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Current genetic engineering, yes, but 50 or 100 years from now? Remember, we're talking not about what's viable now, but rather what's plausible and a unicorn is very plausible biologically -- it's merely technical difficulties which prevent us from creating one.
Touché!
It seems worth considering that I might benefit from specifically practicing being imaginative, or otherwise modifying my "two modes" thought pattern.
This does not seem very plausible as a genetic modification
Given narwhals, I don't see much in the way of biological problems with unicorns.
I think it's implausible with current or near-future genetic engineering. I am far from an expert on this, but I believe we can transfer chemical/metabolic capabilities between organisms, and I believe we can transfer many trats haphazardly, but to put a horn in a specific place and leave everything else untouched? This would involve designing a whole new growth point ("growth point" may not be quite the right concept). You'd have genes that activate only when on the forehead, in a very specific pattern which does not presently exist. Sure, if we could manipulate genes like code we could take the code for this from another animal -- all the activation patterns needed to grow a horn. But then we'd need to find a way to turn them on only at the specific point desired.
The easiest way might be to try and cross in rhino genes. This could produce a hybrid animal with some horse features and some rhino features. It would have many aspects of the rhino shape all throughout the body, and eliminating these without reducing the horn would be difficult. And a rhino horn isn't really like a unicorn horn.
Perhaps narwal genes, but that sounds even more haphazard.
the distinction does not seem so clear in your mental processes
Well, in certain ways it exists. If I'm trying to figure out how to fix a broken thingy, my imagination tends to stick within the realm of the plausible. But in other ways, not necessarily -- for example, I don't see much, if any, difference between imagining a deer standing in the middle of a forest meadow and imagining a unicorn in the same place.
I guess you can even conceptualize progress as movement of "things" from the realm of the fantastical into the realm of the plausible.
For me, there is a big difference. It's something like a mode of thinking -- "is it plausible? could it happen? push toward the real" vs "is it interesting? is it exciting? freely explore the space". The first mode of thinking sees the unicorn and starts thinking: This does not seem very plausible as a genetic modification. Is the horn grafted on, perhaps? Does that work with the skull structure of a horse, or is there not enough foundation to stick it to? What about the skin healing, next to the horn? How does that work? Would it heal over properly, or remain like an open wound?
The second mode says -- just how magical is this unicorn? There are a lot of levels to this. It could be anything from a horse with a horn to a godlike thing which can zap stuff in and out of existence. If it's the godlike thing, it probably isn't very smart or goal-driven; otherwise it would reshape everything to its whim. Maybe it only uses the powers in defense, and occasionally on a whim.
In response to
Fiction Considered Harmful
It could be that, like sleep, the benefits of reading fiction aren't obvious and aren't on the surface. IOW, escapism might be like dreaming - a waste from one point of view (time spent) but still something without which we couldn't function properly, so therefore not a waste, but a necessary part of maintenance, or summat.
Yeah, I'd be very interested in evidence concerning these things.
In response to
Aumann Agreement Game
I like this very much. Did the game work in practice as you describe in the example?
Essentially, yes! There were often a few more revisions than this, and the trolling was more subtle.
In fact-oriented imagination, I'm imagining things that could be true in the real world
"Could be true in the real world" -- given how you mention alien planets -- is a very low bar. Tolkien could be true on some alien planet (especially if you're a fan of MWI). And don't forget Clarke's Third Law.
and dislike fantastical ideas which are not trying to be plausible
Ah, here is an interesting word: "plausible". Notice how it's not a limit of what could actually be -- it's a limit on what a person can imagine :-/
I would guess that if imagining is frowned upon, the boundaries of "plausible" will contract.
What would it look like if rationalists/rationalism steered toward a future society in which fictive discourse was in a similar category to lying?
I think it would look like stagnation.
I take this as a statement that the distinction does not seem so clear in your mental processes.
Which is interesting.
I think it would look like stagnation.
Yeah... I am now of this position as well.
In response to
Fiction Considered Harmful
Fiction is just imagination set to words.
Are you willing to argue against imagination?
In my mind, at least, there is a fairly large distinction between fact-oriented imagination and fictive imagination. In fact-oriented imagination, I'm imagining things that could be true in the real world (including future/past, alien planets, etc). In fictive imagination, deviations are allowed.
Am I willing to argue against non-fact-oriented imagination? Probably not, but let's consider it. What would it look like if rationalists/rationalism steered toward a future society in which fictive discourse was in a similar category to lying?
I'm imagining that the society would still have something like entertainment. This may not be the case, of course, since a society very much in the future is rather difficult to imagine. The entertainment would be more fact-based, like sports, biographies and documentaries. Speculative (imaginative) conversations between friends are fact-oriented; people prefer to talk about hard-science-fiction style speculation rather than soft, and dislike fantastical ideas which are not trying to be plausible.
Is something essential missing?
My feeling is that fiction provides some kind of release that fact does not -- it feels more restful to me. I'm suspicious of this feeling, because I don't think I'm actually more rested after reading fiction, but it's hard to say. Highly fact-oriented discussions can be a lot of fun (especially in situations where discussion is typically not fact-oriented), but it feels "heavy"; there's this big web of constraints to deal with.
I really do want to make a distinction between pleasurable things and terminally-valuable things, though. At least I think I do.
I'm missing a description of what those terminally-valuable goals might be, though.
I think it would be unfortunate if future civilizations decided maximum wireheading was the greatest ethical good.
