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Why does my Karma score keep increasing when I don't do anything? It's a disincentive to post. . .?
Cost: Not much that I wasn't already doing, less optimally. Benefit: Social group that I can count on to at least TRY to be epistemically honest. Also, openness towards odd people. Risk: Pariah? I'm already considered odd by a lot of people.
:D
The textbooks written about my personality type say I'm "eccentric".
LW should make this unique thread widely known. Many couples facing similar decisions can be helped.
I am sorry for your loss.
EDIT: This association to your post won't leave me alone, so here it is: APACHE II software gives the odds of an adult leaving an ICU alive. Perhaps there is, or will soon be, an intrauterine version of this using blood values & other metrics that can prompt preventive measures early in a pregnancy.
Finding a crowd that allows your abilities to bloom is a useful skill as well :)
That's one reason I'm here, but in the limited time the mortality tables give me I'd like to find a way to present myself favorably to almost any crowd.
In the past, very few have cheered me on and a more vocal few have fervently hoped I'd fail.
In response to
Open thread, Jan. 18 - Jan. 24, 2016
Cost of being less wrong: increased cognitive load?
Benefit oblw: longer life expectancy?
Risk oblw: becoming a pariah in most crowds?
Well, some coordination problems get solved, and others don't. I think the most common solution to coordination problems is the large organization - governments, corporations, political parties, labor unions, etc., but, of course, they have their own set of issues...
So in this case it's the Little People against two large orgs and the LP are the enemy of both.
The orgs are above the law and it is in their interest to punish people who don't like them, but they can possibly be embarrassed.
Stay out of it unless you can help anonymously and your odds are good for the risk you are taking; this from a whistleblower.
In response to
Thinking About a Technical Solution to Coordination Problems
Has this problem been solved in any country?
simple thought experiment: You are carrying a gun. Someone else decides they want to do something dangerous with a gun. (shoot some people; commit a gun-crime, etc.). They know they are about to become a target because everyone else is usually also self-preserving. They decide to shoot anyone with the means to slow them down. That primarily includes everyone else with a gun; anyone else strong enough to overpower them, and anyone able to alert authorities on them.
Who do they shoot first? anyone else with a gun. Likely a not safe position to carry a gun
The decision tree for this gets complex even after the split for concealed or open carry.
Also, shot through the heart, a person has about 10 seconds left to act (to return fire, I hope).
I only read a synopsis of their book, but it's massively incorrect to take their statements as "game theory says" anything about carrying a gun in the real world. In their incredibly wrong payoff model, gun ownership does dominate. But that payoff model is simply is simply insane.
What are then appropriate payoff models for carrying or not carrying, concealed or open?
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I think WhyAsk's model of the situation was "get karma while not doing anything" rather than "get karma independently of what you're doing". (WhyAsk, the reality is much nearer the latter than the former.)
A lot of what I was sure of, I'm not any longer. . .:D