The art of grieving well

41 Valentine 15 December 2015 07:55PM

[This is one post I've written in an upcoming sequence on what I call "yin". Yin, in short, is the sub-art of giving perception of truth absolutely no resistance as it updates your implicit world-model. Said differently, it's the sub-art of subconsciously seeking out and eliminating ugh fields and also eliminating the inclination to form them in the first place. This is the first piece I wrote, and I think it stands on its own, but it probably won't be the first post in the final sequence. My plan is to flesh out the sequence and then post a guide to yin giving the proper order. I'm posting the originals on my blog, and you can view the original of this post here, but my aim is to post a final sequence here on Less Wrong.]


In this post, I'm going to talk about grief. And sorrow. And the pain of loss.

I imagine this won't be easy for you, my dear reader. And I wish I could say that I'm sorry for that.

…but I'm not.

I think there's a skill to seeing horror clearly. And I think we need to learn how to see horror clearly if we want to end it.

This means that in order to point at the skill, I need to also point at real horror, to show how it works.

So, I'm not sorry that I will make you uncomfortable if I succeed at conveying my thoughts here. I imagine I have to.

Instead, I'm sorry that we live in a universe where this is necessary.


If you Google around, you'll find all kinds of lists of what to say and avoid saying to a grieving person. For reasons I'll aim to make clear later on, I want to focus for a moment on some of the things not to say. Here are a few from Grief.com:

  • "He is in a better place."
  • "There is a reason for everything."
  • "I know how you feel."
  • "Be strong."

I can easily imagine someone saying things like this with the best of intentions. They see someone they care about who is suffering greatly, and they want to help.

But to the person who has experienced a loss, these are very unpleasant to hear. The discomfort is often pre-verbal and can be difficult to articulate, especially when in so much pain. But a fairly common theme is something like:

"Don't heave your needs on me. I'm too tired and in too much pain to help you."

If you've never experienced agonizing loss, this might seem really confusing at first — which is why it seems tempting to say those things in the first place, I think. But try assuming that the grieving person sees the situation more clearly, and see if you can make sense of this reaction before reading on.

If you look at the bulleted statements above, there's a way of reading them that says "You're suffering. Maybe try this, to stop your suffering." There's an imposition there, telling the grieving person to add more burden to how they are in the moment. In many cases, the implicit request to stop suffering comes from the speaker's discomfort with the griever's pain, so an uncharitable (but sometimes accurate) read of those statements is "I don't like it when you hurt, so stop hurting."

Notice that the person who lost someone doesn't have to think through all this. They just see it, directly, and emotionally respond. They might not even be able to say why others' comments feel like impositions, but there's very little doubt that they do. It's just that social expectations take so much energy, and the grief is already so much to carry, that it's hard not to notice.

There's only energy for what really, actually matters.

And, it turns out, not much matters when you hurt that much.


I'd like to suggest that grieving is how we experience the process of a very, very deep part of our psyches becoming familiar with a painful truth. It doesn't happen only when someone dies. For instance, people go through a very similar process when mourning the loss of a romantic relationship, or when struck with an injury or illness that takes away something they hold dear (e.g., quadriplegia). I think we even see smaller versions of it when people break a precious and sentimental object, or when they fail to get a job or into a school they had really hoped for, or even sometimes when getting rid of a piece of clothing they've had for a few years.

In general, I think familiarization looks like tracing over all the facets of the thing in question until we intuitively expect what we find. I'm particularly fond of the example of arriving in a city for the first time: At first all I know is the part of the street right in front of where I'm staying. Then, as I wander around, I start to notice a few places I want to remember: the train station, a nice coffee shop, etc. After a while of exploring different alleyways, I might make a few connections and notice that the coffee shop is actually just around the corner from that nice restaurant I went to on my second night there. Eventually the city (or at least those parts of it) start to feel smaller to me, like the distances between familiar locations are shorter than I had first thought, and the areas I can easily think of now include several blocks rather than just parts of streets.

I'm under the impression that grief is doing a similar kind of rehearsal, but specifically of pain. When we lose someone or something precious to us, it hurts, and we have to practice anticipating the lack of the preciousness where it had been before. We have to familiarize ourselves with the absence.

When I watch myself grieve, I typically don't find myself just thinking "This person is gone." Instead, my grief wants me to call up specific images of recurring events — holding the person while watching a show, texting them a funny picture & getting a smiley back, etc. — and then add to that image a feeling of pain that might say "…and that will never happen again." My mind goes to the feeling of wanting to watch a show with that person and remembering they're not there, or knowing that if I send a text they'll never see it and won't ever respond. My mind seems to want to rehearse the pain that will happen, until it becomes familiar and known and eventually a little smaller.

I think grieving is how we experience the process of changing our emotional sense of what's true to something worse than where we started.

Unfortunately, that can feel on the inside a little like moving to the worse world, rather than recognizing that we're already here.


It looks to me like it's possible to resist grief, at least to some extent. I think people do it all the time. And I think it's an error to do so.

If I'm carrying something really heavy and it slips and drops on my foot, I'm likely to yelp. My initial instinct once I yank my foot free might be to clutch my foot and grit my teeth and swear. But in doing so, even though it seems I'm focusing on the pain, I think it's more accurate to say that I'm distracting myself from the pain. I'm too busy yelling and hopping around to really experience exactly what the pain feels like.

I could instead turn my mind to the pain, and look at it in exquisite detail. Where exactly do I feel it? Is it hot or cold? Is it throbbing or sharp or something else? What exactly is the most aversive aspect of it? This doesn't stop the experience of pain, but it does stop most of my inclination to jump and yell and get mad at myself for dropping the object in the first place.

I think the first three so-called "stages of grief" — denial, anger, and bargaining — are avoidance behaviors. They're attempts to distract oneself from the painful emotional update. Denial is like trying to focus on anything other than the hurt foot, anger is like clutching and yelling and getting mad at the situation, and bargaining is like trying to rush around and bandage the foot and clean up the blood. In each case, there's an attempt to keep the mind preoccupied so that it can't start the process of tracing the pain and letting the agonizing-but-true world come to feel true. It's as though there's a part of the psyche that believes it can prevent the horror from being real by avoiding coming to feel as though it's real.

