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Despite dictatorships being the only strategyproof mechanisms in general, more interesting strategyproof mechanisms exist for specialized settings. I introduce single-peaked preferences and discrete exchange as two fruitful domains.
Strategyproofness is a very appealing property. When interacting with a strategyproof mechanism, a person is never worse off for being honest (at least in a causal decision-theoretic sense), so there is no need to make conjectures about the actions of others. However, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem showed that dictatorships are the only universal strategyproof mechanisms for choosing from three or more outcomes. If we want to avoid dictatorships while keeping strategyproofness, we’ll have to narrow our attention to specific applications with more structure. In this post, I’ll introduce two restricted domains with more interesting strategyproof mechanisms.
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