Sources?

Maybe I should get a blood test.

I am so much a one-level person that my sense of social insincerity has atrophied.

Rational straight man syndrome. So much a truth-finder you forget how to not speak the truth.

If you lack an objective, a good goal is to be able to solve national math Olympiad problems in the time allowed for the competitions.

At this rate it might be very rational to look at ways to modify our cognitive architecture and limbic system to experience long term and sustained attraction and love... rather than hack it via external stimuli.

MDMA is promising when it comes to revive intimacy between long term couples. But its neurotoxic profile makes this non-workable for most people. Long term sustainable mood enrichers and love enhancers should be developed... this will be much more life enriching than just rationally learning what relationship style best suits you.

The crux of the disagreement, I think, is in the way we understand the self-assessment of our experience. If consciousness is epiphenomenal or just a different level of description of a purely physical world, this self-assessment is entirely algorithmic and does not disclose anything real about the intrinsic nature of consciousness.

But consciousness is not epiphenomenal, and a purely computational account fails to bridge the explanatory gap. Somehow conscious experience can evaluate itself directly, which still remains a not well understood and peculiar fact about the universe. In addition, as I see it, this needs to be acknowledged to make more progress in understanding both ethics and the relationship between the physical world and consciousness.

Dude's dead. QED.

Okay, now for my attempt to actually answer the prompt:

Your supposed "taste" for alcoholic beverages is a lie.

Summary: I've never enjoyed the actual process of drinking alcohol in the way that I e.g. enjoy ice cream. (The effects on my mind are a different story, of course.)

So for a long time I thought that, hey, I just have weird taste buds. Other people really like beer/wine/etc., I don't. No biggie.

But then as time went by I saw all the data about how wine-tasting "experts" can't even agree on which is the best, the moment you start using scientific controls. And then I started asking people about the particulars of why they like alcohol. It turns out that when it comes any implications of "I like alcohol", I have the exact same characterstics as those who claim to like alcohol.

For example, there are people who insist that, yes, I must like alcohol, because, well, what about Drink X which has low alcohol content and is heavily loaded with flavoring I'd like anyway? And wine experts would tell me that, on taste alone, ice cream wins. And defenses of drinking one's favorite beverage always morph into "well, it helps to relax..."

So, I came to the conclusion that people have the very same taste for alcohol that I do, it's just that they need to cook up a rationlizations for getting high. Still trying to find counterevidence...

Your turn: convince me that you really, really like the taste of [alcoholic beverage that happens to also signal your social status].

What does it mean to "cultivate an X based morality" and why should we do it? Why should we have an any-one-thing based morality? Obviously picking one moral emotion and only teaching and encouraging that is likely to leave important moral judgments out. I don't think even Peter Singer is recommending that. Nonetheless, empathy seems to have a central if not exclusive role in the motivation and development of lots of really important moral judgments. That empathy is not necessary for all moral judgments does not mean that it can be systematically replaced by other moral emotions in cases where it is central. Helping people is good! We should teach children to help people and laud those who do.

I'm not sure section 5 says... anything at all. All of the things said about empathy in this section are true of people. Try substituting one for the other. Which is to say, they're true for lots of other behaviors and emotions as well. Pointing out that biases affect empathy isn't helpful unless one has found a different moral emotion which inspires a extensionally similar moral judgment (one that leads to the same behaviors) that combines the motivational force of empathy without the vulnerability to bias. Anyone have candidates for that?

Edit: Prinz's suggestion is "outrage". He says we should get angry and indignant at the causes of suffering- claiming that this has more motivational power than empathy. This may be the case-- but outrage tends to come with empathy (unless the outrage is directed at something causing oneself harm) so it isn't clear how to evaluate this claim. More importantly, I see no reason at all to think outrage is less subject to bias. It can certainly be subject to in-group bias, proximity effects, salience effects. It can be easily manipulated. It also leads to people looking for an enemy where there isn't necessarily one. This leads to people ignoring causes of suffering like economic inefficiencies and institutional ineffectiveness in favor of targeting people perceived as greedy. A bit richly, he condemns the 'empathy-inspired' moral system of collectivism by referencing collectivist atrocities... as if they had nothing to do with outrage.

Obviously, outputting numbers like 10^39 is a sign that your argument is flawed. Nonetheless, I have sympathy for McGrew because so many are misunderstanding her argument.

Christian: If they were independent, the chances of the disciples coming up with the same story are tiny. So it is most likely they are all reporting reality.

Non-Christian: I agree that would be the case if they were independent, but it is more likely that they were in communication and conspired than that there is a supernatural/Jesus rose from the dead/etc.

C: If they were in communication, each martyr had the opportunity to sell out the conspiracy when threatened with death. As unlikely as all the disciples independently hallucinating and dying for a lie is, it is even less likely that each martyr independently chose to die for a conspiracy when each martyr knew any of the other disciples could render their martyrdom pointless by selling out the conspiracy (i.e. defecting in the prisoner's dilemma).

It is even less likely that all of them would cooperate in a many-way prisoner's dilemma when each knew the others knew how unlikely it would be for each to cooperate in a many way prisoner's dilemma when each knew...etc.

Therefore, the conservative assumption is that each was independent, which yields 10^39 to one that Jesus rose from the dead at the least (though it is really more likely than that because I am assuming independence, for which my argument is weaker than had they conspired). Consider: each would be consciously dying for a lie (nothing to gain, everything to lose), unlike people who later made up stories to be famous or for whatever reason (everything to gain, nothing to lose) when they were not in position to now what had happened.

So I am using 1 - [P(people make stuff up about Jesus) * P(they don't get called on it)], P(they don't get called on it) is tiny for cases in which each disciple is claiming that the other disciples were eyewitnesses, particularly when they are not independent.

N-C: Aha! So you admit that you got 10^39 from an assumption of independence!

C:...(sigh)...