For example, quite recently, several respected geneticists declared that there was no such thing as race - an idea that not even the dimmest kid I knew back in Detroit would have fallen for.

That struck me as a stunning nonsequitur. The kid in Detroit has no possible way of knowing how much of what they see is genetic versus environmental - unless they go online and read the scientific literature. Offering that sort of surface observation as evidence is on the level of "any kid in Detroit can see the Earth is flat".

While I agree the evidence is somewhat sparse, I think this is more of an issue of ease-of-reading versus rigor, and I think you've struck a reasonable balance.

I think the central thesis of this is, "The 'classic' view of ev-bio/psych that is modeled on the male earner, female caretaker family structure is probably wrong." If that's the case, your argument and evidence seem fairly solid. If you're going so far as to argue some other specific structure, then you're a bit short on evidence. There is an odd tendency to think that 1955 is the paradigm of human society, when it is decidedly an outlier.

I'm admittedly biased. Ever since I read about the history of marriage, I've suspected that the "History is just like 1950's" view is extremely flawed. Even in agricultural societies, mating was not really determined by individuals, but by their families. Cheating was probably relatively infrequent given the control exercised over women and the difficulty of cheating in a small village without lights available in the evening (as opposed to a large city).

I think this is an excellent post promoting an interesting topic, and I expect it is seeing relatively few upvotes because it runs contrary to many people's cherished beliefs.

This frequencies vs. probabilities issue is one of the controversies in heuristics & biases research, and Kahneman, Tversky, and others dispute Gigerenzer's take. For instance, here (pdf, see p. 8) is what Gilovich & Griffin have to say in their introduction to the book Heuristics and Biases (emphasis added):

In fact, presenting frequencies rather than probabilities sometimes makes judgment distinctly worse (e.g., Griffin & Buehler, 1999; Treadwell & Nelson, 1996), sometimes makes judgments distinctly better (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Koehler, Brenner, & Tversky, 1997) and quite often leaves the quality of judgment largely unchanged (Brenner, Koehler, Liberman, & Tversky, 1996; Griffin & Buehler, 1999). Even more troublesome for the evolution/frequency argument, Kahneman and Tversky’s original explanation of the probability—frequency discrepancy (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982a; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) provides a unified account of when frequency formats improve judgments and when they do not (e.g., Sloman, Slovak, & Over, 2000).

Critics claim that assessments of single-event probabilities are unnatural, and that only a frequency format is consistent with how the mind works (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1991b, 1994; Pinker, 1997). Kahneman and Tversky argued, in contrast, that representing problems in terms of frequencies tends to evoke mental models that facilitate the detection of set inclusion relations and thus improves judgment — and this view has received considerable support from the studies of Sloman and others (e.g., Evans, Handley, Perham, Over, & Thompson, 2000; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001; Sloman & Over, in press; Sloman et al., 2000).