Comment author: moridinamael 01 August 2016 02:33:23PM 3 points [-]

I've made an app that would greatly benefit from being open source in order to allow users to write their own plugins. How do I make it open source while still satisfying my capitalist rent-seeking exploitative desires?

Comment author: akvadrako 07 August 2016 01:10:40PM *  1 point [-]

You could publish it as GPL3 or something more restrictive. If someone else has a plugin that has commercial potential, they'll need a more permissive license.

Comment author: Daniel_Burfoot 12 July 2016 05:39:13PM *  4 points [-]

I have some software I am thinking about packaging up and releasing as open-source, but I'd like to gauge how interesting it is to people other than me.

The software is a highly useable implementation of arithmetic encoding. AE completely handles the problem of encoding, so in order to build a custom compressor for some data set, all you have to do is supply a probability model for the data type(s) you are compressing (I call this "BYOM" - Bring Your Own Model).

One of the key technical difficulties of data compression is that you need to keep the encoder and decoder in exact sync, or the whole procedure goes entirely off the rails. This problem is especially acute for the use case of AE, where you are potentially changing the model in response to every event. My software makes it very easy to guarantee that the sender/receiver are in sync, and at the same time it reduces the amount of code you have to write (basically you don't write a separate encoder and decoder, you just write one class that is used for both, depending on the configuration).

Comment author: akvadrako 07 August 2016 01:05:33PM 0 points [-]

Just post it on github with no effort. If you start getting pull requests or issues logged, you'll have your answer.

Comment author: qmotus 28 March 2016 12:01:53PM 1 point [-]

I think the point is that if extinction is not immediate, then the whole civilisation can't exploit big world immortality to survive; every single member of that civilisation would still survive in their own piece of reality, but alone.

Comment author: akvadrako 31 March 2016 09:22:55PM 0 points [-]

It doesn't really matter if it's immediate according to empty individualism. Instead the chance of survival in the branches where you try to die must be much lower than the chance of choosing that world.

You can never make a perfect doomsday device, because all kinds of things could happen to make it fail at the moment or during preparation. Even if it operates immediately.

Comment author: qmotus 08 March 2016 10:25:59AM 0 points [-]

Yeah. I meant that I don't find the roulette scenario very relevant since I believe that we're much more likely to experience some other scenario where this property of the quantum multiverse becomes relevant, like the terminal illness one I described. Most of us won't play the roulette.

Anyways, there's a flaw in lisper's original argument: death is not unavoidable even after wrists have been slit.

Comment author: akvadrako 08 March 2016 11:28:07AM 0 points [-]

I think we agree but I was trying to make a bigger point than your reply captures. I doubt that you will even experience the terminal illness assuming there are many more possible futures where you stay healthy and anti-aging science advances than ones where you are miraculously saved at the last minute, by aliens or luck.

That makes the roulette scenario relevant to our experience. Because if you have the conviction to pull the trigger if something doesn't go your way you have the three options I laid out. So most likely you don't even have to try - assuming you are sure you will.

Comment author: qmotus 08 March 2016 09:12:47AM 0 points [-]

(This comment is a reply to another branch of this discussion as well.)

Yes, God will be able to see that there is a you that survived the process and went on to live the life of Riley. But whether or not you will be able to see that is a very open question

I disagree. To keep things simple, let's suppose that the bullet, if it hits, really will kill the participant with practically 100% certainty and will do so practically immediately (I'll come to this a bit later). In that case the only outcome the participant can expect to experience, and that they will experience with certainty, is that the gun didn't fire. This is exactly what happens if you take the mortal's-eye-view; God, as you mentioned, will notice that elsewhere in the multiverse, the participant did get hit. Now, whether the participant cares about their loved ones or the copies that die in the attempt is a matter of preferences, but if we're simply talking about which outcome to experience, this is how it goes, I think.

Note that playing quantum roulette successfully depends crucially on the speed with which you can kill yourself. Trying to play by slitting your wrists, for example, doesn't work because once you see that your wrists are slit you can't roll that back. So the success of the enterprise depends entirely on killing yourself fast enough that you don't become aware of your imminent and (in the relevant branches of the multiverse) unavoidable death. How fast is fast enough? Well, that is (literally!) the sixty-four-million-dollar question. Unless you have an answer that you are very confident is the correct one, it seems to me like an imprudent risk to take.

With this I agree, which is why I think the quantum Russian roulette or quantum suicide scenarios are mostly interesting as a thought experiment, as they're intended to be. But there are practical situations that are somewhat analogous: think, for example, about a terminally ill patient who faces an almost certain death within several days. Should they expect to survive or continue to experience things, and if so, in what way? My understanding is that according to quantum mechanics, there are all kinds of weird scenarios with non-zero probability that make "survival" possible, such as simply surviving one more day indefinitely despite all odds, being miraculously cured, or maybe being resurrected by a hyper-advanced future civilization in a simulation. Note that, in principle, this probably applies to any possible life-and-death situation.

I used the word "experience" a number of times there, which brings me to a point you made in another comment:

Notice (!) that when you start to talk about "noticing" things you are tacitly bringing consciousness into the discussion, which is a whole 'nuther can o' philosophical worms.

