And although I'm using the multiple selves / sub-agents terminology, I think it's really just a rhetorical device. There are not multiple selves in any real sense.

I would actually dispute this, but that goes into what you actually mean by a "self". I don't see how it's not obvious that are multiple agents at work; the problem of akrasia is, then, trying to decide which agent actually gets to pilot your brain at that instant. I suspect this is alleviated, to some extent, by increased self-awareness; if you can pick out modes of thought that you don't actually want to "endorse" (like the "I want to be a physicist" versus "I don't want to do physics" example below), you are probably more likely to have the ability to override what you label as "not endorsed" than if you are actually sitting there wondering "wait, is this what I really think? Which mode is me?"

Upon rethinking it, I decided that my original position missed the mark somewhat, because it's not clear how "rationality" plays into an id-ego-superego model (which could either match short-term desires, decider, long-term desires, or immoral desires, decider, moral desires- the first seems more useful for this discussion).

It seems to me that rationality is not superego strengthening, but ego strengthening- and the best way to do that is to elevate whoever isn't present at the moment. If your superego wants you to embark on some plan, consult your id before committing (and making negative consequences immediate is a great way to do that); if your id wants you to avoid some work, consult your superego before not doing it.

And so I think what you've written is spot on for half of the problem, and agree your scheme is good at solving that half of the problem (and gives insights about the other half).

This reference point phenomenon is, to me, the kind of thing that seems obvious after you've already done it, but isn't actually helpful if you're trying to change a behavior.

If you're trying to get into the habit of going to the gym or whatever, you already know that it's going to be to your benefit in "far" mode but "near" mode you just doesn't want to go. Near mode you has better stuff to do right now, healthfulness is far mode's problem. You can't re-program yourself to associate "working out" with "feeling good" until you've already been doing it for a while. This has been my experience, anyway. I run every day, and it's just part of what I do, but the catalyst to getting into this habit wasn't that I was suddenly able to convince myself that this was something that was good for me and that later on I'd enjoy it, even if I didn't enjoy it now -- no, the reason I started running was because at the time I had an immediate desire to do it (stress, pent-up frustration with life situations). I have absolutely no ability to trick my near mode to do things to the benefit of far mode; it has to have utility to me, right now.

Of course, now that I've been doing this for a while, when I'm about to go run I don't even have a mental dialog where I have to convince myself that it's something that I want to do - I just do it. If I haven't run today, then obviously I am going to run, there's modus ponens. If for some reason I have a voice saying I don't want to do it, my brain immediately overrides that with, "But that just doesn't make sense!". If I were trying to convey this mental process to someone else, I might say something like, "well, I just envision myself running and having a good experience, and then not running and not having that good experience, so I've changed my reference point". This after-the-fact explanation sort of explains what's happening in my mind, but doesn't actually give somebody else tools that allow them to actually copy it. The only advice I'd give is to find an actual compelling reason to do it whatever it is right now, rather than trying to fake yourself into thinking you want to do something that you really don't.

Basically, you're right about the changing reference points but I think you've got the order mixed up. That happens after you've changed the behavior.

Why not simply lie and pretend to subscribe to whatever Good Guy/Bad Guy narrative is socially convienient?

I find this also hard with acquaintances. One who has done some really awful things but is also in many ways an interesting and sometimes very selfless and generous person. There's pressure to either say "oh, they're all right really" or "oh, they're not really generous". Ultimately for all that they deny it, people want to know what side you're on.

Just because I never read the original material - in Chapter 27:

"And you wanted to see the results of your test firsthand," said Harry. "So. Am I like my father?"

A strange sad expression came over the man, one that looked foreign to his face. "I should sooner say, Harry Potter, that you resemble -"

Severus stopped short.

...is the name he doesn't say Remus Lupin?

What's your experience with the process? Does it actually helps you to have better conversation or is the argument mainly that it should help?

I'm not sure if it meets the Ponzi scheme model, but the problem is this: lots of students are going deeper into debt to get an education that has less and less positive impact on their earning power. So the labor force will be saturated with people having useless skills (given lack of demand, government-driven or otherwise, for people with a standard academic education) and being deep in undischargeable debt.

The inertia of the conventional wisdom ("you've gotta go to college!") is further making the new generation slow to adapt to the reality, not to mention another example of Goodhart's Law.

On top of that, to the extent that people do pick up on this, the sciences will continue to be starved of the people who can bring about advances -- this past generation they were lured away to produce deceptive financial instruments that hid dangerous risk, and which (governments claim) put the global financial system at the brink of collapse.

My take? The system of go-to-college/get-a-job needs to collapse and be replaced, for the most part, by apprenticeships (or "internships" as we fine gentry call them) at a younger age, which will give people significantly more financial security and enhance the economy's productivity. But this will be bad news for academics.

And as for the future of science? The system is broken. Peer review has become pal review, and most working scientists lack serious understanding of rationality and the ability to appropriately analyze their data or know what heavy-duty algorithmic techniques to bring in.

So the slack will have to be picked up by people "outside the system". Yes, they'll be starved for funds and rely on rich people and donations to non-profits, but they'll mostly make up for it by their ability to get much more insight out of much less data: knowing what data-mining techniques to use, spotting parallels across different fields, avoiding the biases that infect academia, and generally automating the kind of inference currently believed to require a human expert to perform.

In short: this, too, shall pass -- the only question is how long we'll have to suffer until the transition is complete.

Sorry, [/rant].

Kaj Sotala's post wasn't about how to talk to random strangers, but how to get to interesting conversations to some you're already talking to. It's a bit unfair to accuse people who are here to help with that issue of not being helpful on a related, but different one.

Perhaps, but your advice required the ability to successfully start conversations, since you were suggesting to talk to random people:

Who doesn't have easy opportunities to increase their number of conversations, other than a total shut-in? People are everywhere, and therefore, so are potential conversations. You might not have the most interesting conversation with the guy standing behind you in line at the bank,

It's true that practice is necessary, but not just any practice will suffice. And following the practice recommendations you gave would not be helpful unless the problem were mostly solved to begin with.