Comment author: SilasBarta 01 July 2010 09:28:47PM *  6 points [-]

Okay, here's something that could grow into an article, but it's just rambling at this point. I was planning this as a prelude to my ever-delayed "Explain yourself!" article, since it eases into some of the related social issues. Please tell me what you would want me to elaborate on given what I have so far.


Title: On Mechanizing Science (Epistemology?)

"Silas, there is no Bayesian ‘revival’ in science. There is one amongst people who wish to reduce science to a mechanical procedure." – Gene Callahan

“It is not possible … to construct a system of thought that improves on common sense. … The great enemy of the reservationist is the automatist[,] who believes he can reduce or transcend reason. … And the most pernicious [of them] are algorithmists, who believe they have some universal algorithm which is a drop-in replacement for any and all cogitation.” – "Mencius Moldbug"

And I say: What?

Forget about the issue of how many Bayesians are out there – I’m interested in the other claim. There are two ways to read it, and I express those views here (with a bit of exaggeration):

View 1: “Trying to come up with a mechanical procedure for acquiring knowledge is futile, so you are foolish to pursue this approach. The remaining mysterious aspects of nature are so complex you will inevitably require a human to continually intervene to ‘tweak’ the procedure based on human judgment, making it no mechanical procedure at all.”

View 2: “How dare, how dare those people try to mechanize science! I want science to be about what my elite little cadre has collectively decided is real science. We want to exercise our own discretion, and we’re not going to let some Young Turk outsiders upstage us with their theories. They don’t ‘get’ real science. Real science is about humans, yes, humans making wise, reasoned judgments, in a social context, where expertise is recognized and a rewarded. A machine necessarily cannot do that, so don’t even try.”

View 1, I find respectable, even as I disagree with it.

View 2, I hold in utter contempt.

Comment author: TraditionalRationali 02 July 2010 05:47:00AM *  2 points [-]

That it should be possible to Algorithmize Science seems clear from that the human brain can do science and the human brain should be possible to describe algorthmically. If not at a higher level, so at least -- in principle -- by quantum electrodynamics which is the (known and computable in principle) dynamics of electrons and nuclei that are the building blocks of the brain.( If it should be possible to do in practice it would have to be done at a higher level but as a proof of principle that argument should be enough.)

I guess, however, that what is actually meant is if the scientific method itself could be formalised (algorithmized), so that science could be "mechanized" in a more direct way than building human-level AIs and then let them learn and do science by the somewhat informal process used today by human scientists. That seems plausible. But has still to be done and seems rather difficult. The philosophers of science is working on understanding the scientific process better and better, but they seem still to have a long way to go before an actually working algorithmic description has been achieved. See also the discussion below on the recent article by Gelman and Shalizi criticizing bayesianism.

EDIT "done at a lower level" changed to "done at a higher level"

Comment author: nhamann 01 July 2010 11:26:35PM 5 points [-]

This seems extremely pertinent for LW: a paper by Andrew Gelman and Cosma Shalizi. Abstract:

A substantial school in the philosophy of science identifies Bayesian inference with inductive inference and even rationality as such, and seems to be strengthened by the rise and practical success of Bayesian statistics. We argue that the most successful forms of Bayesian statistics do not actually support that particular philosophy but rather accord much better with sophisticated forms of hypothetico-deductivism. We examine the actual role played by prior distributions in Bayesian models, and the crucial aspects of model checking and model revision, which fall outside the scope of Bayesian confirmation theory. We draw on the literature on the consistency of Bayesian updating and also on our experience of applied work in social science.

I'm still reading it so I don't have anything to say about it, and I'm not very statistics-savvy so I doubt I'll have much to say about it after I read it, but I thought others here would find it an interesting read.

I stole this from a post by mjgeddes over in the OB open thread for July (Aside: mjgeddes, why all the hate? Where's the love, brotha?)

