$1000. (With an additional $1000 because of private, non-employer matching.)
Thanks! And thanks again for your huge donation in the summer; I was not expecting more.
$250 from me, and another $250 from my employer, though I am not sure exactly when it will arrive.
MIRI's 2015 Winter Fundraiser!
MIRI's Winter Fundraising Drive has begun! Our current progress, updated live:
Like our last fundraiser, this will be a non-matching fundraiser with multiple funding targets our donors can choose between to help shape MIRI’s trajectory. The drive will run until December 31st, and will help support MIRI's research efforts aimed at ensuring that smarter-than-human AI systems have a positive impact.
Positive reinforcement for being so open about your spending.
$89 donated.
My first donation to you, and it shall not be my last.
Sorry, I meant to imply that my faith in UDT has been dropping a bit too, due to lack of progress on the question of whether the UDT-equivalent of the Bayesian prior just represents subjective values or should be based on something objective like whether some universes has more existence than others (i.e., the "reality fluid" view), and also lack of progress on creating a normative ideal for such a "prior". (There seems to have been essentially no progress on these questions since "What Are Probabilities, Anyway?" was written about six years ago.)
I mostly agree here, though I'm probably less perturbed by the six year time gap. It seems to me like most of the effort in this space has been going towards figuring out how to handle logical uncertainty and logical counterfactuals (with some reason to believe that answers will bear on the question of how to generate priors), with comparatively little work going into things like naturalized induction that attack the problem of priors more directly.
Can you say any more about alternatives you've been considering? I can easily imagine a case where we look back and say "actually the entire problem was about generating a prior-like-thingy" but I have a harder time visualizing different tacts altogether (that don't eventually have some step that reads "then treat observations like Bayesian evidence").
This comment isn't directly related to the OP, but lately my faith in Bayesian probability theory as an ideal for reasoning (under logical omniscience) has been dropping a bit, due to lack of progress on the problems of understanding what one's ideal ultimate prior represents and how it ought to be constructed or derived. It seems like one way that Bayesian probability theory could ultimately fail to be a suitable ideal for reasoning is if those problems turn out to be unsolvable.
(See http://lesswrong.com/lw/1iy/what_are_probabilities_anyway/ and http://lesswrong.com/lw/mln/aixi_can_be_arbitrarily_bad/ for more details about the kind of problems I'm talking about.)
Yeah, I also have nontrivial odds on "something UDTish is more fundamental than Bayesian inference" / "there are no probabilities only values" these days :-)

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There are an awful lot of ideas in this comment thread but many ideas have been proposed in the past. Without leadership, nothing's going to happen, and as I understand it the leaders of lw have left. Nate's been contacted? Ok, does he have decision making power? Is he an appropriate leader to have it? Will he use it? Well, I hope so, but the first step is a deliberate move to take ownership and end the headlessness
I have the requisite decision-making power. I hereby delegate Vaniver to come up with a plan of action, and will use what power I have to see that that plan gets executed, so long as the plan seems unlikely to do more harm than good (but regardless of whether I think it will work). Vaniver and the community will need to provide the personpower and the funding, of course.