Comment author: cousin_it 24 August 2010 09:13:53AM *  9 points [-]

The first dubious statement in the post seems to be this:

Because the experience of consciousness is subjective, we can never “know for sure” that an entity is actually experiencing consciousness.

How can you make such a statement about the entire future of science? A couple quotes:

"We may determine their forms, their distances, their bulk and their motions, but we can never know anything about their chemical and mineralogical structure" - Auguste Comte talking about stars in 1835

"Heavier than air flying machines are impossible" - Lord Kelvin, 1895

The second dubious statement comes right after the first:

However there must be certain computational functions that must be accomplished for consciousness to be experienced.

The same question applies: how on Earth do you know that? Where's your evidence? Sharing opinions only gets us so far!

And it just goes downhill from there.

Comment author: daedalus2u 24 August 2010 12:49:03PM 0 points [-]

With all due respect to Lord Kelvin, he personally knew of heavier than air flying machines. We now call them birds. He called them birds too.

Comment author: Oscar_Cunningham 24 August 2010 09:39:51AM *  3 points [-]

EDIT: I realise that you asked us to be gentle, and all I've done is point out a flaws. Feel free to ignore me.

You explore many interesting ideas, but none of them are backed up with enough evidence to be convincing. I doubt that anything you've said is correct. The first example of this is this statement:

Because the experience of consciousness is subjective, we can never “know for sure” that an entity is actually experiencing consciousness.

How do you know?

What if tomorrow a biologist worked out what caused conciousness and created a simple scan for it? What evidence do you have that would make you surprised if this happened?

First an entity must have a “self detector”; a pattern recognition computation structure which it uses to recognizes its own state of being an entity and of being the same entity over time.

Why? What is it that actually makes it impossible to have a concious (has qualia) entity that is not self-aware (knows some stuff about itself).

Recommended reading: http://lesswrong.com/lw/jl/what_is_evidence/

Comment author: daedalus2u 24 August 2010 12:43:28PM 0 points [-]

We can't “know for sure” because consciousness is a subjective experience. The only way you could “know for sure” would be if you simulated an entity and so knew from how you put the simulation together that the entity you were simulating did experience self-consciousness.

So how does this hypothetical biologist calibrate his consciousness scanner? Calibrate it so that he “knows for sure” that it is reading consciousness correctly? His degree of certainty in the output of his consciousness scanner is limited by his degree of certainty in his calibration standards. Even if it worked perfectly.

In order to be aware of something, you need to detect something. To detect something you need to receive sensory data and then process that data via pattern recognition into detection or not detection.

To detect consciousness your hypothetical biologist needs a “consciousness scanner”. So does any would-be detector of any consciousness. That “consciousness scanner” has to have certain properties whether it is instantiated in electronics or in meat. Those properties include receipt of sufficient data and then pattern recognition on that data to determine a detection or a not detection. That pattern recognition will be subject to type 1 errors and type 2 errors.

Comment author: wedrifid 24 August 2010 03:17:48AM *  3 points [-]

So, for example, any computer program that has the ability to to parse and understand relevant features of its own source code and also happens to have a few 'if' statements in some of the relevant areas.

It may actually exclude certain humans that I would consider conscious. (I believe Yvain mentioned this too.)

Comment author: daedalus2u 24 August 2010 03:43:10AM 0 points [-]

I am talking about minimum requirements, not sufficient requirements.

I am not sure what you mean by "understand relevant features of its own source code".

I don't know any humans that I would consider conscious that don't fit the definition of consciousness that I am using. If you have a different definition I would be happy to consider it.

Comment author: Yvain 24 August 2010 01:42:01AM *  9 points [-]

I think you've hit on an important point in asking what dissociation syndromes show about the way the mind processes "selfhood", and you could expand upon that by considering a whole bunch of interesting altered states that seem to correspond to something in the temporal lobe (I can't remember the exact research).

I didn't completely follow the rest of the article. Is "consciousness" even the right term to use here? It has way too many meanings, and some of them aren't what you're talking about here - for example, I don't see why there can't be an entity that has subjective experience but no personal identity or self-knowledge. Consider calling the concept you're looking for "personal identity" instead.

I also take issue with some of the language around continuity of personal identity being an illusion. I agree with you that it probably doesn't correspond to anything in the universe, but it belongs in a category with morality of "Things we're not forced to go along with by natural law, but which are built into our goal system and finding they don't have any objective basis doesn't force us to give them up". I don't think aliens would be philosophically rash enough to stop existing just because of a belief that personal identity is an illusion.

Also, paragraph breaks!

