When the call to compile a reading list for new rationalists went out, contributor djcb responded by suggesting The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul, a compilation of essays, fictions and excerpts "composed and arranged" by Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett. Cut to me peering guiltily over my shoulder, my own copy sitting unread on the shelf, peering back.
The book presents Hofstadter and Dennett's co-curation of 27 pieces, some penned by the curators themselves, meant to "reveal" and "make vivid" a set of "perplexities," to wit: "What is the mind?" "Who am I?" "Can mere matter think or feel?" "Where is the soul?" Two immediate concerns arise. First, The Mind's I's 1981 publication date gives it access to the vast majority of what's been thought and said about these questions, but robs it of of any intellectual progress toward the answers made in the nearly three decades since. (This turns out not to be an issue, as most of the answers seem to have drawn no closer in the 1980s, 1990s or 2000s.) Second, those sound suspiciously similar to questions hazily articulated by college freshmen, less amenable to "rational inquiry" than to "dorm furniture and bad weed." They don't quite pass the "man test," an reversal of the fortune cookie "in bed" game: simply tack "man" onto the beginning of each question and see who laughs. "Man, who am I?" "Man, where is the soul?" "Man, can matter think or feel?"
Hofstadter and Dennett's fans know, however, that their analyses rise a cut above, engaged as they are in the admirable struggle to excise the navel-gazing from traditionally navel-gazey topics. The beauty is that they've always accomplished this, together and separately, not by making these issues less exciting but by making them more so. Their clear, stimulating exegeses, explorations and speculations brim with both the enthusiasm of the thrilled neophyte and the levelheadedness of the seasoned surveyor. They even do it humorously, Hofstadter with his zig-zaggy punniness and Dennett with his wit that somehow stays just north of goofy. Thus armed, they've taken on such potentially dangerous topics as whether words and thoughts follow rules, how the animate emerges from the inanimate (Hofstader's rightly celebrated Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid) and consciousness (most of Dennett's career), on the whole safely.
But obviously this is not a "pure" (whatever that might mean) Hofstadter-Dennett joint; rather, their editorial choices compose one half and their personal commentaries — "reflections," they banner them — on the fruits of those choices compose the other. Nearly every selection, whether a short story, article, novel segment or dialogue, leads into an original discussion and evaluation by, as they sign them, D.R.H. and/or D.C.D. They affirm, they contradict, they expand, they question, they veer off in their own directions; the reflections would make a neat little book on the topics at hand by themselves.
IAWYC and your examples reflect my own experience.
But unless there's some difference between the amount of planning, thinking, and daydreaming necessary for our ancestral environment and the amount of those things necessary now, evolutionary psychology at least provides some weak evidence that humans on average plan, think, and daydream about the right amount. That suggests that maybe the costs to asking people on dates and getting stuff done is balanced by benefits elsewhere.
This is an important consideration. I just can't figure out how to test it.
I upvoted this partly because it was really well written and I would love to see more articles of this caliber.
As for the topic... I guess I don't disagree on any particular point and I think the insights are good to note. Personally I seemed to head in the opposite direction when faced with this problem:
One might grant that while responding that running models in head-land is nevertheless the best predictor of real-land events that any individual has. And that's true, but it doesn't change our apparent tendency to place far more trust in our head-land models than their dismal accuracy could ever warrant.
Instead of throwing out the head-land models and simulations as not helpful I look for ways to make the head-land models more accurate. The success of specific head-land models is more or less easy to measure: Did the predictions occur? The solution is two-pronged: look for better accuracy and ditch the apparently accuracy-bias.
The danger of head-land catastrophes that poison real-land endeavors looms over every step of the path. The possibility of being metaphorically laughed out of the classroom, though probably only illusory to begin with, never quite leaves one's mind.
Agreed; a major obstacle to measuring the success of head-land predictors comes when the predictions themselves affect the outcome of real-land. Namely, both fear of failures imagined and the relaxing opium of daydreams.
In my experience, it is possible to shoo the metaphorical laughter away. Furthermore, it is possible to let the head-land simulations run and remain emotionally abstracted from the results. Instead of responding to imagined failure with real-land fear, forge onward with the intent of measuring the success of your head-land.
Fearing head-land failures to the degree of not acting in the real-world truly is poison. But shutting off our best predictor because it may predict inaccurate failure seems to be letting a valuable tool fall away. It is better to not emulate than to not act but is it not possible to increase our accuracy?
I suppose my point can be boiled into this: My head-land has been known to guess correctly. Are these successes a false pattern? Are they evidence of a talent that can be honed into something useful to my real-land self? My head-land is telling me the latter.
Furthermore, it is possible to let the head-land simulations run and remain emotionally abstracted from the results.
This is wise. Getting the necessary distance would indeed work, as would improving head-land accuracy, though I'm dubious about the extent to which it can be improved. In any case, I'm not quite to either goal myself yet. And if your own head-land making accurate predictions, that's a good thing; I just can't get those kinds of results out of mine. Yet.
Could I get step by step instructions on how to more active in real-land instead of head-land?
I finally created an account just so I could 'up-vote' this post, which I enjoyed. I think it shows a depth of thought and introspection that is very helpful. Perhaps this post could be the start of a series?
I'd like to make it that, but we'll see what I can do.
I thought that was on purpose.
Nah; it was supposed to read "in which I construct." I just fumbled the editing.
Minor typo : it seems there's a missing word in this sentence:
Head-land is the world in which I constructing an image of what this sentence will look like when complete
Thank y'kindly. I upvote any and all comments that correct mistakes that would've made me look like a sub-lingual doof otherwise.
First off, welcome to Less Wrong! Check out the welcome thread if you haven't already.
You have a good writing style, but I hope you'll pardon me if I make a few suggestions based on the usual audience for Less Wrong posts:
Typically, a post of this length should be broken up into a sequence; you run the risk of "too long; didn't read" reactions after 1000 words, let alone 3000, and the conversation in the comments is usually sharper if the post has a single narrow focus. Usually, the analysis of a situation and the recommendations become separate posts if both are substantial.
Secondly, with the notable exception (sometimes) of P.J. Eby, we're often mistrustful of theories borne of introspection and anecdotes, and especially of recommendations based on such theories. There's therefore a norm of looking for and linking to experimental confirmation where it exists, and being doubly cautious if it doesn't. In this case, for instance, you could find some experimental evidence on choking that supports your thesis. This also forces you to think carefully about what sort of things your model predicts and doesn't predict, since at first glance it seems vague to the point of danger. The more specific you can get about these phenomena, the more useful your post will be.
Thanks; duly noted. I plan to write a few posts on the "road testing" of Less Wrong and Less Wrong-y theories about rationality and the defeat of akrasia, so these are helpful pointers.
View more: Next
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d){kind=logo}
= 27d567bc2d48d9f40e9ccc20ea370b15)
= b715d02e85f7b3b4ae65ca3d3e450868)
Subscribe to RSS Feed
In software development, this is known as being "Agile." Originally, software was designed mostly in head-land (a "Big Design Up Front"), but gradually a different process was pushed wherein a smaller, prototype design would first be constructed, then evaluated for its effects in real-land, and then improved upon, repeatedly. I find it interesting that unlike in the world of sports, where "one step at a time" can be almost universally agreed upon, software development is rife with controversy over whether "Agile software development methods" have any real advantages.
Sounds like the concept of "agility" could be generalized richly indeed.