Today's Inkhaven post is an edit to yesterday's, adding more examples of legitimacy-making characteristics, so I'm posting it in shortform so that I can link it separately:

Here are some potential legitimacy-relevant characteristics:

• The reasoning is logically valid.
• The assumptions of the argument are credible (this splits into many characteristics we can name:)
  • The assumptions are simple.
  • There are few assumptions.
  • The assumptions have very few degrees of freedom.
  • The assumptions are agreed upon by many humans.
  • The assumptions are a strong consensus in the relevant field(s).
  • The assumptions are very probable according to best existing models.
  • The assumptions have high-quality citations backing them up.
  • The assumptions have been very useful (EG productive axioms in mathematics).
  • The assumptions are not jointly contradictory.
• The reasoning is probabilistically valid.
  • The reasoning is not Dutch-bookable.
  • The reasoning is very difficult to Dutch-book (bounded cognition).
  • The reasoning is accuracy-maximizing.
  • The reasoning is a plausible extension of logic.
• The reasoning employs credible priors.
  • The prior is close to human priors, or priors humans justifiably endorse.
  • The priors have rigorous frequentist justification (EG probability of a prime number based on the prime number theorem).
  • The priors have empirical validation.
  • The priors have a maximum-entropy justification.
  • The priors are dominant over other priors one might want to use.
• The probability of the conclusion is very high.
• The argument is very strong as a statistical test.
  • The bias is low.
  • The variance is low.
  • Confidence intervals are small.
  • The test has a low false positive rate.
  • The test has a low false negative rate.
  • The test is the best test to use out of alternative tests.
  • Robustness to outliers.
  • Robustness to a variety of distributions.
  • Good rate of convergence.

Yeah, the logic still can't handle arbitrary truth-functions; it only works for continuous truth-functions. To accept this theory, one must accept this limitation. A zealous proponent of the theory might argue that it isn't a real loss, perhaps arguing that there isn't really a true precise zero, that's just a model we use to understand the semantics of the logic. What I'll say is that this is a real compromise, just a lesser compromise than many other theories require. We can construct truth-functions arbitrarily close to a zero detector, and their corresponding Strengthened Liar will be arbitrarily close to false.

Seems to me like both.

No disagreement with the broad statements, but I note that your words do not particularly register the point that good conversation itself might be a turnon and lack thereof a turnoff? IE your post presents a puzzle: what's with the banter -> sex thing? I'm suggesting that many people might want to talk first as an inherent preference. Sure, there might be ways around that, but you weren't asking for something with no loopholes, you were asking about the banter -> sex thing.

Not really an experienced player of the relevant games, but I personally have turned down an obvious sex invitation with someone who I was otherwise interested in because too little conversation (and don't regret this choice). I am not very interested in sex with someone who I can't have a good conversation with. I feel like a lot of the intrigue of an intimate encounter is conversational intimacy. I've never experienced the chat at party -> sex pipeline, however. Only [chat online for multiple months]->sex.

all the relationships between components, etc, I made "explicit" 

Is there a typo here? "are made explicit" perhaps?

or that there is some set of rules such that following those rules (/modifying the expression according to those rules) is guaranteed to preserve (something like) the expression's "truth value"?

That's correct. More generally (since the concept also applies to noun phrases) guaranteed to preserve its "value" whatever type that may be. This "value" is something like what-it-points-at, semantic reference.

Yep, will fix.

(Also it's kinda iffy that weak disjunction is a stronger statement than strong disjunction...)

Yeah! I'm just going with what Wikipedia said there (unless I've made an error), but I had the same thought.

Fixed!