Comment author: TraditionalRationali 02 July 2010 05:18:03AM *  2 points [-]

I wrote a backlink to here from OB. I am not yet expert enough to do an evaluation of this. I do think however that it is an important and interesting question that mjgeddes asks. As an active (although at a low level) rationalist I think it is important to try to at least to some extent follow what expert philosophers of science actually find out of how we can obtain reasonably reliable knowledge. The dominating theory of how science proceeds seems to be the hypothetico-deductive model, somewhat informally described. No formalised model for the scientific process seems so far has been able to answer to serious criticism of in the philosophy of science community. "Bayesianism" seems to be a serious candidate for such a formalised model but seems still to be developed further if it should be able to anser all serious criticism. The recent article by Gelman and Shalizi is of course just the latest in a tradition of bayesian-critique. A classic article is Glymour "Why I am Not a Bayesian" (also in the reference list of Gelman and Shalizi). That is from 1980 so probably a lot has happened since then. I myself am not up-to-date with most of development, but it seems to be an import topic to discuss here on Less Wrong that seems to be quite bayesianistically oriented.

Comment author: MartinB 01 May 2010 09:09:54PM *  3 points [-]

To answer my own question:

  • changed political and economic views (similar to Matt).

  • changed views on the effects of Nutrition and activity on health (including the actions that follow from that)

  • changed view on the dangers of GMO (yet again)

  • I became aware of areas where I am very ignorant of opposing arguments, and try to counterbalance

  • I finally understand the criticisms about the skeptics movement

  • I repeatedly underestimated the amount of ignorance in the world, and got shocked when discovering that

And on the funnier side. Last week I found out that i learned a minor physics fact wrong. That was not a strongly held opinion, just a fact i never looked up again till now. For some reason i always was convinced that the volume increase in freshly frozen water is 10x, while its actually more like 9%

Comment author: TraditionalRationali 19 May 2010 02:43:00AM 1 point [-]

Very interesting. If you find time, could you elaborate on these. I am particularly interested in hearing more on the criticism of the skeptics movement.

Comment author: AllanCrossman 04 May 2010 09:18:29PM 3 points [-]

Is Eliezer alive and well? He's not said anything here (or on Hacker News, for that matter) for a month...

Comment author: TraditionalRationali 16 May 2010 01:48:16AM *  5 points [-]

Eliezer Yudkowsky and Massimo Pigliucci just recently had a dialogue on Bloggingheads.tv. The title is The Great Singularity Debate.

After Yudkowsky at the beginning gives three different definitions of "the singularity" they discuss strong artificial intelligence and consciousness. Pigliucci is the one who quite quickly takes the discussion from intelligence to consciousness. Just before that they discuss whether simulated intelligence is actually intelligence. Yudkowsky made an argument (something like) if the AI can solve problems over a sufficiently broad range of areas and give answers then that is what we mean by intelligence, so if it manages to do that then it has intelligence. I.e., it is then not "just simulating to have intelligence" but is actually intelligent. Pigliucci however seems to want to distinguish between those and say that "well it may then just simulate intelligence, but maybe it is not actually having it". (Too difficult for me to summarize it very well, you have too look for yourself if you want it more accurately.)

There it seemed to me (but I am certainly not an expert in the field) that Yudkowsky's definition looked reasonable. It would have been interesting to have that point elaborated in more detail though.

Pigliucci's point seemed to be something like that for the only intelligence that we know so far (humans (and to lesser extent other higher animals)) intelligence comes together with consciousness. And for consciousness we know less, maybe only that the human biological brain somehow manages to have it, and therefore we of course do not know whether or not e.g. a computer simulating the brain on a different substrate will also be conscious. Yudkowsky seemed to think this very likely while Pigliucci seemed to think that very unlikely. But what I lacked in that discussion is what do we know (or reasonable conjecture) about the connection between intelligence and consciousness? Of course Pigliucci is right in that for the only intelligence we know of so so far (the human brain) intelligence and consciousness comes together. But for me (who do not know much about this subject matter) that seems not a strong argument for discussing them so closely together when it comes to artificial intelligence. Maybe someone here on Less Wrong who knows more about connection or not between intelligence and consciousness? For a naive non-expert like me intelligence seems (rather) easy to test if anything has: just test how good it is to solve general problems? While to test if anything has consciousness I would guess that a working theory of consciousness would have to be developed before a test could be designed?

