable Vows allowing for easy solutions to the prison vs. execution dilemma resurfaces again.

Thanks, I think part of my surprise was from a different understanding of "he'll feel forced to kill Quirrel", to me that means "he'll take the decision of trying to kill Quirrel, using whatever indirect plan, surprise, henchmen, ... in the process", not just a one-to-one fight in which Harry kills Quirrel (like the way he kills Voldemort in the cannon). I agree the probability of such one-to-one fight is quite low.

So, Eliezer isn't human? Or am I missing something?