From EY's post:
The fourth horn of the anthropic trilemma is to deny that increasing the number of physical copies increases the weight of an experience, which leads into Boltzmann brain problems, and may not help much (because alternatively designed brains may be able to diverge and then converge as different experiences have their details forgotten).
Suppose I build a (conscious) brain in hardware using today's technology. It uses a very low current density, to avoid electromigration.
Suppose I build two of them, and we agree that both of them experience consciousness.
Then I learn a technique for treating the wafers to minimize electromigration. I create a new copy of the brain, the same as the first copy, only using twice the current, and hence being implemented by a flow of twice as many electrons.
As far as the circuits and the electrons travelling them are concerned, running it is very much like running the original 2 brains physically right next to each other in space.
So, does the new high-current brain have twice as much conscious experience?
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What if I hack & remove $100 from your bank account. Are you just as wealthy as you were before, because you haven't looked? If the 2 copies simply haven't looked or otherwise are still unaware, that doesn't mean they are the same. Their possible futures diverge.
And, sure, it's possible they might never realize - we could merge them back before they notice, just as I could restore the money before the next time you checked, but I think we would agree that I still committed a crime (theft) with your money; why couldn't we feel that there was a crime (murder) in the merging?
Standard Dispute. If wealthy = same amount of money in the account, no. If wealthy = how rich you judge yourself to be. The fact that 'futures diverge' is irrelevant up until the moment those two different pieces of information have causal contact with the brain. Until that point, yes, they are 'the same