The above might seem kind of abstract, so let me list a very few examples that I think do in fact apply to resisting grief:

  • After a breakup, someone might refuse to talk about their ex and insist that no one around them bring up their ex. They might even start dating a lot more right away (the "rebound" phenomenon, or dismissive-avoidant dating patterns). They might insist on acting like their ex doesn't exist, for months, and show flashes of intense anger when they find a lost sweater under their bed that had belonged to the ex.
  • While trying to finish a project for a major client (or an important class assignment, if a student), a person might realize that they simply don't have the time they need, and start to panic. They might pour all their time into it, even while knowing on some level that they can't finish on time, but trying desperately anyway as though to avoid looking at the inevitability of their meaningful failure.
  • The homophobia of the stereotypical gay man in denial looks to me like a kind of distraction. The painful truth for him here is that he is something he thinks it is wrong to be, so either his morals or his sense of who he is must die a little. Both are agonizing, too much for him to handle, so instead he clutches his metaphorical foot and screams.

In every case, the part of the psyche driving the behavior seems to think that it can hold the horror at bay by preventing the emotional update that the horror is real. The problem is, success requires severely distorting your ability to see what is real, and also your desire to see what's real. This is a cognitive black hole — what I sometimes call a "metacognitive blindspot" — from which it is enormously difficult to return.

This means that if we want to see reality clearly, we have to develop some kind of skill that lets us grieve well — without resistance, without flinching, without screaming to the sky with declarations of war as a distraction from our pain.

We have to be willing to look directly and unwaveringly at horror.


In 2014, my marriage died.

A friend warned me that I might go through two stages of grief: one for the loss of the relationship, and one for the loss of our hoped-for future together.

She was exactly right.

The second one hit me really abruptly. I had been feeling solemn and glum since the previous night, and while riding public transit I found myself crying. Specific imagined futures — of children, of holidays, of traveling together — would come up, as though raising the parts that hurt the most and saying "See this, and wish it farewell."

The pain was so much. I spent most of that entire week just moving around slowly, staring off into space, mostly not caring about things like email or regular meetings.

Two things really stand out for me from that experience.

First, there were still impulses to flinch away. I wanted to cry about how the pain was too much to bear and curl up in a corner — but I could tell that impulse came from a different place in my psyche than the grief did. It felt easier to do that, like I was trading some of my pain for suffering instead and could avoid being present to my own misery. I had worked enough with grief at that point to intuit that I needed to process or digest the pain, and that this slow process would go even more slowly if I tried not to experience it. It required a choice, every moment, to keep my focus on what hurt rather than on how much it hurt or how unfair things were or any other story that decreased the pain I felt in that moment. And it was tiring to make that decision continuously.

Second, there were some things I did feel were important, even in that state. At the start of this post I referenced how mourners can sometimes see others' motives more plainly than those others can. What I imagine is the same thing gave me a clear sense of how much nonsense I waste my time on — how most emails don't matter, most meetings are pointless, most curriculum design thoughts amount to rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. I also vividly saw how much nonsense I project about who I am and what my personal story is — including the illusions I would cast on myself. Things like how I thought I needed people to admire me to feel motivated, or how I felt most powerful when championing the idea of ending aging. These stories looked embarrassingly false, and I just didn't have the energy to keep lying to myself about them.

What was left, after tearing away the dross, was simple and plain and beautiful in its nakedness. I felt like I was just me, and there were a very few things that still really mattered. And, even while drained and mourning for the lovely future that would never be, I found myself working on those core things. I could send emails, but they had to matter, and they couldn't be full of blather. They were richly honest and plain and simply directed at making the actually important things happen.

It seems to me that grieving well isn't just a matter of learning to look at horror without flinching. It also lets us see through certain kinds of illusion, where we think things matter but at some level have always known they don't.

I think skillful grief can bring us more into touch with our faculty of seeing the world plainly as we already know it to be.


I think we, as a species, dearly need to learn to see the world clearly.

A humanity that makes global warming a politicized debate, with name-calling and suspicion of data fabrication, is a humanity that does not understand what is at stake.

A world that waits until its baby boomers are doomed to die of aging before taking aging seriously has not understood the scope of the problem and is probably still approaching it with distorted thinking.

A species that has great reason to fear human-level artificial intelligence and does not pause to seriously figure out what if anything is correct to do about it (because "that's silly" or "the Terminator is just fiction") has not understood just how easily it can go horribly wrong.

Each one of these cases is bad enough — but these are just examples of the result of collectively distorted thinking. We will make mistakes this bad, and possibly worse, again and again as long as we are willing to let ourselves turn our awareness away from our own pain. As long as the world feels safer to us than it actually is, we will risk obliterating everything we care about.

There is hope for immense joy in our future. We have conquered darkness before, and I think we can do so again.

But doing so requires that we see the world clearly.

And the world has devastatingly more horror in it than most people seem willing to acknowledge.

The path of clear seeing is agonizing — but that is because of the truth, not because of the path. We are in a kind of hell, and avoiding seeing that won't make it less true.

But maybe, if we see it clearly, we can do something about it.

Grieve well, and awaken.

Comment author: PhilGoetz 31 August 2015 06:12:10PM 2 points [-]

I really like this post. Questions:

  • Can the (physical or mental) posture that's appropriate for avoiding mistakes be opposed to the posture appropriate for focusing power on one point?

  • Are there multiple styles of posture or thought that are equally effective local maxima, while hybrids of them are less effective?

Comment author: Valentine 31 August 2015 10:55:49PM 1 point [-]

I really like this post.

Thanks!

Can the (physical or mental) posture that's appropriate for avoiding mistakes be opposed to the posture appropriate for focusing power on one point?

Sorry, I'm not sure what you mean.

I don't do a lot of brick-breaking with my fists, so I might not know much about doing that well. But my impression is that the principles that transfer force well through the body in aikido will also transfer force well when trying to deliver a sharp blow to exactly one spot on a brick. In aikido at least, there's no opposition between posture that helps make you do the right thing and posture that helps you avoid doing the wrong thing.

…but of course, it's possible to compromise posture and still deliver a lot of power to one point, just like it's possible to avoid falling over when throwing someone while you have a weak spine posture.

