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Comment author: entirelyuseless 14 June 2017 01:16:07PM 0 points [-]

I mostly agree with this, except for argument that we are in a simulation based on the non-existence of aliens, since I have no reason to believe that it is easy to get life from non-life in the first place. There may be one civilization out of every ten thousand spaces the size of our visible universe. This could change, of course, if it turns out that abiogenesis is extremely easy. Such a fact would actually support your position (which falsifies the implied claim in this thread that there cannot be evidence for it in principle.)

I definitely agree that it is a mistake to assume that an external simulating universe should have the same physical laws, or to argue that we are not in a simulation because it is "hard," or that it would use too much energy.

Comment author: denimalpaca 14 June 2017 02:50:30PM 0 points [-]

Could you give an actual criticism of the energy argument? "It doesn't pass the smell test" is a poor excuse for an argument.

When I assume that the external universe is similar to ours, this is because Bostrom's argument is specifically about ancestral simulations. An ancestral simulation directly implies that there is a universe trying to simulate itself. I posit this is impossible because of the laws of thermodynamics, the necessity to not allow your simulations to realize what they are, and keeping consistency in the complexity of the universe.

Yes its possible for the external universe to be 100% different from ours, but this gives us exactly no insight at all into what that external universe may be, and at this point it's a game of "Choose Your God", which I have no interest in playing.

Comment author: WalterL 14 June 2017 02:35:34AM 2 points [-]

It feels like you are answering the old question of whether God could create a rock he couldn't lift by explaining that lifting is hard.

Like, the idea that an entity simulating our universe wouldn't be able to do that, because they'd run out of energy doesn't pass even the basic sniff test.

Say 'our' universe, the one that you and I observe, is a billionth the size of a real one. Say they are running it so that we get a second every time they go through a trillion years. Say that all of us but me are p-zombies, and they only simulate the rest of y'all every time you interact with my experiences. The idea that there aren't enough resources to simulate the universe isn't even really wrong, it just seems like you haven't thought through the postulation of us being a simulation.

Even the invocation of our laws of physics as applying to the simulation is bonkers. Why would the reality where our simulation is run in have anything resembling ours? Our creations don't have physics that resemble ours. Video game characters don't fall as per gravity, characters in movies and books don't have real magnetism. Why would you imagine that our simulator is recreating their home conditions?

Lastly, you need to either fish or cut bait on the humans being possible to simulate. If you aren't postulating a soul, then we are nothing but complicated lighting and meat, meaning that we are entirely feasible to simulate. If you do think there's something about the human mind going on that God's computers or whatever can't replicate, then I'll certainly cede the argument, but you don't get to call yourself an atheist.

It's even more bizarre to see you say that the claim of simulation makes no predictions, in response to me pointing out that it's prediction (just us in the observable universe) is the reason to believe it.

Walter if no aliens: Simulation/creator of some kind Walter if aliens : Real

Denim if aliens: Real Denim if no aliens: looks really hard away from how monstrously unlikely our situation is.

Comment author: denimalpaca 14 June 2017 02:47:38PM 1 point [-]

Like, the idea that an entity simulating our universe wouldn't be able to do that, because they'd run out of energy doesn't pass even the basic sniff test.

I'm convinced you are not actually reading what I'm writing. I said if the universe ours is simulated in is supposed to be like our own/we are an ancestral simulation then this implies that the universe simulating ours should be like ours, and we can apply our laws of physics to it, and our laws of physics say there's entropy, or a limit to the amount of order.

I also believe that if we're a simulation, then the universe simulating ours must be very different than ours in fundamental ways, but this tells us nothing specific about that universe. And it implies that there could be no evidence, ever, of being in a simulation. Just like there could be no evidence, ever, of a god, or a flying spaghetti monster, or whatever other thought experiment you have faith in.

What I am trying to say is that you need a level of complexity to sufficiently trick intelligent beings in to not thinking they're in a simulation, and that humans could not create such a simulation themselves.

If you aren't postulating a soul, then we are nothing but complicated lighting and meat, meaning that we are entirely feasible to simulate.

Key word: complicated. Wrong word: feasible. I think you mean possible. Yes we are possible to simulate, but feasible implies that it can readily be done, which is exactly what I'm arguing against. Go read up about computer science, how simulations actually work, and physics before you start claiming things are feasible when they're currently impossible and certainly difficult problems that may only be feasible to the entirety of humanity working together for centuries.

