Possibly related:

The other day it was raining heavily. I chose to take an umbrella rather than shaking my fist at the sky. Shaking your fist at the sky seems pretty stupid, but people do analogous things all the time.

Complaining to your ingroup about your outgroup isn't going to change your outgroup. Complaining that you are misunderstood isn't going to make you understood. Changing the way you communicate might. You are not in control of how people interpret you, but you are in control of what you say.

It might be unfortunate that people have a hair-trigger tendency to interpret others as saying something dastardly, but, like the rain, it is too large and diffuse a phenomenon to actually do anything about.

Thinking in terms of virtue (or blame), and thinking in terms of fixing things , are very different. It's very tempting to sit down with your ingroup, and agree with them about the deplorability of the outgroup, who aren't even party to the conversation...as if that was achieving something. You can tell it is an attractor, because rational people are susceptible to it, too

That observation runs headlong into the problem, rather than solving it.

Well, we don't know if they work magically, because we don't know that they work at all. They are just unavoidable.

It's not that philosophers weirdly and unreasonably prefer intuition to empirical facts and mathematical/logical reasoning, it is that they have reasoned that they can't do without them: that (the whole history of) empiricism and maths as foundations themselves rest on no further foundation except their intuitive appeal. That is the essence of the Inconvenient Ineradicability of Intuition. An unfounded foundation is what philosophers mean by "intuition". Philosophers talk about intution a lot because that is where arguments and trains of thought ground out...it is away of cutting to the chase. Most arguers and arguments are able to work out the consequences of basic intutitions correctly, so disagrements are likely to arise form differencs in basic intuitions themselves.

Philosophers therefore appeal to intuitions because they can't see how to avoid them...whatever a line of thought grounds out in, is definitiionally an intuition. It is not a case of using inutioins when there are better alternatives, epistemologically speaking. And the critics of their use of intuitions tend to be people who haven't seen the problem of unfounded foundations because they have never thought deeply enough, not people who have solved the problem of finding sub-foundations for your foundational assumptions.

Scientists are typically taught that the basic principles maths, logic and empiricism are their foundations, and take that uncritically, without digging deeper. Empircism is presented as a black bx that produces the goods...somehow. Their subculture encourages use of basic principles to move forward, not a turn backwards to critically relflect on the validity of basic principles. That does not mean the foundational principles are not "there". Considering the foundational principles of science is a major part of philosophy of science, and philosophy of science is a philosophy-like enterprise, not a science-like enterprise, in the sense it consists of problems that have been open for a long time, and which do not have straightforward empirical solutions.

Does the use of empiricism shortcut the need for intuitions, in the sense of unfounded foundations?

For one thing, epistemology in general needs foundational assumptions as much as anything else. Which is to say that epistemogy needs epistemology as much as anything else. -- to judge the validity of one system of epistemology, you need another one. There is no way of judging an epistemology starting from zero, from a complete blank. Since epistemology is inescapable, and since every epistemology has its basic assumptions, there are basic assumptions involved in empiricism.

Empiricism specifically has the problem of needing an ontological foundation. Philosophy illustrates this point with sceptical scenarios about how you are being systematically deceived by an evil genie. Scientific thinkers have closely parallel scenarios in which humans cannot be sure whether you are not in the Matrix or some other virtual reality. Either way, these hypotheses illustrate the point that the empiricists are running on an assumption that if you can see something, it is there.

Many-worlds-flavored QM, on the other hand, is the conjunction of 1 and 2, plus the negation of 5

Plus 6: There is a preferred basis.

First, it's important to keep in mind that if MWI is "untestable" relative to non-MWI, then non-MWI is also "untestable" relative to MWI. To use this as an argument against MWI,

I think it's being used as an argument against beliefs paying rent.

MWI is testable insofar as QM itself is testable.

Since there is more than one interpretation of QM, empirically testing QM does not prove any one interpretation over the others. Whatever extra arguments are used to support a particular interpretation over the others are not going to be, and have not been, empirical.

But, importantly, collapse interpretations generally are empirically distinguishable from non-collapse interpretations.

No they are not, because of the meaning of the word "interpretation" but collapse theories, such as GRW, might be.

This is why there's a lot of emphasis on hard-to-test ("philosophical") questions in the Sequences, even though people are notorious for getting those wrong more often than scientific questions -- because sometimes [..] the answer matters a lot for our decision-making,

Which is one of the ways in which beliefs that don't pay rent do pay rent.

I am not familiar with Peterson specifically, but I recognise the underpinning in terms of Jung, monomyth theory, and so on.

, a state is good when it engages our moral sensibilities s

Individually, or collectively?

We don't encode locks, but we do encode morality.

Individually or collectively?

Namely, goodness of a state of affairs is something that I can assess myself from outside a simulation of that state. I don't need to simulate anything else to see it

The goodness-to-you or the objective goodness?

if you are going say that morality "is" human value, you are faced with the fact that humans vary in their values..the fact that creates the suspicion of relativism.

This, I suppose, is why some people think that Eliezer's metaethics is just warmed-over relativism, despite his protestations.

It's not clearly relativism and it's not clearly not-relativism. Those of us who are confused by it. are confused because we expect a metaethical theory to say something on the subject.

The opposite of Relative is Absolute or Objective. It isn't Intrinsic. You seem to be talking about something orthogonal to the absolute-relative axis.