Comment author: daedalus2u 24 August 2010 03:31:15AM 3 points [-]

Yvain, what I mean by illusion is:

perceptions not corresponding to objective reality due to defects in sensory information processing used as the basis for that perception.

Optical illusions are examples of perceptions that don't correspond to reality because of how our nervous system processes light signals. Errors in perception; either false positives or false negatives are illusions.

In some of the meditative traditions there is the goal of "losing the self". I have never studied those traditions and don't know much about them. I do know about dissociation from PTSD.

There can be entities that are not self-aware. I think that most animals that don't recognize themselves in a mirror fit in the category of not recognizing themselves as entities. That was not the focus of what I wanted to talk about.

To be self-aware, an entity must have an entity detector that registers “self” upon exposure to certain stimuli.

Some animals do recognize other entities but don't recognize themselves as “self”. They perceive another entity in a mirror, not themselves.

Comment author: Jayson_Virissimo 24 August 2010 02:15:26AM 3 points [-]

daedalus2u, taboo "consciousness".

Comment author: daedalus2u 24 August 2010 02:46:36AM *  0 points [-]

[Consciousness] :The subjective state of being self-aware that one is an autonomous entity that can differentially regulate what one is thinking about.

Comment author: inklesspen 24 August 2010 01:04:58AM 1 point [-]

If I'm following your "logic" correctly, and if you yourself adhere to the conclusions you've set forth, you should have no problem with me murdering your body (if I do it painlessly). After all, there's no such thing as continuity of identity, so you're already dead; the guy in your body is just a guy who thinks he's you.

I think this may safely be taken as a symptom that there is a flaw in your argument.

Comment author: daedalus2u 24 August 2010 02:42:01AM 1 point [-]

No, there are useful things I want to accomplish with the remaining lifespan of the body I have. That there is no continuity of personal identity is irrelevant to what I can accomplish.

That continuity of personaal identity is an illusion simply means that the goal of indefinite extension of personal identity is a useless goal that can never be achieved.

I don't doubt that a machine could be programmed to think it was the continuation of a flesh-and-blood entity. People have posited paper clip maximizers too.

Comment author: daedalus2u 23 August 2010 11:58:36PM -1 points [-]

This is my first article on LW, so be gentle.

Minimum computation and data requirements for consciousness.

-13 daedalus2u 23 August 2010 11:53PM

Consciousness is a difficult question because it is poorly defined and is the subjective experience of the entity experiencing it. Because an individual experiences their own consciousness directly, that experience is always richer and more compelling than the perception of consciousness in any other entity; your own consciousness always seem more “real” and richer than the would-be consciousness of another entity.

Because the experience of consciousness is subjective, we can never “know for sure” that an entity is actually experiencing consciousness. However there must be certain computational functions that must be accomplished for consciousness to be experienced. I am not attempting to discuss all computational functions that are necessary, just a first step at enumerating some of them and considering implications.

First an entity must have a “self detector”; a pattern recognition computation structure which it uses to recognizes its own state of being an entity and of being the same entity over time. If an entity is unable to recognize itself as an entity, then it can't be conscious that it is an entity. To rephrase Descartes, "I perceive myself to be an entity, therefore I am an entity."  It is possible to be an entity and not perceive that one is an entity. This happens in humans but rarely. Other computation structures may be necessary also, but without an ability to recognize itself as an entity an entity cannot be conscious.

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Comments (81)
Comment author: gwern 02 August 2010 04:02:46AM 0 points [-]

Yes yes, this is an argument for suicide rates never going to zero - but again, the basic theory that suicide is inversely correlated, even partially, with quality of life would seem to be disproved by this point.

Comment author: daedalus2u 02 August 2010 12:53:21PM 3 points [-]

I think the misconception is that what is generally considered “quality of life” is not correlated with things like affluence. People like to believe (pretend?) that it is, and by ever striving for more affluence feel that they are somehow improving their “quality of life”.

When someone is depressed, their “quality of life” is quite low. That “quality of life” can only be improved by resolving the depression, not by adding the bells and whistles of affluence.

How to resolve depression is not well understood. A large part of the problem is people who have never experienced depression, don't understand what it is and believe that things like more affluence will resolve it.

Comment author: gwern 01 August 2010 05:27:06PM *  2 points [-]

My counterpoint to the above would be that if suicide rates are such a good metric, then why can they go up with affluence? (I believe this applies not just to wealthy nations (ie. Japan, Scandinavia), but to individuals as well, but I wouldn't hang my hat on the latter.)

Comment author: daedalus2u 01 August 2010 05:58:07PM 3 points [-]

Suicide rates are a measure of depression, not of how good life is. Depression can hit people even when they otherwise have a very good life.

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