It's even more bizarre to see you say that the claim of simulation makes no predictions, in response to me pointing out that it's prediction (just us in the observable universe) is the reason to believe it.

The prediction something makes is never the reason to believe something. The confirmation of that prediction is the reason to believe something. You cannot prove that whatever prediction the simulation makes is true, therefore there is not a rational reason to believe we are in a simulation. This is the foundation of logic and science, I urge you to look into it more.

The lack of aliens isn't proof of anything (absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence).

Comment author: WalterL 13 June 2017 09:37:10PM 1 point [-]

It feels like you've gone from asking for an explanation to resisting a conversion effort that I'm not making here.

Minds simulatable:

It's kind of weird that I'm the one saying that there is nothing magic about a mind, and you are the one basically adding souls, yet we are theist and atheist respectively, but surely if minds are unable to be simulated that would be a blow 'against' your beliefs, yeah?

Doing that being hard:

That doesn't seem knowable. Like, yeah, it seems like faking five senses would be hard, but that's just from our perspective. We can make much simpler minds than ours easily, presumably whatever made us is far enough beyond us that this isn't a big deal.

Rollback:

Same as above? LIke, maybe this is happening constantly, maybe not. No way for us to know.

We might find aliens one day!:

Sure, I'll change my mind when that happens. For now the evidence is that we are a special case, which implies a hidden variable. That hidden variable is most likely a mind, since that's what it would be if any simulated intelligence asked what it was.

The earth is unlike the rest of everything we've observed. That's weird. One potential reason is that a mind we cannot observe arranged things that way. That will be the right answer for any of our fictions that we give the ability to ask this question in the future, so it is probably the right answer for us.

Comment author: denimalpaca 14 June 2017 12:07:12AM 1 point [-]

First, I'm not "resisting a conversion". I'm disagreeing with your position that a hidden variable is even more likely to be a mind than something else.

you are the one basically adding souls

I absolutely am not adding souls. This makes me think you didn't really read my argument. I'll present this a different way: human brains are incredibly complex. So complex, in fact, we still don't fully understand them. With a background in computer science, I know that you can't simulate something accurately without at least having a very accurate model. Currently, we have no accurate model of the brain, and it seems that the first accurate model we may get is just simulating every neuron at some level. What I'm saying is that unless that level we simulate neurons on is sufficiently small, there will be obvious errors. Perhaps this is feasible to simulate some human minds, even at the level of quantum mechanics.

My claim against a simulation being run in our universe that could sufficiently trick a human is this: There is not enough energy. This can be understood by thinking about the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and recognizing that to fully simulate something would require giving that thing the actual energy it has; to simulate an electron, you would need to give it the charge of an actual electron, or else it would not interact properly with its environment. Then it follows, if everything is simulated with its actual energy, it would take more energy than the universe has to simulate, because practically we lose energy to heat every time we try to fight entropy in some small way. The conclusion is that the universe is precisely simulating itself, which is indistinguishable from reality.

The need for this perfect simulation is a consequence of maintaining the observable complexity that is apparent in the formulations of these hypotheses by people like Bostrom. I wouldn't claim humans being in a simulation is impossible - my claim is that our own civilization cannot perfectly recreate itself.

So there's no actual good reason to believe we're in a simulation of ourselves, unless you take Bostrom's arbitrary operations on even more arbitrary numbers as evidence. Which I obviously don't think anyone should.

Finally, as I said before, the claim of a simulation makes no predictions, and we can't even know a way, if any, of proving we're in a simulation - except by construction, which seems impossible as outlined above. So, with no way to prove we're in a simulation, no way to prove a god exists, and no decent way to even make a reasonable estimate of the likelihood of either, the potential mechanisms that created the universe should be part of random distribution until we can sufficiently understand and test physical processes at a deeper level.

Comment author: WalterL 13 June 2017 08:40:11PM 0 points [-]

You can call it 'something missing', or 'god'. The thing that put life on one planet and not on anything else that can be observed is the thing we are gesturing at here.

It feels like you see how the Mario argument works. The koopas are both pointing to the weirdness of their world, and the atheists are talking about randomness and the theists are talking about maybe it is a Sky Koopa.

