Critically, the areas in which ant maps are limited are the areas in which natural selection doesn't kill them for it. Colonies that think food is in places where food isn't starve to death.

Moss and ants have horrible maps

That's not self-evident to me. They certainly have very limited maps, but I don't know if these limited maps are bad.

This additional context does help; thanks.

It's still adaptive for animals to avoid all snakes with this coloring (just to be safe)

Yes, this could be adaptive, but not costless. An animal that avoids all snakes that look venomous misses out on some opportunities (e.g., foraging for food in a tree occupied by a harmless but dangerous-seeming snake). The opportunity cost, in reproductive terms, might be negligible, or it might matter, depending on the specifics. (Here I'm agreeing with you when you point to the importance of the term "significantly.")

Because the truth, even in small matters like snake coloration, can make a difference, the original quotation is an overstatement.

This seems to be just wrong. If your map significantly doesn't match the territory, natural selection is likely to be brutal to you.

These maps don't need to match the territory to be adaptive (I think your criticism of the quote hinges on how you would define "significantly")

Partially that, but also partially about the direction of the gradient. First, maps never match the territory perfectly precisely, they are always simplified models. In that sense, of course, a map not "matching" the territory is not a obstacle to surviving and prospering.

However I would claim that the greater the mismatch between the map and the territory, the greater disadvantage in the natural selection game does the creature accrue. If, magically, you get a choice between getting a more accurate map or a less accurate map, you should always choose the more accurate map.

It's still adaptive for animals to avoid all snakes with this coloring (just to be safe) without needing to know the truth about which snake is dangerous and which isn't.

That is not true -- you set up the question wrong. There are three maps involved: map 1 does not recognize venomous snakes at all; map 2 confuses venomous and mimicry-using snakes; and map 3 successfully distinguishes between venomous snakes and mimicry-using ones.

Map 3 matches the territory better than map 2 which matches the territory better than map 1. The natural selection would give advantage to an animal with map 3 over the one with map 2, and the one with map 2 over the one with map 1.

As a general statement the quote seems absurd (except in the sense that natural selection has no mind and is thus indifferent to everything). But note that our ancestors' beliefs interacted with evolution by way of predictions (conscious or unconscious) and not by truth directly. Our normative 'beliefs' may have had reproductive value in other ways, but this need have nothing to do with moral truth as defined by those same norms.

This seems to be just wrong. If your map significantly doesn't match the territory, natural selection is likely to be brutal to you.

I think that your edit clarified things for me substantially. I read the entire article that you linked. I regret my earlier post for reasons that you will hopefully see.

I have a relevant anecdote about a simpler situation. I was with two friends. The One thought that it would be preferable for there to be less and/or simpler technology in the world, and the Other thought that the opposite was true. The One believed that technology causes people to live meaningless lives, and the Other conceded that he believed this to be true but also believed that technology has so many other benefits that this is acceptable. The One would always cite examples of how technology was used for entertainment, and the Other, examples of how technology was used for work. I stepped in and pointed out the patterns in their respective examples. I said that there were times when I had wasted time by using technology. I pointed out that if a person were like the One, and thus felt that they were leading a less meaningful life by the use of technology, then they should stop. It would be harmful were I to prescribe that a person like the One indiscriminately use technology. I then said that, through technology, I was able to meet people similar to me, people whom I would be far less likely to meet in physical life, and with whom I could hold conversations that I could not hold in physical life. In this way, my life had been made more meaningful by technology. And so it would be harmful for someone to prescribe that I indiscriminately do not use technology.

I learned three things from this event:

1) I should look for third alternatives.

I definitely did not consider this enough in my original response to you, and I apologize. Just like it is not a matter of less technology vs. more technology, it is not necessarily a matter of 'Keep your old life,' vs. 'Start a new life.' Honestly, your 'vague tentative plans' sound like potential third alternatives. I would say keep thinking about those, and also feel good for thinking of and about them. I'd love to hear about them, however vague and tentative. Vaniver touched on this. I would say that he found a third alternative in his own life. I'm bisexual; in physical life, I'm selective about whom I tell, and I don't feel outraged that this is pragmatic or feel inauthentic for doing it. Others would feel like they were in a prison of their own making. I picked the best alternative that I could live with.

2) I should remember that humans are never 'typical.'

There are people who feel like their skin is on wrong when they use technology that they consider undesirably advanced. I love technology. The One thought that people who used technology were suffering from a sense of meaninglessness, and they were simply unaware of this, or actively ignoring it. This was not true for me: Technology makes my life more meaningful. For either of us to act otherwise would be for us to act against our preferences. Likewise, it may have been more important for Shulem to act authentically than it was for him to keep his social relationships. Maryles had a sneaking suspicion that this is false. Yet, Shulem may really be more lonely and really not regret it.