I think the analog in the mind is something like focus or concentration. I think it's certainly possible to concentrate really hard in a way that violates good mental posture in other situations, but I intuitively wouldn't anticipate very good results from that compared to the counterfactual where the focus is done while maintaining good mental posture.

But I really don't know.

And I might have totally misunderstood what you were gesturing at. Please feel free to clarify if needed!

Are there multiple styles of posture or thought that are equally effective local maxima, while hybrids of them are less effective?

I don't know. I don't know of any for the body, I don't think. Some people claim that you should never round your lower back outward, but as far as I can tell the real rule is to brace your spine so that it can transfer force well, which is much harder to do when it's rounded but not impossible. There are some situations where using the rule of thumb of "curve in your lower back" just isn't possible, so you have to go back to the reason why the rule is there. At that point you start getting things that look like violations of "good posture" but are actually quite good uses of body mechanics. (In this case you brace your spine with your abs while "lengthening" it.)

I'm less sure about mental posture. But that's because I don't have a very good reductionistic model of what "mental posture" is yet.

Comment author: CCC 31 August 2015 09:10:05AM 1 point [-]

I felt like I was considering the opposite roughly the same way a young child replies to their parent saying "Now say that you're sorry" with an almost sarcastic "I'm sorry."

One thought on this point - it might be easier to evaluate "what-if" scenarios by explicitly considering them as fictional. What if I am wrong about this assertion? Well, in such a fictional universe, I would then observe consequences A, B, and C... and only then do I ask the question about whether the assertion or its opposite appears more likely to be fictional.

...it may also be partially because I enjoy speculating about fictional universes.

Comment author: Valentine 31 August 2015 05:41:11PM 0 points [-]

Yep! I find stuff like this helpful.

…and yet when I pump it through the analogical mapping I'm using here between mind and body, mental movements like this feel a bit like practicing grabbing things as I fall as a way of dealing with being pushed or knocked into. That seems like a useful skill, but like a second-order tweak after figuring out how to not get knocked totally off-balance when someone bumps into me. Sort of like trying to learn how to do parkour before learning how to brace one's spine.

And appropriately enough, doing that with parkour actually endangers your spine. Mapping that back through the analogy to the mind again, I think I see a close correlate: I don't know when I can trust my fictional "what-if" thinking to kick online when I need it, or if my attempt to do "what-if" thinking will still be dutiful rather than based on a sincere desire to know the truth.

…although I do think the technique you're suggesting is useful, and I'm totally going to play with it.

Comment author: Lumifer 31 August 2015 04:22:57PM 4 points [-]

A bit of a side question -- would you recommend the Supple Leopard book for figuring out the underlying biomechanics of many martial arts techniques? The spine positioning, in particular, looks a lot like what Tai Chi tries to achieve...

Comment author: Valentine 31 August 2015 05:26:23PM 3 points [-]

would you recommend the Supple Leopard book for figuring out the underlying biomechanics of many martial arts techniques?

Yes.

Comment author: ScottL 31 August 2015 11:45:52AM *  6 points [-]

What, exactly, are the principles of good mental posture for the Art of Rationality?

I’m not sure if I can answer this because I don’t understand what good mental posture is or even what good physical posture is, for that matter. Can you please confirm if my understanding, below, of what these are is correct?

Basically, posture refers to the body's alignment and positioning with respect to the force of gravity.

Good posture:

  • is efficient
  • allows movement within the posture
  • prepares for the next movement
  • allows you to react to unexpected forces
  • is structurally strong

Good posture refers to the removal of impediments in movement. It is about activating only the right muscles at the right time in order to achieve specific movements.

Good mental posture, on the other hand, seems to involve taking certain perspectives or entering certain frames of mind that are conducive to the achievement of your current goals.

From the article you linked:

I've been using a term for changing the overall quality of my thoughts and feelings to something more conducive to accomplishing my immediate goal. I call it "adopting a mental posture".

If we view thought activation in a similar way to how we view muscle activation in regards to physical posture, then we can think of good mental posture as the undertaking of certain perspectives or mindsets that inhibit unhelpful thoughts and induce helpful thoughts, where what is helpful depends on the current task at hand.

A good mental posture will be:

  • Relaxed - there is no misattribution. That is, you are not carrying thoughts from previous interactions or arguments. You start the thought process with a relaxed mind set in which you are free from recurrent and intruding thoughts.
  • Fluid - there is no stickiness in your perspectives. This means that you can easily change your perspective. You can think of what the opposites are or what the other person you’re arguing with thinks or what the situation would be like if certain variables were changed etc. The key point here is that you can move between perspectives with ease. There is no flinching.
  • Efficient and synchronous - you are activating only the thoughts that are pertinent to the task at hand. You are also thinking of the pertinent thoughts at the right time. That is, you don’t linger and dwell on certain thoughts.
  • Adaptable - if you receive new information that requires you to change perspective, if you are to keep good posture, then you do so. This means that you update your beliefs.
  • Normally in a broad perspective - we can think of broadness as similar to stability in physical posture. In the same way that stability is transient in physical posture, that is, you are not stable during the transition to a new movement, but do default to being stable. Your psychical (mental) posture should by default be broad, but you should be able to transition to a narrow perspective if this is going to be beneficial. You do need to be able to transition back to the broad perspective, though.

PS. Physical posture and mental posture may be entwined. People who are in pain or tired often have bad posture.

Comment author: Valentine 31 August 2015 05:25:07PM 6 points [-]

I’m not sure if I can answer this because I don’t understand what good mental posture is or even what good physical posture is, for that matter. Can you please confirm if my understanding, below, of what these are is correct?

Well, I can do that for physical posture. I don't know if I can do that for mental posture, but I'll try.

I think in broad strokes your description of what good physical posture is sounds right to me. I wouldn't tie it to gravity specifically; I think it makes sense to talk about good posture in a space station. But maybe replace "gravity" with "surrounding forces" and I think it's basically right.

I'd sum it up by saying that posture is a description of how efficient the arrangement of your body is at transmitting forces. A curled-forward upper back is terrible at transmitting forces between your arms and your hips when compared to a more straight upper back, so I'm inclined to call a straighter upper back "better posture".

