Scott, I'm not dismissing QM's accomplishment, because yes it's significant, the point is simply that it's still just a theory, and so long as that's what it is, dismissing the possibility that it is incomplete, or wrong, is not scientific.

Eliezer, I get that you are highly confident in QM. Obviously, QM has a lot going for it. But that still doesn't mean that QM can't be incomplete, or even wrong. Of course, reality is what it is, but our mental representation of it can be arbitrarily accurate or innacurate, and we can continue to fool our selfs into thinking that "This is the point in which my scientific knowledge is complete", but that is completely unscientific. Now that is elementary cognitive science that I'm sure you agree with. So it is curious why you can't imagine how there might possibly be some high-level theoretical component to particle physics which QM simply doesn't take into account, despite how confident you feel that you haven't missed anything in the math or logic backing up the theory.

And making the claim that one aspect of a theory being wrong invalidates the whole, is just as presumptuous as saying that a theory is simply correct, no questions. So let's not go there.

Eliezer: There can be properties of the particles we don't know about yet, but our existing experiments already show those new properties are also identical

According to a specific theory, the experiments do, yes. But again I beg to know why you have 100% confidence that right now you think our understanding of sub-atomic particles is totally complete, such that there can't possibly be anything about particles that we haven't taken into account in our experiments so far. More specifically, I really doubt that any experiment will show two particles are exactly the same with absolute certainty, unless you subject the two particles to all possible interactions within this universe, which of course is unlikely in any experiment.

Well then, if philosophers must be more cautious about their philosophies, because observable evidence might prove them wrong, then this goes equally for the physicist's arguments as well: Observable evidence might prove him wrong in the future. Since it is always true that "You might be wrong", then it is never valid to say you can prove that two particles are exactly the same, since future theories or evidence may show there are properties of a particle we just don't know about yet, and how to test for them. Therefore Eliezer's argument against Philosopher Bob is also wrong, making me wonder what exactly the point of this post was in the first place, other than the obvious "Observable evidence might prove you wrong" (no offense meant)

Eliezer, I may be missing something here, but it seems you did not really disprove the philosophers argument. Yes according to physics status-quo of understanding, there might be a way to prove absolutely that two particles are the same, but who says the status-quo is complete, and how can you ever know that it is? That is the philosphers point I believe.

Windy, according to my logic, yes, to a certain degree all adaptations contribute to some sort of group survival, thus negating the importance of drawing the distinction between group and individual/K selection as some sort of fundamental difference in the mechanics of evolution.

That doesn't mean I'm saying 'group selection' is not a valid area of study, it still needs to be resolved how some adaptations which seem detrimental to the individual end up being good for the individual by proxy of the being good for the group. This is not so much a redefinition of 'group selection' as it is lowering the expectations of what group selection can be expected to accomplish, namely not being able to resolve some impossible logical paradox.

"Actual decreased fitness" does not mean "all will die". If it is logically impossible for "actual decreased fitness" to evolve, how do you explain worker ants? (ignore for the moment whether it's kin or group selection or what, just consider what the fitness of the workers is.)

If you are talking about genetic fitness, the pure ability to continue the genetic line, yes it does mean eventually all will die. I am not giving any importance to an arbitrary definition of 'health', which is not always important to genetic survival. If the organism reproduces successfully from generation to generation, then it is fit, period. The more it reproduces successfully, the more fit. Existence of the genome in an active form is the only important factor.

So to reinforce the impossibility of the paradox, if the group is able to continue its existence generation after generation via the survival of the individuals within that group, then the individuals must themselves be 'fit', mustn't they? No matter the bizzarity of how they are able to reproduce, they do, which is why the group survives.

Worker ants are explained because through the breeding structure of an ant colony, the worker ants behavior ensures a genome very similar to it's own will continue to exist. It effectively is protecting its own genome even if won't actually get to reproduce with its exact genome.

Wiseman's misunderstanding of group selection demonstrates why this would have been an important distinction to make.

Windy, the point you referred to from Caledonian is not different than my own, so clearly it is you who is misunderstanding something here.

I "get" what group selection is, as you know, at the high level it's not a difficult concept. But my point in an earlier argument is that the idea of group selection can logically only mean one thing, and it is not the idea that somehow the group can flourish while the individuals are slowly dying out, due to actual decreased fitness, that is a logical paradox that cannot be resolved. There seems to be exceptionally high expectations from group selection in this sense. Unrealistic expectations.

If you take away that paradoxical definition of group selection, and consider the only logical alternative, 'group selection' now becomes how can the group of individuals evolve in a way in which changes how the individual survives to benefit not just itself but also the group, but not the degree to which the individual survives. In this sense of group selection, evolution at the 'gene level' is not forbidden from partaking in group selection. Remember, if the degree to which the individual was able to survive decreased, if it was actual decreased fitness, we arrive back at the paradox where somehow the group is flourishing while all the individuals of that group are dead.

Eliezer: "If the entire human genome of 3 billion DNA bases could be meaningful, it's not clear why it would contain <25,000 genes"

I wouldn't say we know enough about biological mechanics to say we necessarily need more protein coding-DNA that protein-regulating DNA. If you think about it, collagen the protein is used in everything from skin, tendons, ligaments, muscles, fascia, etc. But you can't code for all of those uses of collagen just by HAVING the collagen code in the DNA, you need regulating code to instruct when/where/how to use it.

Also, as I explained earlier, it seems doubtful that you could ever calculate the maximum sustainable DNA that actually codes, unless you know how many mutations are detrimental. You might be able to come up with a mathematical relationship, but not an absolute amount that would rule all that human DNA is junk.

"Once you are dealing with hominids, which may be the most important example, indeed "enforcement" may well be important. There is a growing lit on how reciprocal altruism ultimately depends on punishment of free riders, that is, enforcement."

That sounds to me like an example of an "Evolution Fairy".

TGGP, your description of what group selection is is not in contradiction with mine. I merely described one isolated group, but the concept can apply to more than one of course. Imagine two groups of foxes and rabbits, one in which restraint is developed and selected for because of the greater health of their youth in times of famine, and one in which restraint is not in any gene, in which case the health of that population is generally lower than the restrained group, but still alive because it is not competing with any internal restrained-breeding individuals. This concept even works when the fox groups are isolated and the rabbit population is shared (however unlikely, that is possible.)

As for your last comment,

"However, all those populations would be vulnerable to the overbreeding mutation suddenly appearing, so it would not be a good explanation."

...I addressed the mechanics of why this wouldn't be a problem to group selection in my first post.

Ok Kaj, I agree fast-breeders will at some points overwhelm slow/restrained breeders, at times where food is plentiful and greater than the amount needed to sustain the current fox population. But as long as that breeding goes unrestrained, the ecosystem enters a state which there exists less fox food than needed. As soon as that happens, restrained breeders have an inherint advantage because they waste less energy developing innevitably unviable fetuses. The important thing about this rule is it applies to any situation where they is less food than needed to sustain the current fox population. Even if it's only 99% enough food, the rule still applies. When I say 99% enough food to sustain the current population, I litterally mean that, and not states where there's less food so every fox has to go hungry sometimes. I mean metabolically, can the available food possibly sustain the current fox population? If not what's the advantage of giving birth to more cubs than could possibly survive anyway? How is that behavior going to lead to greater spreading of your genes? I don't see how it could.

I know it sounds like I'm repeating myself, but I just can't think of another way to state it. Perhaps it will come to me later.