This was the second recent BHTV dialogue where Pigliucci discussed singularity/transhumanism related questions. The previous I mentioned here. As mentioned there it seems to have started with a blogg-post of Pigliucci's where he criticized transhumanism. I think it interesting that Pigliucci continues his interest in the topic. I personally see it as a very positive establishing of contact between "traditional rationalist/skeptic/(cis-)humanist"-community and "LessWrong-style rationalist/trans-humanist".community. Massimo Pigliucci very much gave the impression of enjoying the discussion with Elizer Yudkowsky! I am also pleased to have noticed that recently Pigliucci's blog has now and then linked to LessWrong/ElizerYudkowsky (mostly Julias Galef if I remember correctly (too lazy to locate the exact links right now)). I would very much like to see this continue (e.g. Yudkowsky discussing with people like e.g. Paul Kurtz, Michael Shermer, Richard Dawkins, Sean Carroll, Steven Weinberg, Victor Stenger (realizing of course that they are probably too busy for it to happen)).

Previous BHTV dialogues with Elizer Yudkowsky I have seen noticed here on LessWrong but not this one (hope it is not that I have just missed that post). Therefore I posted this here, I did not find a perfect place for it, this was the least-bad I noticed. Although my post here is only partly about "Is Elizer alive and well" (he surely looked so on BHTV), I hope it is not considered too much off-topic.

Comment author: TraditionalRationali 13 March 2010 07:11:28PM *  3 points [-]

An interesting dialogue at BHTV abot transhumanism between cishumanist Massimo Pigliucci and transhumanist Mike Treder. Pigliucci is among other things blogging at Rationally Speaking. This BHTV dialogue is partly as a follow-up to Pigliucci's earlier blog-post the problems with transhumanism . As I (tonyf, July 16, 2009 8:29 PM) commented then, despite the title of his blog-post, it was more of a (I think) misleading generalisation from an article by some Munkittrick than by an actual study of the "transhumanist" community that was the basis for Pigliuccci's then rather sweeping criticism. The present BHTV dialogue was in a rather different tone, and it seemed Pigliucci and Treder understood each others rather well. (As for now I do not see any mentioning of the dialogue on Rationally Speaking, it would be interesting to see if he will make any further comment.)

I have not time to comment the dialogue in detail. But I say that both Pigliucci and Treder did not distinguish between consciousness and intelligence. Pigiliucci pointed very clearly out that the concept of "mind uploading" suppose the "computational hypothesis of consciousness" to be true, but (at least from an materialistic point of view) it is not at all clear why it should be true. But from that he tacitly draw the conclusion (it seemed to me at last after a single view of the dialogue) that also [general] intelligence is depending on that assumption. Which I cannot see how it should. Is not the connection (or not) betwen consciouness and intelligence a so-far open question?

Comment author: TraditionalRationali 05 March 2010 03:37:22AM *  7 points [-]

This is a standard semiclassical motivation as to why gravitons most probably exist (I think from Steven Weinberg "gravitation and cosmology" but I have since long lost the book so I am not sure): In the limit of weak gravitation GR looks similar to the Maxwell equations. In particular there should exist gravitational waves.. (Have not yet been detected experimentally but if GR is (at least approximately) correct they should exist.) This means that you could in principle build a gravitational wave microscope. Say you want to measure the position of a test particle using this microscope. Now if gravitational waves were actually classical you could use arbitrarily feeble waves and thus arbitrarily small recoil on the test particle. And thus measuring position and momentum of the test particle with lower unaccuracy of position times momentum (along a given direction) than allowed by the Heisenberg uncertainty relation. But if gravitational waves are quantized in gravitons of energy = h times oscillation frequency Heisenberg uncertainty relation will be satisfied (Heisenberg's original semiclassical derivation goes through for any wave quantised like this).

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