There seem to be a few default physical positions that are about as good at general force transmission as a human body can get. Those positions are what I call "good posture".

I personally like Todd Hargrove's breakdown of what good physical posture does for you, though I think the one you linked to is reasonably good too.

I honestly don't know what good mental posture is. I'm gesturing at an intuition based on a bunch of my own experiences and how they resonate with my experience with physical posture.

For instance, if someone trips and knocks into me, I'm much more likely than untrained people to just keep my ground. If I get knocked to the side, though, I'm likely to keep my torso moving as basically one piece, which makes it really easy for me to recover my balance. It's really notable to me when my postural habits slip up and someone knocks into me because I feel like I'm flopping around through the air as I fall over, and relative to my baseline it feels physically dangerous to me.

I notice something that feels analogous in my mind. If someone turned to me and said "Val, go get me coffee", I'm likely to get agitated in a way that reminds me of getting bumped into while having a floppy core. I can pause and use some CBT-like techniques to "catch" myself by, say, noticing that the person probably didn't mean to offend me - but this seems more analogous to grabbing a hold of something nearby to keep myself from falling than it does having a solid core. Instead, I notice that there's some kind of way I can choose to orient myself to the situation and to myself that lets me notice my annoyance at being ordered around and basically not get "knocked over". In that mental "position", I feel like the CBT-like thoughts are much more solid mental "movements", more like taking a stable step to keep my balance than grabbing at whatever is in reach as I fall.

If I had to guess at a definition of mental posture, I would try by analogy to the "efficient at transmitting forces" description of physical posture above. Maybe something like saying it's a description of how efficiently one's patterns of directing attention let one mentally navigate one's environment. The thing is, I haven't really worked out how to capture the intuition I have that being unbothered by being offended is a function of good mental posture whereas being really fast at mathematical computations isn't.

Good mental posture, on the other hand, seems to involve taking certain perspectives or entering certain frames of mind that are conducive to the achievement of your current goals.

From the article you linked:

I've been using a term for changing the overall quality of my thoughts and feelings to something more conducive to accomplishing my immediate goal. I call it "adopting a mental posture".

Right, though I think this might be too abstract to be useful. I could also say that physical posture involves taking certain physical positions that are conductive to the achievement of your current goals. I think that's accurate, but I don't think it quite captures the details that are useful in the analogical mapping.

If we view thought activation in a similar way to how we view muscle activation in regards to physical posture, then we can think of good mental posture as the undertaking of certain perspectives or mindsets that inhibit unhelpful thoughts and induce helpful thoughts, where what is helpful depends on the current task at hand.

That's a neat take on it. I feel like it's missing something; e.g., in the anxious/avoidant trap in attachment theory, the problem isn't just the thoughts, but also something about the way that emotional anticipations seem "off balance". Just changing thought patterns a la CBT doesn't seem to reach deeply enough to fix attachment wounds in my experience. But the basic idea is neat. It reminds me of the idea of avoiding wasted mental movements (e.g., thoughts like "I don't know if I can handle this!" when you have to are utterly wasted in nearly all possible futures where you succeed, so it seems worthwhile to just not bother with that thought).

(By the way, I'd warn not to take attachment theory too seriously. It has a lot of psychobabble in it. I do think it does a really nice job of describing some experiences people have, and the "anxious/avoidant trap" is a great example. But the page I just linked to includes a bunch of Freudian guesswork about why avoidants attract anxious folk and vice versa, and that's basically without any empirical support as far as I know.)

A good mental posture will be:

  • Relaxed…
  • Fluid…
  • Efficient and synchronous…
  • Adaptable…
  • Normally in a broad perspective…

I like this breakdown. It resonates with me. There are two details I'd want to tweak based on my limited personal experience playing with this stuff:

  • While I really like the framing of good mental posture in terms of avoiding what I (due to some conversations with Eliezer) call "wasted mental movements", I'm really hesitant to name keeping one's mind unwaveringly on a task a virtue. I'm reminded of how mathematicians classically need to distract themselves after being stuck on a problem for a long while. There seems to be something very good that comes out of (1) priming the subconscious mind with a lot of potential updates and then (2) getting the conscious mind out of the way so that the subconscious mind can do some kind of magical processing in the background. (The same thing seems to happen with physical skills, by the way: I keep finding that taking weeks-long breaks from aikido sometimes boosts my skill quite a lot more than training over similar time periods does.)
  • I intuit that the "adaptable" point isn't quite right. I'm inclined to think that being adaptable is a little bit like being able to sidestep or block an attack: you really need good posture to do it well, but there's still a skill that needs to be trained. But this is based just on how the analogy between mental and physical postures maps in my head.

Overall I like your description though. It gives me the impression that you're looking at basically the same thing I am.

… psychical posture…

I thought this was a delightful use of language! I had been using "mental arts" to act as a verbal and visual mirror for "martial arts", but hadn't noticed this mapping between "physical" and "psychical". Thank you for this!

PS. Physical posture and mental posture may be entwined. People who are in pain or tired often have bad posture.

Yep. I'm a little surprised by how strong the analogy is in my inner experience, which makes me wonder if the mapping is somehow a natural one.

I'm reminded of Todd Hargrove's suggestion that the brain is for movement and his follow-up analysis of the idea.

Proper posture for mental arts

28 Valentine 31 August 2015 02:29AM

I'd like to start by way of analogy. I think it'll make the link to rationality easier to understand if I give context first.


I sometimes teach the martial art of aikido. The way I was originally taught, you had to learn how to "feel the flow of ki" (basically life energy) through you and from your opponent, and you had to make sure that your movements - both physical and mental - were such that your "ki" would blend with and guide the "ki" of your opponent. Even after I stopped believing in ki, though, there were some core elements of the art that I just couldn't do, let alone teach, without thinking and talking in terms of ki flow.

A great example of this is the "unbendable arm". This is a pretty critical thing to get right for most aikido techniques. And it feels really weird. Most people when they first get it think that the person trying to fold their arm isn't actually pushing because it doesn't feel like effort to keep their arm straight. Many students (including me once upon a time) end up taking this basic practice as compelling proof that ki is real. Even after I realized that ki wasn't real, I still had to teach unbendable arm this way because nothing else seemed to work.

