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Why should I desire what you describe? What's wrong with values more complex than a single transistor?
Also, naturalistic fallacy.
It's not a matter of what you should desire, it's a matter of what you'd desire if you were internally consistent. Theoretically, you could have values that weren't pleasure, such as if you couldn't experience pleasure.
Also, the naturalistic fallacy isn't a fallacy, because "is" and "ought" are bound together.
Can you define 'terminal values', in the context of human beings?
Terminal values are what are sought for their own sake, as opposed to instrumental values, which are sought because they ultimately produce terminal values.
Why is my terminal value pleasure? Why should I want it to be?
Fundamentally, because pleasure feels good and preferable, and it doesn't need anything additional (such as conditioning through social norms) to make it desirable.
No, we don't. That's making recommendations as to how they can attain their preferences. That you don't seem to understand this distinction is concerning. Instrumental and terminal values are different.
My position is in line with that - people are wrong about what their terminal values are, and they should realize that their actual terminal value is pleasure.
Awfully presumptuous of you to tell people what they should prefer.
Why? We do this all the time, when we advise people to do something different from what they're currently doing.
In response to
Open thread, Nov. 3 - Nov. 9, 2014
I hardly ever post (somewhere between one post per month and one post per year), but I read my feed almost daily.
In response to
2014 Less Wrong Census/Survey
The political ideology question seems to equate libertarian with libertarian capitalist, and communist with totalitarian There's no option for libertarian communism/socialism.
Also, the moral philosophy question seems to assume one believes moral questions have truth values. "None" isn't given as a choice.
"None" is presumably included in "Other", though next year it should probably be a separate option.
In response to
2014 Less Wrong Census/Survey
I'm a bit unhappy about the options for metaethical positions. I object to the identification of non-cognitivism with emotivism, because if non-cognitivism is defined as the position that moral statements don't have truth-values, then I'm a non-cognitivist, but I still hold that there are logical relationships between moral statements, and between moral and factual statements.
I suggested the metaethics question, and I'm sorry for any inadequacies in my descriptions. I used emotivism as the example for non-cognitivism because it's the form of it with which I'm most familiar, and because it would've been difficult to come up with a general example that would encompass all forms of non-cognitivism.
It was similarly difficult to come up with a general example for constructivism - my example is along the lines of Hobbesian constructivism, with which other constructivists may disagree.
In response to
Stupid Questions (10/27/2014)
How do I stop being a hipster? I saw Bryan Caplan advising his readers to read Scott Alexander and my first reaction was "Oh no, a well-known blog is recommending people read my favorite little blog. Now more people will read it and I won't be as special." I know this feeling is irrational, but how can I overcome it?
Whether this feeling is irrational depends on what causes it. It makes sense to worry about a community you like becoming popular, since it means that an increasing number of people would join it, potentially reducing its quality.
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Why is the internal consistency of my preferences desirable, particularly if it would lead me to prefer something I am rather emphatically against?
Why should the way things are be the way things are?
(Note: Being continuously downvoted is making me reluctant to continue this discussion.)
One reason to be internally consistent is that it prevents you from being Dutch booked. Another reason is that it enables you to coherently be able to get the most of what you want, without your preferences contradicting each other.
As far as preferences and motivation are concerned, however things should be must appeal to them as they are, or at least as they would be if they were internally consistent.