3) I should remember that humans do things for more than just happiness.

People value other things besides happiness. The One saw that some people were happy playing mobile games all of the time, their reward centers firing away, but didn't think that it was worth it because their happiness was meaningless. The One valued meaning more than entertainment, and perhaps even more than happiness in general. People forget this easily. I see this in the article when Maryles says:

Not that I have a right to tell people how to live their lives. I just wish that he would have made choices that would have kept his family intact, and given him a better more meaningful life. Shulem says that he has no regrets. And yet I wonder if he has had similar thoughts? So I am sad for Shulem who still seems to live a very lonely life. I am sad for his children who lost a father they once loved. And yet I am hopeful that those with similar leanings that read his book will realize that the kind of radical change Shulem Deen made- even as he felt it was the right one based on being true to oneself -may not be the best solution for individual happiness.

He wishes that Shulem had made decisions to give himself a more meaningful life. He wishes that Shulem had made decisions to give himself a happier life. He wishes that Shulem had made decisions to give himself a less lonely life. He thinks that, ultimately, Shulem has made decisions to give himself a more authentic life at the price of forgoing these other possibilities. About this, he may be right. Another possibility is that there was no more preferable alternative. Maryles suggests otherwise: He seems to think either that authenticity, meaning, community, and happiness are all the same; or that all are reducible to one; or that all necessarily follow from one. I cannot glean which he believes from context. It is entirely possible that Shulem feels that his life is less happy, less meaningful, more lonely, and more authentic, and that he prefers all and regrets none of this. On the other hand, you, it seems, would not prefer this and would regret this, because you are not typical, as said above. I keep the complexity of value in mind when evaluating potential third alternatives.

Lastly, because things are often about that which they explicitly are not, I feel obliged to touch on this:

I was sad not so much about his erroneous (in my view) conclusions about God and Judaism. Although I am in no way minimizing the importance of that - this post isn’t about that.

If this is true, then 'The Lonely Man of No Faith' is a bad title, in the sense that it isn't representative of the article's implication. (It does, however, make for excellent link bait.) No one is thinking, "Surely his lack of faith is merely a coincidence. There must be other reasons that this man is lonely." Maryles has to say that the post is not about 'that' precisely because everyone has assumed that it's about that.

The general implication is that the so-called truth-seekers are worse off even though the opposite should be true. On this, I will say that any time that I have seen someone become less satisfied with their life by reading about the sorts of things that are posted here, it's because they have experienced a failure of imagination, or their new beliefs have not fully propagated. The failure modes that I've seen the most are:

• No absolute morality implies moral relativism or moral nihilism. ("Actions are not intrinsically good or bad, therefore, morality is open season or meaningless.")
• Reductionism implies existential nihilism. ("Magical processes are really natural processes of such complexity that I mistook them for magical processes? I live for nothing!")
• Determinism implies fatalism. ("Things can only go one way, therefore, I should not make decisions.")
• Representing truth values with probabilities rather than with Boolean values implies epistemological nihilism. ("I can't know things for sure, so I should stop trying to know things.")
• The lack of sensation after death is equivalent to a sensation of darkness and silence of infinite duration. ("I know that you're saying 'no experience,' but I feel like you're saying 'one of the worst experiences that I can possibly imagine.'")

You've given no indication that you believe any of these things, but I had to address that because of the article's implication, and you or others very well may believe these things, explicitly or implicitly, without indication. You identify as an open-minded person; you seem to take pride in it. As such, you may not really believe that there is no God; rather, you might believe that you ought to believe that there is no God, because perhaps that is what you believe open-minded people do, and you want to do what open-minded people do. (I had this very problem. Belief in belief goes both ways!) Saying that one atheist is less happy because he has been separated from his loved ones is very different from saying that atheists are universally dissatisfied because theism is essentially preferable. Though the author attempts to make that distinction, I think that he fails.

I'm also not saying that I deductively concluded that truth-seeking is preferable to ignorance. I inductively concluded it. Truth-seeking could have been horrible: It turns out it generally isn't.

One sees similar urgency claims in the extreme end of the organic food movement and similar purity focused food ideas.

[Charles] Darwin wrote in his autobiography of a habit he called a "golden rule": to immediately write down any observation that seemed inconsistent with his theories--"for I had found by experience that such facts and thoughts were far more apt to escape from the memory than favorable ones."

-Robert Wright, The Moral Animal, p.280