…and then I found anatomical resources like Becoming a Supple Leopard.

It turns out that the unbendable arm works when:

That's it. If you do this correctly, you can relax most of your other arm muscles and still be able to resist pretty enormous force on your arm.

Why, you might ask? Well, from what I have gathered, this lets you engage your latissimus dorsi (pretty large back muscles) in stabilizing your elbow. There's also a bit of strategy where you don't actually have to fully oppose the arm-bender's strength; you just have to stabilize the elbow enough to be able to direct the push-down-on-elbow force into the push-up-on-wrist force.

But the point is, by understanding something about proper posture, you can cut literally months of training down to about ten minutes.


To oversimplify it a little bit, there are basically three things to get right about proper posture for martial arts (at least as I know them):

  1. You need to get your spine in the right position and brace it properly. (For the most part and for most people, this means tucking your pelvis, straightening your thoracic spine a bit, and tensing your abs a little.)
  2. You need to use your hip and shoulder ball-and-socket joints properly. (For the most part this seems to mean using them instead of your spine to move, and putting torque in them by e.g. screwing your elbow downward when reaching forward.)
  3. You need to keep your tissue supple & mobile. (E.g., tight hamstrings can pull your hips out of alignment and prevent you from using your hip joints instead of your mid-lumbar spine (i.e. waist) to bend over. Also, thoracic inflexibility usually locks people in thoracic kyphosis, making it extremely difficult to transfer force effectively between their lower body and their arms.)

My experience is that as people learn how to feel these three principles in their bodies, they're able to correct their physical postures whenever they need to, rather than having to wait for my seemingly magical touch to make an aikido technique suddenly really easy.

It's worth noting that this is mostly known, even in aikido dojos ("training halls"). They just phrase it differently and don't understand the mechanics of it. They'll say things like "Don't bend over; the other guy can pull you down if you do" and "Let the move be natural" and "Relax more; let ki flow through you freely."

But it turns out that getting the mechanical principles of posture down makes basically all the magic of aikido something even a beginner can learn how to see and correct.

A quick anecdote along these lines, which despite being illustrative, you should take as me being a bit of an idiot:

I once visited a dojo near the CFAR office. That night they were doing a practice basically consisting of holding your partner's elbow and pulling them to the ground. It works by a slight shift sideways to cause a curve in the lumbar spine, cutting power between their lower and upper bodies. Then you pull straight down and there's basically nothing they can do about it.

However, the lesson was in terms of feeling ki flow, and the instruction was to pull straight down. I was feeling trollish and a little annoyed about the wrongness and authoritarian delivery of the instruction, so I went to the instructor and asked: "Sensei, I see you pulling slightly sideways, and I had perhaps misheard the instructions to be that we should pull straight down. Should I be pulling slightly sideways too?"

At which point the sensei insisted that the verbal instructions were correct, concentrated on preventing the sideways shift in his movements, and obliterated his ability to demonstrate the technique for the rest of the night.


Brienne Yudkowsky has a lovely piece in which she refers to "mental postures". I highly recommend reading it. She does a better job of pointing at the thing than I think I would do here.

…but if you really don't want to read it just right now, here's the key element I'll be using: There seems to be a mental analog to physical posture.

We've had quite a bit of analogizing rationality as a martial art here. So, as a martial arts practitioner and instructor with a taste of the importance of deeply understanding body mechanics, I really want to ask: What, exactly, are the principles of good mental posture for the Art of Rationality?

In the way I'm thinking of it, this isn't likely to be things like "consider the opposite" or "hold off on proposing solutions". I refer to things of this breed as "mental movements" and think they're closer to the analogs of individual martial techniques than they are principles of mental orientation.

That said, we can look at mental movements to get a hint about what a good mental posture might do. In the body, good physical posture gives you both more power and more room for error: if you let your hands drift behind your head in a shihonage, having a flexible thoracic spine and torqued shoulders and braced abs can make it much harder for your opponent to throw you to the ground even though you've blundered. So, by way of analogy, what might an error in attempting to (say) consider the opposite look like, and what would a good "mental posture" be that would make the error matter less?

(I encourage you to think on your own about an answer for at least 60 seconds before corrupting your mind with my thoughts below. I really want a correct answer here, and I doubt I have one yet.)

When I think of how I've messed up in attempts to consider the opposite, I can remember several instances when my tone was dutiful. I felt like I was supposed to consider the opinion that I disagreed with or didn't want to have turn out to be true. And yet, it felt boring or like submitting or something like that to really take that perspective seriously. I felt like I was considering the opposite roughly the same way a young child replies to their parent saying "Now say that you're sorry" with an almost sarcastic "I'm sorry."

What kind of "mental posture" would have let me make this mistake and yet still complete the movement? Or better yet, what mental posture would have prevented the mistake entirely? At this point I intuit that I have an answer but it's a little tricky for me to articulate. I think there's a way I can hold my mind that makes the childish orientation to truth-seeking matter less. I don't do it automatically, much like most people don't automatically sit up straight, but I sort of know how to see my grasping at a conclusion as overreaching and then… pause and get my mental feet under my mental hips before I try again.

I imagine that wasn't helpful - but I think we have examples of good and bad mental posture in action. In attachment theory, I think that the secure attachment style is a description of someone who is using good mental posture even when in mentally/emotionally threatening situations, whereas the anxious and avoidant styles are descriptions of common ways people "tense up" when they lose good mental posture. I also think there's something interesting in how sometimes when I'm offended I get really upset or angry, and sometimes the same offense just feels like such a small thing - and sometimes I can make the latter happen intentionally.

The story I described above of the aikido sensei I trolled also highlights something that I think is important. In this case, although he didn't get very flustered, he couldn't change what he was doing. He seemed mentally inflexible, like the cognitive equivalent of someone who can't usefully block an overhead attack because of a stiff upper back restricting his shoulder movement. I feel like I've been in that state lots of times, so I feel like I can roughly imagine how my basic mental/emotional orientation to my situation and way of thinking would have to be in order to have been effective in his position right then - and why that can be tricky.

