It bothers some people - for example, you - but not most of us, no. This is the internet. You need to keep the trolls off, and posting things elsewhere is easy if you feel it's necessary.

Still, I'm not sure why it vanished, if Eliezer didn't delete it. That seems much more bother-worthy than it's unpopularity.

Why would it be deleted? Is there any accountability or appeal?

He explained why, didn't he? IANEY, but I suspect that there is no appeal. I assume that the comments people made are visible from their profile, but maybe not. Maybe there is an archived version somewhere online, if you are lucky. Don't hold your breath, though.

Deleted posts and comments can still be seen from the user's page.

Hi, an old discussion

http://lesswrong.com/lw/56m/the_conjunction_fallacy_does_not_exist/

gives the error, "The page you requested does not exist"

I have the right link. It's actually still linked from:

http://lesswrong.com/user/curi/submitted/

I wanted to check something from that discussion. As you can see from my submitted page, there were 113 comments. Why doesn't it exist? What's going on? Can someone help?

I didn't find any contact info except a bug tracker that didn't seem to have much activity since 2012, and my first guess is not a software bug. I may well have missed the right place to be asking about this, tell me if so.

At the time Popper wrote that, scientists had not yet figured out the rules for using probability correctly; the stuff he was criticizing really was wrong, but it wasn't the same stuff people use today.

Is this true? Popper wrote LScD in 1934. Keynes and Ramsey wrote about using probability to handle uncertainty in the 1920s although I don't think anyone paid attention to that work for a few years. I don't know enough about their work in detail to comment on whether or not Popper is taking it into account although I certainly get the impression that he's influenced by Keynes.

Bayesian updating, as a method of learning in general, is induction. It's trying to derive knowledge from data.

Only in a sense so broad that Popper can rightly be accused of the very same thing. Bayesians use experience to decide between competing hypotheses. That is the sort of "derive" that Bayesians do. But if that is "deriving", then Popper "derives". David Deutsch, who you know, says the following:

But, in reality, scientific theories are not ‘derived’ from anything. We do not read them in nature, nor does nature write them into us. They are guesses – bold conjectures. Human minds create them by rearranging, combining, altering and adding to existing ideas with the intention of improving upon them. We do not begin with ‘white paper’ at birth, but with inborn expectations and intentions and an innate ability to improve upon them using thought and experience. Experience is indeed essential to science, but its role is different from that supposed by empiricism. It is not the source from which theories are derived. Its main use is to choose between theories that have already been guessed. That is what ‘learning from experience’ is.

I direct you specifically to this sentence:

Experience is indeed essential to science, but its role is different from that supposed by empiricism. It is not the source from which theories are derived. Its main use is to choose between theories that have already been guessed.

This is what Bayesians do. Experience is what Bayesians use to choose between theories which have already been guessed. They do this using Bayes' Theorem. But look back at the first sentence of the passage:

But, in reality, scientific theories are not ‘derived’ from anything. 

Clearly, then, Deutsch does not consider using the data to choose between theories to be "deriving". But Bayesians use the data to choose between theories. Therefore, as Deutsch himself defines it, Bayesians are not "deriving".

The point of this criticism is that to even begin the Bayesian updating process you need probability estimates which are created unscientifically by making them up

Yes, the Bayesians make them up, but notice that Bayesians therefore are not trying to derive them from data - which was your initial criticism above. Moreover, this is not importantly different from a Popperian scientist making up conjectures to test. The Popperian scientist comes up with some conjectures, and then, as Deutsch says, he uses experimental data to "choose between theories that have already been guessed". How exactly does he do that? Typical data does not decisively falsify a hypothesis. There is, just for starters, the possibility of experimental error. So how does one really employ data to choose between competing hypotheses? Bayesians have an answer: they choose on the basis of how well the data fits each hypothesis, which they interpret to mean how probable the data is given the hypothesis. Whether he admits it or not, the Popperian scientist can't help but do something fundamentally the same. He has no choice but to deal with probabilities, because probabilities are all he has.

The Popperian scientist, then, chooses between theories that he has guessed on the basis of the data. Since the data, being uncertain, does not decisively refute either theory but is merely more, or less, probable given the theory, then the Popperian scientist has no choice but to deal with probabilities.  If the Popperian scientist chooses the theory that the data fits best, then he is in effect acting as a Bayesian who has assigned to his competing theories the same prior.

There was nothing in Open Society and its Enemies, Objective Knowledge, Popper Selections, or Conjectures and Refutations, nor in any of the books on Popper that I located. The one exception I found was in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, and the mentions of Bayes are purely technical discussion of the theorem (with which Popper, reasonably enough, has no problem), with no criticism of Bayesians. In summary, I found no critiques by Popper of Bayesians after going through the indices of Popper's main works as you recommended. I did find mention of Bayes, but it was a mention in which Popper did not criticize Bayes or Bayesians.

Nor were Bayes or Bayesians mentioned anywhere in David Deutsch's book The Beginning of Infiinity.

So I return to my earlier request:

I asked you to critique Bayesian updating with concrete examples.

I have repeatedly requested this, and in reply been given either condescension, or a fantastically obscure and seemingly self-contradictory response, or a major misinterpretation of my request, or a recommendation that I look to Popper, which recommendation I have followed with no results.

You've already been told that you made that the point of Jim's remark was about the emotionalism in your remarks, not about the correctness of your arguments. In that context, your sibling comment is utterly irrelevant. The fact that you still haven't gotten that point is of course further evidence of that problem. We are well past the point where there's any substantial likelyhood of productive conversation. Please go away. If you feel a need to come back, do so later, a few months from now when you are confident you can do so without either insulting people, deliberately trolling, and are willing to actually listen to what people here have to say.

I know what he thinks: he agrees with me.

I'm skeptical of the claim about Deutsch. Why not actually test it? A Popperian should try to poke holes in his ideas. Note also that you seem to be missing Jim's point: Jim is making an observation about the level of emotionalism in your argument, not the correctness. These are distinct issues.

As another suggestion, we could take a bunch of people who have epistemologies that are radically different from either Popper or Bayes. From my friends who aren't involved in these issues, I could easily get an Orthodox Jew, a religious Muslim, and a conspiracy theorist. That also handles your concern about a sample size of 1. Other options include other Orthodox Jews including one who supports secular monarchies as the primary form of government, and a math undergrad who is a philosophical skeptic. Or if you want to have some real fun, we could get some regulars from the Flat Earth Forum. A large number of them self-identify as "zetetic" which in this context means something like only accepting evidence that is from one's own sensory observation.

Not a single one of them considers it plausible my position on this stuff is a matter of emotions.

Jim is not suggesting that your position is "a matter of emotions"- he's suggesting that you are being emotional. Note that these aren't the same thing. For example, one could hypothetically have a conversation between a biologist and a creationist about evolution and the biologist could get quite angry with the creationist remaining calm. In that case, the biologist believes what they do due to evidence, but they could still be unproductively emotional about how they present that evidence.

They have put fallacious behaviour in quotes to indicate that they don't agree the fallacy exists. I could be wrong, however, as I am just going from the abstract and maybe the authors do claim it exists. However they seem to be saying it is just an artifact of hints. I'll need to read the paper to understand better. Maybe I'll end up disagreeing with the authors.

Textbook arguments are often wrong. Consider quantum physics and the Copenhagen Interpretation for example. And one way of arguing against CI is from a philosophical perspective (it's instrumentalist and a bad explanation).