I agree. But the fundamental question: what is the good of Man? is going unanswered. As it mostly has done on LessWrong, even in the Sequences. We spend our whole lives on two things: overcoming problems, and enjoying ourselves. Bread (the struggle to procure it) and circuses. In Paradise, the problems are gone, the bread is free; is anything left but lotus-eating?
I don't have an answer to that either. One can talk about "eudaimonia", or "flourishing", or as Eliezer does, "fun", but those are just names for whatever it is.
But casting this in terms of Paradise, whether the transhuman one or a religious one, removes the problem from the world around us and too easily leads into empty speculation. When you leave aside the irksome chores of keeping your body fed, clothed, and housed, and the rejected pleasures listed previously, what purposes should get someone out of bed in the morning? And when they are achieved, what then? Is there, in fact, such a thing as a terminal goal?
(I find it quite amusing that I'm getting push-back on the ice cream thing.)
gjm said that it's "basically sugar and fat, neither of which is very good for your health when consumed in large quantities". But the dose makes the poison; fat is an essential macronutrient, and carbohydrates all but.
I'm sceptical of the whole superstimulus idea, based partly on personal experience and partly on an understanding of control systems. I hinted at the former in speaking of having had an ice-cream "as recently as a month ago". People speak of chocolate as another superstimulus. There's usually a 200g block of Cadbury's Fruit and Nut in my store cupboard. A block lasts about a month and is only there for quasi-medicinal purposes, to alleviate low blood sugar crashes (of causes unknown). From the point of view of control systems, if your satiety-sensing system is in order, you will never overeat. The "attractiveness" of food is irrelevant. I don't care how "enjoyable" something is to eat, if I'm already full it is effortless to decline to eat more, and repugnant to do otherwise. Whatever is going wrong in the current surge of obesity, it isn't extraordinarily attractive food.
Whatever is going wrong in the current surge of obesity, it isn't extraordinarily attractive food.
Yeah, that's true.
I agree. But the fundamental question: what is the good of Man? is going unanswered.
In terms of it going unanswered in the Sequences or wider lesswrong, I somewhat disagree. The sequences specifically argue that good is complex and fragile -- complex meaning it would take a long time to write down all the details and they can't just be summarized with a pattern that gives rise to them; fragile meaning that we need to get all the details right. This means, specifically, that Eliezer did not expect anyone to be able to write everything humans value down and get it right in one shot, even given considerable effort. Instead, some aspects were addressed which were particularly important to illustrate one point or another.
As for me, I also was not expecting to be able to fully articulate what it is that I, or humans, value. I'm trying to articulate my intuitions about this particular issue.
I'm missing a description of what those terminally-valuable goals might be, though.
I think the reason that you're asking is because you think I'm pushing everything off the table, in trying to make a distinction between pleasurable things and actually-valuable things. At times in this conversation, under varying degrees of devil's-advocacy, I've pushed things ranging from fiction to taking a walk in the park off the table. I can see why you're concerned.
My intuition tends to say that nothing is very valuable in isolation. Things gain meaning by their connection to each other (beyond just instrumental value of being able to physically cause more value down the line). This is because value comes from patterns of things, and systems of interconnected structure. A thing like an ice cream cone is not totally devoid of this kind of beauty; it's a matter of degree.
In the view that you're devils-advocating, fiction is fake, admiring nature is silly, casual sex is meaningless, and music is empty. If these are counterfeits, what are they counterfeits of?
And what's the thing about ice-cream?
I'd better climb out of the devil's advocate position before I dig myself too deep a hole.
gjm's reply is perfect in terms of describing the position being outlined.
I really do want to make a distinction between pleasurable things and terminally-valuable things, though. At least I think I do.
The way you're reacting makes me think that you don't -- that you find it puzzling that I want to differentiate between superstimulus and actually good things at all, regardless of questions about fiction and such.
I think it would be unfortunate if future civilizations decided maximum wireheading was the greatest ethical good.
I think it would also be unfortunate (but less so) if future civilizations decided that finely crafted full sensory experiences, akin to movies, were the ultimate good.
I furthermore think it would be unfortunate (but significantly less so) if future civilizations decided that finely crafted interactive experiences, akin to 1-player games with only non-sentient NPCs, were the ultimate good.
(With significantly more uncertainty, I think it would be much worse if all of the movies or interactive experiences were identical. The image of billions or more identical clones (human-optimal in whatever sense) watching identical recordings of a single extremely well-crafted thousand-year movie does not appeal very much to me. I'm not sure it's more preferable than a single human experiencing this best-of-all-possible-movies. Similarly, but less so, for interactive experiences.)
The ideal case seems much more like a massively multiplayer one, despite the fact that players will tend to clash with one another and it's much harder to optimize properly (will have to be worse in other respects as a result).
Applying the intuitions from these rather distant scenarios to more everyday matters, the enjoyment from ice cream does fall rather far toward the beginning of the spectrum I've just outlined. It seems rather like a small dose of wireheading (except when enjoyed socially).
(I find it quite amusing that I'm getting push-back on the ice cream thing.)
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This is fair, because you're using the technique to redirect us back to the original morality issue.
But i also don't think that MBlume was completely evading the question either. The question was about ethical principles, and his response does represent an exploration of ethical principles. MBlume suggests that it's more ethical to sacrifice one of the lives that was already in danger, than to sacrifice an uninvolved stranger. (remember, from a strict utilitarian view, both solutions leave one person dead, so this is definitely a different moral principle.)
This technique is good for stopping people from evading the question. But some evasions are more appropriate than others.
Agreed.