I don't feel like I've adequately answered the question of what good mental posture is yet. But I feel like I have some intuitions - sort of like being able to talk about proper posture in terms of "good ki flow". But I also notice that there seem to be direct analogs of the three core parts of good physical posture that I mentioned above:

  1. Have a well-braced "spine". Based on my current fledgling understanding, this seems to look something like taking a larger perspective, like imagining looking back at this moment 30 years hence and noticing what does and does not matter. (I think that's akin to tucking your hips, which is a movement in service of posture but isn't strictly part of the posture.) I imagine this is enormously easier when one has a well-internalized sense of something to protect.
  2. Move your mind in strong & stable ways, rather than losing "spine". I think this can look like "Don't act while triggered", but it's more a warning not to try to do heavy cognitive work while letting your mental "spine" "bend". Instead, move your mind in ways that you would upon reflection want your mind to move, and that you expect to be able to bear "weight".
  3. Make your mind flexible. Achieve & maintain full mental range of movement. Don't get "stiff", and view mental inflexibility as a risk to your mental health.

All three of these are a little hand-wavy. That third one in particular I haven't really talked about much - in part because I don't really know how to work on that well. I have some guesses, and I might write up some thoughts about that later. (A good solution in the body is called "mobilization", basically consisting of pushing on tender/stiff spots while you move the surrounding joints through their maximal range of motion.) Also, I don't know if there are more principles for the mind than these three, or if these three are drawing too strongly on the analogy and are actually a little distracting. I'm still at the stage where, for mental posture, I keep wanting to say the equivalent of "relax more and let ki flow."


A lot of people say I have excellent physical posture. I think I have a reasonably clear idea of how I made my posture a habit. I'd like to share that because I've been doing the equivalent in my mind for mental posture and am under the impression that it's getting promising results.

I think my physical practice comes down to three points:

  • Recognize that having good posture gives you superpowers. It's really hard to throw me down, and I can pretty effortlessly pull people to the ground. A lot of that is martial skill, but a huge chunk of it is just that good posture gives me excellent leverage. This transfers to being able to lift really heavy things and move across the room very efficiently and quickly when needed. This also gives me a pretty big leg up on learning physical skills. Recognizing that these were things I'd gain from learning good posture gave me a lot of drive to stick to my practice.
  • Focus on how the correct posture feels, and exactly how it's different from glitchy posture. I found it super-important to notice that my body feels different in specific ways when my shoulders are in the right position versus when they're too far forward or back. Verbal instructions like "Pull shoulders back" don't work nearly as well as the feeling in the body.
  • Choose one correction at a time, and always operate from that posture, pausing and correcting yourself when you're about to slip up. Getting good shoulder posture required that I keep my shoulders back all the time. When I would reach for water, I'd notice when my shoulder was in the too-far-forward position, and then pull back and fix my shoulder position before trying again. This sometimes required trying at very basic tasks several times, often quite slowly, until I could get it right each time.

Although I didn't add this until quite late, I would now add a fourth point when giving advice on getting good physical posture: make sure to mobilize the parts of your body that are either (a) preventing you from moving into a good position or (b) requiring you to be very stiff or tense to hold that position. The trouble is, I know how to do that for the body, but I'm not as sure about how to do that for the mind.

But the three bullet points above are instructions that I can follow with respect to mental posture, I think.

So, to the extent that that seems possible for you, I invite you to try to do the same - and let me know how it goes.

 

Comment author: John_Maxwell_IV 24 May 2015 05:29:16AM 5 points [-]

People select hypotheses for testing because they have previously weakly updated in the direction of them being true. Seeing empirical data produces a later, stronger update.

Comment author: Valentine 24 May 2015 07:36:08PM 1 point [-]

I like your way of saying it. It's much more efficient than mine!

Comment author: [deleted] 24 May 2015 06:17:16PM *  -2 points [-]

Those are not different models. They are different interpretations of the utility of probability in different classes of applications.

though I'm not sure how you would find out the frequency at which hypotheses turn out to be true the way you figure out the frequency at which a coin comes up heads. But that could just be my not being as familiar thinking in terms of the Frequentist model

You do it exactly the same as in your Bayesian example.

I'm sorry, but this Bayesian vs Frequentist conflict is for the most part non-existent. If you use probability to model the outcome of an inherently random event, people have called that “frequentist.” If instead you model the event as deterministic, but your knowledge over the outcome as uncertain, then people have applied the label “bayesian.” It's the same probability, just used differently.

It's like how if you apply your knowledge of mechanics to bridge and road building, it's called civil engineering, but if you apply it to buildings it is architecture. It's still mechanical engineering either way, just applied differently.

One of the failings of the sequences is the amount of emphasis that is placed on “Frequentist” vs “Bayesian” interpretations. The conflict between the two exists mostly in Yudkowsky's mind. Actual statisticians use probability to model events and knowledge of events simultaneously.

Regarding the other points, every single example you gave involves using empirical data that had not sufficiently propagated, which is exactly the sort of use I am in favor of. So I don't know what it is that you disagree with.

Comment author: Valentine 24 May 2015 07:32:00PM *  7 points [-]

Those are not different models. They are different interpretations of the utility of probability in different classes of applications.

That's what a model is in this case.

I'm sorry, but this Bayesian vs Frequentist conflict is for the most part non-existent.

[…]

One of the failings of the sequences is the amount of emphasis that is placed on “Frequentist” vs “Bayesian” interpretations. The conflict between the two exists mostly in Yudkowsky's mind. Actual statisticians use probability to model events and knowledge of events simultaneously.

How sure are you of that?

I know a fellow who has a Ph.D. in statistics and works for the Department of Defense on cryptography. I think he largely agrees with your point: professional statisticians need to use both methods fluidly in order to do useful work. But he also doesn't claim that they're both secretly the same thing. He says that strong Bayesianism is useless in some cases that Frequentism gets right, and vice versa, though his sympathies lie more with the Frequentist position on pragmatic grounds (i.e. that methods that are easier to understand in a Frequentist framing tend to be more useful in a wider range of circumstances in his experience).

I think the debate is silly. It's like debating which model of hyperbolic geometry is "right". Different models highlight different intuitions about the formal system, and they make different aspects of the formal theorems more or less relevant to specific cases.