I don't think this can of worms is that bad. We have a pretty good grasp of what it means to be conscious, even if we can't define it exactly; and also we're (at least I am) pretty confident that it's a purely physical phenomenon with nothing supernatural and thus subject to the laws of QM. I think that's enough. Where it does get a bit problematic is when we're talking about scenarios like the one with the terminally ill patient; presumably there's also a possibility that the patient's consciousness degrades until it no longer makes sense to call them conscious, since there's probably no clear line anywhere separating conscious and non-conscious in this way. (This might also imply that if we should expect to die, we should expect to do so by very slow decay, like patients with Alzheimer's, which doesn't sound too good to me.)

Comment author: akvadrako 08 March 2016 09:56:55AM *  0 points [-]

In that case the only outcome the participant can expect to experience, and that they will experience with certainty, is that the gun didn't fire

Yes, that's the point. Every future version of you will of course call themselves "you".

Note that playing quantum roulette successfully depends crucially on the speed with which you can kill yourself. With this I agree, which is why I think the quantum Russian roulette or quantum suicide scenarios are mostly interesting as a thought experiment, as they're intended to be.

Although I don't want to advocate performing the roulette experiment, I do disagree. If it's a quantum certainty that all future branches of you die off, perhaps due to a conservation law, then only those versions of you which didn't go down that branch will be conscious.

Even if it isn't certain, because it seems like we are more likely to experience the branches that match our classical explanations in the following scenario after a few minutes I would expect to be version 3. Version 1 is of course impossible and only with a very short-sighted definition of self do I need to consider version 2.

  1. fire the gun and die (0%)
  2. fire the gun and be miraculously saved (1%)
  3. don't even attempt the experiment (99%)
Comment author: lisper 06 March 2016 06:27:04PM 0 points [-]

Doesn't the QIT you describe make the exact same predictions, also the Russian roulette you mentioned?

Nope.

But there's no single privileged future you, right?

There is no single privileged future me now, but when my future becomes my present there will be. (Also, see note below.)

You can actually do this experiment: listen to a geiger counter, or tune an old-school TV to an inactive channel and watch the snow on the screen. The math says that during this process there are an inconceivably vast number of you's being split off every time the geiger counter clicks (or fails to click) or every time you perceive a light or dark pixel on the screen. But you will only ever experience being one of those you's. Yes, all those other you's do exist, but the you that you perceive yourself to be can never interact with any of them, so they may as well not exist for the one you that you perceive yourself to be. And so the one you that you perceive yourself to be may as well live your life as if all those other you's didn't exist even though they really do.

(NOTE: there is really no such thing as "now", and you don't even have to go quantum to see that. Simultaneity gets tossed out the window with special relativity. There is my "now" and there is your "now" and they will not, in general, be the same.)

Comment author: akvadrako 07 March 2016 09:20:11PM 0 points [-]

Hi lisper,

I found your paper easy to follow and maybe insightful (I'll have to read it more carefully the second time) but like qmotus, I don't understand your reasoning in this thread. I'm assuming MWI is just an interpretation of unitary QM, so makes all the same mathematical predictions as other non-collapse theories. And the roulette story is just one way of looking at it, from the perspective of what I consider my (classical) self and what I call the future.

Since you are not claiming that QIT makes different mathematical predictions than MWI, how can you claim they make different predictions at all?

Comment author: Andy_McKenzie 30 June 2015 01:28:04PM 4 points [-]

That we want to stop AI research. We don’t. Current AI research is very far from the risky areas and abilities. And it’s risk aware AI researchers that are most likely to figure out how to make safe AI.

Is it really the case that nobody interested in AI risk/safety wants to stop or slow down progress in AI research? It seemed to me there was perhaps at least substantial minority that wanted to do this, to buy time.

Comment author: akvadrako 14 August 2015 09:18:44AM *  1 point [-]

I am one of those proponents of stopping all AI research and I will explain why.

(1) Don't stand too close to the cliff. We don't know how AGI will emerge and by the time we are close enough to know, it's probably too late. Either human error or malfeasance will bring us over the edge.

(2) Friendly AGI might be impossible. Computer scientists cannot even predict the behavior of simple programs. The halting problem, a specific type of prediction, is provably impossible in non-trivial code. I doubt we'll even grasp why the first AGI we build works.

Neither of these statements seems controversial, so if we are determined to not produce unfriendly AGI, the only safe approach is to stop AI research well before it becomes dangerous. It's playing with fire in a straw cabin, our only shelter on a deserted island. Things would be different if someday we solve the friendliness problem, build a provably secure "box", or are well distributed across the galaxy.

Comment author: akvadrako 25 January 2014 10:38:31AM 1 point [-]

This sounds like an excellent idea if you can get good number of countries represented. Could you clarify a couple things?

  • Is that €70 per night or for the whole weekend (and with 2 breakfasts)?
  • How many participants can attend?
  • How many are signed up already?
In response to Meetup : Utrecht
Comment author: akvadrako 10 December 2013 12:54:53PM 1 point [-]

I'm going to have to pass on this one, but I'd like be interested to see comments about how it went. Hopefully this becomes a regular thing in Amsterdam / Utrecht.

In response to Meetup : Amsterdam
Comment author: akvadrako 18 November 2013 11:24:11PM 2 points [-]

Would this be the first Less Wrong meetup in Amsterdam? Sounds worth a try.

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