What would be an adequate weapon, then? Pavlovian training to follow the rationality to the best of one's abilities?

Hi everyone.

I'm about to start my second year of college in Utah. My intent is to major in math and/or computer science, although more generally I'm interested in many of the subjects that LessWrongers seem to gravitate towards (philosophy, physics, psychology, economics, etc.)

I first noticed something that Eliezer Yudkowsky posted on Facebook several months ago, and have since been quietly exploring the rationality-sphere and surrounding digital territories (although I'm no longer on FB). Joining LessWrong seemed like the obvious next step given the time I had spent on adjacent sites. I'm here solely out of curiosity and philosophical interest.

Thanks to Sarunas and predecessors for the welcome page, and the LW community more generally. I look forward to being a part of it.

Only in mathematics is it possible to demonstrate something beyond all doubt. When held to that standard, we find ourselves quickly overwhelmed.

-- Max Shron, Thinking with Data, O'Reilly 2014

The principle, stated simply in my bastardized version, is to believe no thing with probability 1.

Meeehhhh. Believe nothing empirical with probability 1.0. Believe formal and analytical proofs with probability 1.0.

Physicists are not very precise about it, may I suggest looking into "potential outcomes" (the language some statisticians use to talk about counterfactuals):

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubin_causal_model

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterfactual_definiteness

Potential outcomes let you think about a model that contains a random variable for what happens to Fred if we give Fred aspirin, and a random variable for what happens to Fred if we give Fred placebo. Even though in reality we only gave Fred aspirin. This is "counterfactual definiteness" in statistics.

This paper uses potential outcomes to talk about outcomes of physics experiments (so there is an exact isomorphism between counterfactuals in physics and potential outcomes):

http://arxiv.org/pdf/1207.4913.pdf

Man on the street needs to learn what counterfactual definiteness is.

Has there been discussion of Jack Good's principle of nondogmatism? (see Good Thinking, page 30).

The principle, stated simply in my bastardized version, is to believe no thing with probability 1. It seems to underlie Good's type 2 rationality (to maximize expected utility, within reason).

This is (almost) in accord with Lindley's concept of Cromwell's rule (see Lindley's Understanding Uncertainty or https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cromwell%27s_rule). And seems to be closely related to Jaynes' mind projection fallacy.

"Irrationality is intellectual violence against which the pacifism of rationality may or may not be an adequate weapon."

• Jack Good, Good Thinking, page 25.