B-theorists incline to say that you are a temporally extended object, and that your present awareness is just one time-slice of this 4D object. That is, they allow that you contain, within your 4D extension, several self-aware parts that are not aware of one another. Two such self-aware parts are you-today and you-tomorrow.

I'm an A-ist and that's what I think. I don't see how it's incompatible with A-ism.

What is the meaning of "theory" in philosophy?

If Moral Parliament can make deals, it could as well decide on a single goal to be followed thereafter, at which point moral uncertainty is resolved (at least formally). For this to be a good idea, the resulting goal has to be sensitive to facts discovered in the future. This should also hold for other deals, so it seems to me that unconditional redistribution of resources in not the kind of deal that a Moral Parliament should make. Some unconditional redistributions of resources are better than others, but even better are conditional deals that say where the resources will go depending on what is discovered in the future. And while resources could be wasted, so that at a future point you won't be able to direct at much in a new direction, seats in the Moral Parliament can't be.

It seems to me that they're both perfectly valid and indeed equivalent. Like a change of basis, though, you will seem to have rearranged everything.

ETA: Actually, this IS a change of basis.

I feel like this is just a really obnoxious argument about definitions.

I especially feel like this is a really obnoxious argument about definitions when the wiki article quotes things like:

"Take the supposed illusion of change. This must mean that something, X, appears to change when in fact it does not change at all. That may be true about X; but how could the illusion occur unless there were change somewhere? If there is no change in X, there must be a change in the deluded mind that contemplates X. The illusion of change is actually a changing illusion. Thus the illusion of change implies the reality of some change. Change, therefore, is invincible in its stubbornness; for no one can deny the appearance of change."

So, to taboo a bunch of words, and to try and state my take on the actual issue as I understand it (including some snark):

B theory: Let there be this thing called spacetime which encodes all moments of time (past,present, future) and space (i.e., the universe). The phenomenal experience of existence is akin to tracking a very particular slice of spacetime move along at the speed that time inches forward, as observed by me.

A theory: My mind is the fundamental metaphysical object, and moments of "time" can only be oriented with respect to my immediate phenomenal experience of reality. Trying to say something about a grand catalog of time (including the future) robs me of this phenomenal experience because I know what I'm feeling, and I'm feeling the phenomenal experience of existing right now, dammit! Point to that on your fancy spacetime chart!

Read this way, I suppose the most succinct objection of the A-theorist is: "If all of spacetime exists, all reference frames are equivalent, etc. etc., why am I, in this moment, existing right now?" To which, I imagine, a B-theorist would respond by saying, "Because you're right here," and would then point to their location on the spacetime chart.

But this isn't actually an argument about what time is like. It's an argument about how whether or not we should privilege the phenomenal experience of existing--of experiencing the now. That is, does me experiencing life right at this moment mean that this moment is special?

I suppose I can see why people that aren't computationalists would be bothered by the B theory, because it does rob you of that special-ness.

When reading the first paragraph I stopped to think what my intuition about 'orderings of events in time' is. Before being primed by actual proposals (I luckily didn't know A vs. B beforehand and the naming doesn't give anything away). I thought about some events today and yesterday, their ordering and was mindful of how I phrased it and the tempos used. I didn't came to any clear theory of time this way.

To be specific I used phrases like "yesterday I did A and then I did B", "today I first did C and now do D", "later I will do E and then I will do F". During this mental speech I observed it and noticed that almost always two events are put in an X-before-Y or X-after-Y relation.

Then I went back to the wiki-article and read is sentence by sentence to avoid revealing more than absolutely needed to arrive at a forking of my mental model in two by the differentiations provided.

The result? I didn't see any contradiction between both theories and actually don't find any more compelling. Rather they provide different views on the phenomenon and perception of time. Both aspects were present in my model and mental process.

Maybe this view results from the process applied. Maybe it is because my mental model was rich enough initially. And maybe it is as in calefs comment that people with a computational background are used to dealing with both views.

From a constructivist standpoint, I can observe the present, so that's there. Than I can construct based on that the past and the future.

It seems like the nature of time should be emotionally neutral1.

I personally can say that I had a very strong belief that if I awake and the last day I remember is Tuesday it should be Wednesday and not Monday. It was quite a shock to learn that isn't true.

Fundamental beliefs often do come with strong emotions if they are challenged.

Some A-theorists report that a particular basic experience of "becoming" is the immediate reason for their attachment to the A-theory. But the story above doesn't really have anything to do with "becoming", at least not obviously. (This is because I can't make heads or tails of "becoming".)

Experience is a word that refers to qualia. The blind man can't easily make sense of someone speaking about experiencing seeing red.

Different perception can easily lead to different intuitions.

I had to re-read this several times before I understood the point of what you were saying. It has a lot of important things missing, in particular:

Why bring time into this? Intuitions 1 and 2 collide in the same way regardless of whether the two mind-states are causally connected (e.g. I'd still feel that a sufficiently-similar-to-me simulation in some place outside my light cone is still me, somehow, even though I don't have any of his qualia).

How does B-theory solve this problem?

I dislike how people call this vague A- (or B-) intuition a theory, given how it is untestable even in principle. It's no more a "theory" than counting the proverbial angels on the head of a pin. The term "true" does not apply in this case.