In response to Even Odds
Comment author: VAuroch 30 July 2016 02:25:10AM 0 points [-]

For an explicit derivation of why this is fair:

Say that you believe the event is likely with probability p, and your betting partner tells you that it will fail with probability q. Then I am going to modify my estimate by c before I tell it to the other person. So my expected value is:

p*(q^2-(1-(p+c))^2) - (1-p)((p+c)^2 - (1-q)^2)

Naturally I want to find the local maximum for variation in c, for a fixed value of p and assuming q is out of my control. So we take the derivative with respect to c. Using Wolfram Alpha shows this is -2c. So the only local maxima possible are telling someone 0, telling them 1, or telling them the true value of p.

In response to comment by VAuroch on Zombies Redacted
Comment author: entirelyuseless 15 July 2016 12:58:05PM -2 points [-]

That's easy to describe. If I have any experience in the future, I have qualia. If I have no experience in the future, I have no qualia. That's the difference.

Comment author: VAuroch 30 July 2016 12:57:31AM 0 points [-]

How are qualia different from experiences? If experiences are no different, why use 'qualia' rather than 'experiences'?

In response to comment by dxu on Zombies Redacted
Comment author: entirelyuseless 20 July 2016 04:50:26AM -2 points [-]

I can transmit it through words. We both know what we're talking about here.

Comment author: VAuroch 30 July 2016 12:53:40AM 0 points [-]

I, also, still do not know what you're talking about. I expect to have experiences in the future. I do not really expect them to contain qualia, but I'm not sure what that would mean in your terms. Please describe the difference I should expect in terms of things I can verify or falsify internally.

In response to comment by VAuroch on Zombies Redacted
Comment author: entirelyuseless 10 July 2016 03:48:34PM -1 points [-]

Do you have a clear definition of clear definition? Or of anything, for that matter?

Comment author: VAuroch 14 July 2016 11:02:30PM 1 point [-]

In this case, "description of how my experience will be different in the future if I have or do not have qualia" covers it. There are probably cases where that's too simplistic.

Comment author: drewbug 19 September 2015 01:37:53PM 0 points [-]

Anyone have the old version of the recipe? It contained Marmite, OJ, sunflower seeds, and a bunch of other things. RomeoStevens doesn't have time to dig it up, so this is a final plea directed at any archivists out there.

Comment author: VAuroch 09 July 2016 11:38:42PM 0 points [-]
In response to comment by turchin on Zombies Redacted
Comment author: kilobug 05 July 2016 12:03:08PM 3 points [-]

Or more likely :

d) the term "qualia" isn't very properly defined, and what turchin means with "qualia" isn't exactly what VAuroch means with "qualia" - basically an illusion of transparecny/distance of inference issue.

In response to comment by kilobug on Zombies Redacted
Comment author: VAuroch 09 July 2016 11:18:57PM *  1 point [-]

No one defines qualia clearly. If they did, I'd have a conclusion one way or the other.

In response to Zombies Redacted
Comment author: turchin 03 July 2016 12:58:21PM *  4 points [-]

I know people who claim that they don't have qualia. I doubt that it is true, but based on their words they should be considered zombies. ))

I would like to suggest zombies of second kind. This is a person with inverted spectrum. It even could be my copy, which speaks all the same philosophical nonsense as me, but any time I see green, he sees red, but names it green. Is he possible? I could imagine such atom-exact copy of me, but with inverted spectrum. And if such second type zombies are possible, it is argument for epiphenomenalism. Now I will explain why.

Phenomenological judgments (PJ) about own consciousness, that is the ability to say something about your own consciousness, will be the same in me and my zombie of the second type.

But there are two types of PJ: quantitative (like "I have consciousness") and qualitative which describes exactly what type of qualia I experience now.

The qualitative type of PJ is impossible. I can't transfer my knowing about "green" in the words.

It means that the fact of existence of phenomenological judgments doesn't help in case of second type zombies.

So, after some upgrade, zombie argument still works as an argument for epiphenomenalism.

I would also recommend the following article with introduce "PJ" term and many problems about it (but I do not agree with it completely) "Experimental Methods for Unraveling the Mind-body Problem: The Phenomenal Judgment Approach" Victor Argonov http://philpapers.org/rec/ARGMAA-2

In response to comment by turchin on Zombies Redacted
Comment author: VAuroch 04 July 2016 10:10:13PM 2 points [-]

I don't see any difference between me and other people who claim to have consciousness, but I have never understood what they mean by consciousness or qualia to an extent that lets me conclude that I have them. So I am sometimes fond of asserting that I have neither, mostly to get an interesting response.

In response to Upcoming LW Changes
Comment author: VAuroch 03 February 2016 06:19:52PM 8 points [-]

Nice to see someone taking the lead! I've been looking for something to work on, and I'd be proud to help rebuild LW. I'll send you a message.

Comment author: VAuroch 16 January 2016 10:15:09AM 1 point [-]

Huh. I think I've been doing this at my current (crappy, unlikely to lead anywhere, part-time remote contract programming) job. Timely!

In response to comment by VAuroch on LessWrong 2.0
Comment author: satt 12 December 2015 01:58:32PM 0 points [-]

I know I could check; I was more wondering whether you, or someone you knew, had checked yourself/themselves.

I think it's quite possible that Discussion has had a higher maths density over the last two or three months, mainly because of Stuart Armstrong posting his run of ideas from his AI risk retreat. Aside from that, though, I'm doubtful that LW's had a strong rise in maths density over the last few years. To me it feels like an idea that's probably more truthy than true.

It's possible the LW diaspora has concrete evidence on this and I haven't encountered it. I look at rationalist Tumblr only intermittently and I don't have Facebook, so I would likely have missed it.

In response to comment by satt on LessWrong 2.0
Comment author: VAuroch 27 December 2015 11:48:43PM 1 point [-]

I have heard this discussed for at least the last year, well before Stuart started his series, and would be very surprised if it was not true. I'd put down $30 to your $10 on the matter, pending an agreed-upon resolution mechanism for the bet.

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