I think Eliezer's claim is that as a matter of psychology, using a Bayesian model of probability lets you think about the results of probability theory as laws of thought, and from that you can derive some useful results about how one ought to think and what results from experimental psychology ought to capture one's attention. He might also be claiming somewhere that Frequentism is in fact inconsistent and therefore is simply a wrong model to adopt, but honestly if he's arguing that then I'm inclined to ignore him because people who know a lot more about Frequentism than he does don't seem to agree.

But there is a debate, even if I think it's silly and quite pointless.

And also, the axiomatic models are different, even if statisticians use both.

Regarding the other points, every single example you gave involves using empirical data that had not sufficiently propagated, which is exactly the sort of use I am in favor of. So I don't know what it is that you disagree with.

The concern about AI risk is also the result of an attempt to propagate implications of empirical data. It just goes farther than what I think you consider sensible, and I think you're encouraging an unnecessary limitation on human reasoning power by calling such reasoning unjustified.

I agree, it should itch that there haven't been empirical tests of several of the key ideas involved in AI risk, and I think there should be a visceral sense of making bullshit up attached to this speculation unless and until we can find ways to do those empirical tests.

But I think it's the same kind of stupid to ignore these projections as it is to ignore that you already know how your New Year's Resolution isn't going to work. It's not obviously as strong a stupidity, but the flavor is exactly the same.

If we could banish that taste from our minds, then even without better empiricism we would be vastly stronger.

I'm concerned that you're underestimating the value of this strength, and viewing its pursuit as a memetic hazard.

I don't think we have to choose between massively improving our ability to make correct clever arguments and massively improving the drive and cleverness with which we ask nature its opinion. I think we can have both, and I think that getting AI risk and things like it right requires both.

But just as measuring everything about yourself isn't really a fully mature expression of empiricism, I'm concerned about the memes you're spreading in the name of mature empiricism retarding the art of finishing thinking.

I don't think that they have to oppose.

And I'm under the impression that you think otherwise.

Comment author: [deleted] 22 May 2015 06:58:10PM *  3 points [-]

Thank you for correcting me on this.

So the source of the confusion is the Author's notes to HPMoR. Eliezer promotes both CFAR and MIRI workshops and donation drives, and is ambiguous about his full employment status--it's clear that he's a researcher at MIRI, but if was ever explicitly mentioned who was paying for his rationality work, I missed it. Googling "CFAR site:hpmor.com" does show that on http://hpmor.com/applied-rationality/, a page I never read he discloses not having a financial relationship with CFAR. But he notes many times elsewhere that "his employer" has been paying for him to write a rationality textbook, and at times given him paid sabbaticals to finish writing HPMOR because he was able to convince his employer that it was in their interest to fund his fiction writing.

As I said I can understand the argument that it would be beneficial to an organization like CFAR to have as fun and interesting an introduction to rationality as HPMOR is, ignoring for a moment the flaws in this particular work I pointed out elsewhere. It makes very little sense for MIRI to do so--I would frankly be concerned about them losing their non-profit status as a result, as writing rationality textbooks let alone harry potter fanfics is so, so far outside of MIRI's mission.

But anyway, it appears that I assumed it was CFAR employing him, not MIRI. I wonder if I was alone in this assumption.

EDIT: To be clear, MIRI and CFAR have shared history--CFAR is an offshoot of MIRI, and both organizations have shared offices and staff in the past. You staff page lists Eliezer Yudkowsky as a "Curriculum Consultant" and specifically mentions his work on HPMOR. I'll take your word that none of it was done with CFAR funding, but that's not the expectation a reasonable person might have from your very own website. If you want to distance yourself from HPMOR you might want to correct that.

Comment author: Valentine 24 May 2015 05:52:18PM 3 points [-]

To be clear, I can understand where your impression came from. I don't blame you. I spoke up purely to crush a rumor and clarify the situation.

I'll take your word that none of it was done with CFAR funding, but that's not the expectation a reasonable person might have from your very own website. If you want to distance yourself from HPMOR you might want to correct that.

That's a good point. I'll definitely consider it.

We're not trying to distance ourselves from HPMOR, by the way. We think it's useful, and it does cause a lot of people to show interest in CFAR.

But I agree, as a nonprofit it might be a good idea for us to be clearer about whom we are and are not paying. I'll definitely think about how to approach that.

Comment author: [deleted] 24 May 2015 04:05:35AM *  0 points [-]

Perhaps you're using a Frequentist definition of "likelihood" whereas I'm using a Bayesian one?

There's a difference? Probability is probability.

So, if you mean to suggest that figuring out which hypothesis is worthy of testing does not involve altering our subjective likelihood that said hypothesis will turn out to be true, then I quite strongly disagree.

But if you mean that clever arguments can't change what's true even by a little bit, then of course I agree with you.

If you go about selecting a hypothesis by evaluating a space of hypotheses to see how they rate against your model of the world (whether you think they are true) and against each other (how much you stand to learn by testing them), you are essentially coming to reflective equilibrium regarding these hypothesis and your current beliefs. What I'm saying is that this shouldn't change your actual beliefs -- it will flush out some stale caching, or at best identify an inconsistent belief, including empirical data that you haven't fully updated on. But it does not, by itself, constitute evidence.

So a clever argument might reveal an inconsistency in your priors, which in turn might make you want seek out new evidence. But the argument itself is insufficient for drawing conclusions. Even if the hypothesis is itself hard to test.

Comment author: Valentine 24 May 2015 05:28:14PM 8 points [-]

Perhaps you're using a Frequentist definition of "likelihood" whereas I'm using a Bayesian one?

There's a difference? Probability is probability.

There very much is a difference.

Probability is a mathematical construct. Specifically, it's a special kind of measure p on a measure space M such that p(M) = 1 and p obeys a set of axioms that we refer to as the axioms of probability (where an "event" from the Wikipedia page is to be taken as any measurable subset of M).

