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A better analogy in science would be a maze with 10^10 possible branches. Without considering which branch to take, no one is going to find the finish.
In response to
Do biases matter?
Sure. In reality it is still going to require some narrowing down. But once you have reduced it to a few cases the best thing might be to just guess.
Do biases matter?
It occurred to me that our biases might not matter very much lots of the time. They matter if you want to maximize your chances of finding the truth, but not if you are interested in maximizing the chances the chances of someone finding the truth.
Take science as an example, scientists aren't always free from biases when it comes to thinking about their own theories. They look for ways to confirm what they believe, not discomfirm it. But does that matter? As long as their rivals are looking for ways to falsify those theories then overall the system should work well.
In fact it might work better:
Imagine that there is a prize (a really big prize) at the end of a maze. Several of you are sent into the maze and the first person to find the prize gets to keep it. You all head down the corridor and come to three doors, there are some clues written on the wall, but before you can even begin to read them, someone dashes through door 1. Someone else follows then another through door 2 and a few take door 3. What do you do? You could be methodical and try to solve the clues. This would maximize your chance of finding the right path. However, it will not maximize your chances of being the first one to find the prize. For this, you need to pick a door and run.
Likewise, in science, if you want to get the prize (nobel prize, or a good job, or fame, or a best-selling book), then you might be better off coming up with a new theory and running with it (anecdotally, this seems to be what a lot of successful scientists have done). Having lots of people making leaps in different directions might also make science progress faster overall.
What does all this mean for biases? Are they best thought of on an individual level or group level? Is it really a bias if it is the best thing to do? Can you think of other examples where individual biases might produce better results for the group?
In response to
Settled questions in philosophy
I think it is doubtful that any of the examples that you give have been solved/settled in any meaningful sense (particularly the last one).
If they were settled then those who disagree would have to be one of the following: * Unknowledgeable about the subject matter * Confused about the subject matter * Lying * irrational
However, there seem to be plenty of people who disagree with you who don't fall into the above categories.
From what you say it just sounds like you are saying that these are the issues that you are convinced about and which you cannot imagine being persuaded otherwise about. But on that kind of definition what is settled/solved will be person relative.
Are you able to give some kind of understanding to solved/settled where these issues come out as settled/solved and is also not person relative?
In response to
Rational = true?
I think the rational is the closest to true you can possibly [edit: justifiably] get from where you are.
Notice that in your example you introduce a third person perspective which is aware of the misprint. From Rob's perspective the rational is to believe the newspaper. If he knew of the misprint as the third-person perspective seems to, the rational would be not to believe the news paper.
However, to reach a position where you can say "The rational belief is X, but the true belief is Y", it means you are making this distinction from the same perspective, which you shouldn't be able to do if you're defining 'rational' as most of us do.
"I think the rational is the closest to true you can possibly get from where you are."
The truth is the closest you can get to the truth. Suppose Rob reads the newspaper but then believes that City won because their his team and it would make him happy if they won. His belief would be closer to the truth, but it would not be rational.
Rational = true?
For example, if you say, "The rational belief is X, but the true belief is Y" then you are probably using the word "rational" in a way that means something other than what most of us have in mind
This was copied from here.
Surely it is obvious that there are lots of examples when one might say this. Consider this:
Rob looks in the newspaper to check the football scores. The newspaper says that United won 3-2, but it is a misprint because City actually won 3-2. In this case, the rational belief is that United won, but the true belief is that City won.
Am I missing something?
In response to
Philosophers and seeking answers
I am wary of criticizing the discipline of philosophy simply on the grounds that not everyone in it agrees with me.
Wrong meta-level. It's not disagreement with you, it's a long list of specific reasons that move you to a long list of specific conclusions that are different from those of many other philosophers.
That depends what the conclusion is supposed to be. If it is just that philosophers X, Y and Z are wrong, then you are right - he can simply bring forward arguments a, b and c to show this.
However, his claim is stronger than that. He is claiming that these philosophers (or at least many of them) are not in the truth business. His philosophical arguments may show that the other philosophers are wrong, but it won't follow that they are not sincere in trying to find answers and solve problems. For that he needs something like: they can't really be trying to find the truth, otherwise they would agree with me (at least on these "simple" matters).
In response to
Philosophers and seeking answers
I'm not sure what you're worried about. Just as you can't force people to move on from a problem that you think has been solved, so too they can't force you to wait while they work it out.
In the early modern period various thinkers were asking questions that would ultimately lead to the foundations of modern science (I'm thinking of Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, John Locke and others). Philosophers have continued worrying about a lot of these issues (problem of induction, demarcation) while the scientists have moved on and made many fruitful discoveries. You may think that this shows that the philosophers have wasted their time, but so what? It hasn't slowed science down. It has also proved to be important. When new discoveries (particularly in physics) question the underlying assumptions, or where the method seems inadequate for solving the problem, then it turns out to be rather useful that there are some philosophers still thinking about these things.
So, you are free to carry on with your assumptions, and ignore others who think the matter is not solved, but further down the line you might be grateful that others were a bit more hesitant.
I have two concerns about the practical implementation of this sort of thing:
- It seems like there are cases where if a rule is being used then people could abuse it. For example, in job applications or admissions to medical schools. A better understanding of how the rule relates to what it predicts would be needed.
If X+Y predicts Z does that mean enhancing X and Y will up the probability of Z? Not necessarily, consider the example of happy marriages. Will having more sex make your relationship happier? Or does the rule work because happy couples tend to have more sex?
- It is not true in every case that we equally value all true beliefs, and equally value all false beliefs. Certain rules might work better if we take into consideration a person's race, sex, religion and nationality. But most people find this sort of thing unpalatable because it can lead to the systematic persecution of sub groups, even if it results in more true, and fewer false, beliefs overall. It also might be the case that some of these rules discriminate against groups of people in more subtle ways that won't be immediately obvious.
Of course neither of these problems mean that there won't be perfectly good cases where these rules would improve decision making a lot.
In response to
Note on Terminology: "Rationality", not "Rationalism"
Does the same reasoning apply to all -isms? Empircism, materialism, internalism and externalism to name a few.
ism has a few different uses it can indicate a group of principles (empiricism), or a political movement (socialism), or a type of discrimination (sexism).
Your worry seems to be that "rationalism" looks like a political movement, but that sort of thing is more likely to be determined by how the people who use the term of themselves act. And that problem does not go away by refusing to use certain words. If people who call themselves rationalist try to spread their ideas through exerting political force rather than calm argumentation then it is going to look like a political movement, whether or not a ism is being used.
If you're worried about this then you need to deal with the underlying problems, not just worry about words (after all, I'm not aware that empiricists have this concern).
As an aside, I think the main reason for not using it is that it already taken: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/
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Yes, but some of this might be in the wrong direction. We have plenty of examples where scientists have gone with incorrect theories...
Of course. Most of it will be in the wrong direction, that's the point. It might not be best for you, but maybe it will be the best thing for the group.