This is a bit like highlighting that Euclidean geometry is a mathematical construct based on following thus-and-such axioms for relating thus-and-such undefined terms. Of course, in normal ways of thinking we point at lines and dots and so on, pretend those are the things that the undefined terms refer to, and proceed to show pictures of what the axioms imply. Formally, mathematicians refer to this as building a model of an axiomatic system. (Another example of this is elliptic geometry, which is a type of non-Euclidean geometry, which you can model as doing geometry on a sphere.)

The Frequentist and Bayesian models of probability theory are relevantly different. They both think of M as the space of possible results (usually called the "sample space" but not always) and a measurable subset EM as an "event". But they use different models of p:

  • Frequentists suggest that were you to look at how often all of the events in M occur, the one we're looking at (i.e., E) would occur at a certain frequency, and that's how we should interpret p(E). E.g., if M is the set of results from flipping a fair coin and E is "heads", then it is a property of the setup that p(E) = 0.5. A different way of saying this is that Frequentists model p as describing a property of that which they are observing - i.e., that probability is a property of the world.
  • Bayesians, on the other hand, model p as describing their current state of confidence about the true state of the observed phenomenon. In other words, Bayesians model p as being a property of mental models, not of the world. So if M is again the results from flipping a fair coin and E is "heads", then to a Bayesian the statement p(E) = 0.5 is equivalent to saying "I equally expect getting a heads to not getting a heads from this coin flip." To a Bayesian, it doesn't make sense to ask what the "true" probability is that their subjective probability is estimating; the very question violates the model of p by trying to sneak in a Frequentist presumption.

Now let's suppose that M is a hypothesis space, including some sector for hypotheses that haven't yet been considered. When we say that a given hypothesis H is "likely", we're working within a partial model, but we haven't yet said what "likely" means. The formalism is easy: we require that HM is measurable, and the statement that "it's likely" means that p(H) is larger than most other measurable subsets of M (and often we mean something stronger, like p(H) > 0.5). But we haven't yet specified in our model what p(H) means. This is where the difference between Frequentism and Bayesianism matters. A Frequentist would say that the probability is a property of the hypothesis space, and noticing H doesn't change that. (I'm honestly not sure how a Frequentist thinks about iterating over a hypothesis space to suggest that H in fact would occur at a frequency of p(H) in the limit - maybe by considering the frequency in counterfactual worlds?) A Bayesian, by contrast, will say that p(H) is their current confidence that H is the right hypothesis.

What I'm suggesting, in essence, is that figuring out which hypothesis HM is worth testing is equivalent to moving from p to p' in the space of probability measures on M in a way that causes p'(H) > p(H). This is coming from using a Bayesian model of what p is.

Of course, if you're using a Frequentist model of p, then "most likely hypothesis" actually refers to a property of the hypothesis space - though I'm not sure how you would find out the frequency at which hypotheses turn out to be true the way you figure out the frequency at which a coin comes up heads. But that could just be my not being as familiar thinking in terms of the Frequentist model.

I'll briefly note that although I find the Bayesian model more coherent with my sense of how the world works on a day-by-day basis, I think the Frequentist model makes more sense when thinking about quantum physics. The type of randomness we find there isn't just about confidence, but is in fact a property of the quantum phenomena in question. In this case a well-calibrated Bayesian has to give a lot of probability mass to the hypothesis that there is a "true probability" in some quantum phenomena, which makes sense if we switch the model of p to be Frequentist.

But in short:

Yes, there's a difference.

And things like "probability" and "belief" and "evidence" mean different things depending on what model you use.

What I'm saying is that this shouldn't change your actual beliefs -- it will flush out some stale caching, or at best identify an inconsistent belief, including empirical data that you haven't fully updated on. But it does not, by itself, constitute evidence.

Yep, we disagree.

I think the disagreement is on two fronts. One is based on using different models of probability, which is basically not an interesting disagreement. (Arguing over which definition to use isn't going to make either of us smarter.) But I think the other is substantive. I'll focus on that.

In short, I think you underestimate the power of noticing implications of known facts. I think that if you look at a few common or well-known examples of incomplete deduction, it becomes pretty clear that figuring out how to finish thinking would be intensely powerful:

  • Many people make resolutions to exercise, be nicer, eat more vegetables, etc. And while making those resolutions, they often really think they mean it this time. And yet, there's often a voice of doubt in the back of the mind, as though saying "Come on. You know this won't work." But people still quite often spend a bunch of time and money trying to follow through on their new resolution - often failing for reasons that they kind of already knew would happen (and yet often feeling guilty for not sticking to their plan!).
  • Religious or ideological deconversion often comes from letting in facts that are already known. E.g., I used to believe that the results of parapsychological research suggested some really important things about how to survive after physical death. I knew all the pieces of info that finally changed my mind months before my mind actually changed. I had even done experiments to test my hypotheses and it still took months. I'm under the impression that this is normal.
  • Most people reading this already know that if they put a ton of work into emptying their email inbox, they'll feel good for a little while, and then it'll fill up again, complete with the sense of guilt for not keeping up with it. And yet, somehow, it always feels like the right thing to do to go on an inbox-emptying flurry, and then get around to addressing the root cause "later" or maybe try things that will fail after a month or two. This is an agonizingly predictable cycle. (Of course, this isn't how it goes for everyone, but it's common enough that well over half the people who attend CFAR workshops seem to relate to it.)
  • Most of Einstein's work in raising special relativity to consideration consisted of saying "Let's take the Michelson-Morley result at face value and see where it goes." Note that he is now considered the archetypal example of a brilliant person primarily for his ability to highlight worthy hypotheses via running with the implications of what is already known or supposed.
  • Ignaz Semmelweis found that hand-washing dramatically reduced mortality in important cases in hospitals. He was ignored, criticized, and committed to an insane asylum where guards beat him to death. At a cultural level, the fact that whether Semmelweis was right was (a) testable and (b) independent of opinion failed to propagate until after Louis Pasteur gave the medical community justification to believe that hand-washing could matter. This is a horrendous embarrassment, and thousands of people died unnecessarily because of a cultural inability to finish thinking. (Note that this also honors the need for empiricism - but the point here is that the ability to finish thinking was a prerequisite for empiricism mattering in this case.)

I could keep going. Hopefully you could too.

But my point is this:

Please note that there's a baby in that bathwater you're condemning as dirty.

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