Turn it around another way. Before too long we'll be able to write software that does basically what our brains do (citation needed, but LW so I'll guess you agree). Some of this software will be in simulated worlds. That software may well divide into atheist and theist movements, and speculate about whether they are in a simulation. The theists will be right.

There will be a lot more minds in simulations than have ever existed inside of human bodies (citation needed, but I feel pretty safe here), so the general answer, posed at large to the universe of all minds ever, to whether your observable universe has a 'god' or 'hidden factor' is 'Yes'.

Seems super arrogant for us to presume that we are the exception. Much more likely, there is sentience behind the arrangement of the observable universe. The idea that one planet alone would have life is just too much of a score counter, too much of a giveaway.

Comment author: denimalpaca 13 June 2017 09:22:35PM 0 points [-]

You can call it 'something missing', or 'god'.

I disagree. Something missing is different than a god. A god is often not well-defined, but generally it is assumed to be some kind of intelligence, that is it can know and manipulate information, and it has infinite agency or near to it. Something missing could be a simple physical process. One is infinitely complex (god), the other is feasibly simple enough for a human to fully understand.

The koopas are both pointing to the weirdness of their world, and the atheists are talking about randomness and the theists are talking about maybe it is a Sky Koopa.

I don't think this is really what you wrote the first time, but the argument you're presenting here doesn't progress us anywhere so I won't spend more time on it. I think we should drop this metaphor from the conversation.

Before too long we'll be able to write software that does basically what our brains do... There will be a lot more minds in simulations than have ever existed inside of human bodies...

Disagree again. First, "basically what our brains do" and "what our brains do" is almost certainly a non-trivial gap - if our brains are too complex for us to fully know every aspect of it at once, that is well enough to make precise predictions - then the jump to "basically what our brains do" introduces a difference in what we would predict. If we want to program all the neurons and neurotransmitters perfectly - have a brain totally modeled in software - then that brain would still need input like actual humans get or it may not develop correctly.

To the second point about " a lot more minds in simulations...", I also think this argument is fatally flawed. Let's assume that a perfect human brain can be simulated, however unlikely I think this is personally. To convince that simulated mind that it is in a base reality, it would have to be able to observe every aspect of that reality and come to the conclusion that the universe can and does fully exist by it's own processes. To be convinced it is living in a simulation, it may only need to see one physically "weird" thing; not a seemingly-too-improbable thing like no aliens, but an absolutely wrong thing, such as reversal of causality, that would be basically a glitch of the system.

Now some may argue that the simulators could "roll back" the simulation when these glitches occur, but I'm skeptical of the engineering feasibility of such a simulation in the first place that could, even for thousands of years, trick human minds. If we take a "lossy" simulation like video games now, it's clear that besides obvious bugs and invisible walls that bound the world, there's also a level of information resolution that's low compared to our world. That is, we can explain the physics of modern games by their physics engines, while we still struggle to explain the physics of the whole universe. If you have any amount of "lossiness" in a simulation, then eventually minds capable of finding that lossiness will - a brain in a vat will discover that, actually, nothing is made of atoms, but instead have their textures loaded in. Even if the brains we make don't have the ability to find this edge of resolution, we must assume that if we can create a superintelligent machine, and we can create a simulation of our own minds, then our simulated minds must also be able to create a superintelligence, which would either be able to find those lossy resolution issues or make a smarter being that can. Then the jig is up, and the simulations know they're in a simulation.

To get around the inevitable finding of lossiness in a simulation, the simulation creators would need to make their simulation indistinguishable from our own universe. This implies two things: first that such a simulation cannot be made, because making a perfect simulation of our universe inside our universe would take more energy than the universe has (see the Second Law of Thermodynamics if this doesn't make sense right away); the second is that if we could make a simulation indistinguishable from our universe, then we would know all the secrets of our universe, including whether or not we were in a simulation.

In physics, the answer to the question of "what's the something missing?" is not god, it is "we don't know yet." The answer that physicists look for makes specific predictions about testable phenomenon, and so far it does not seem that there are even any good testable claims that we're in a simulation.

What would those claims even be? Can we see where our universe is stored in memory on the machine we're supposedly running on? Why or why not?

Seems super arrogant for us to presume that we are the exception.

And it's super arrogant for theists to believe that a god created them special. So your argument from distaste of the other is not helping you.

The idea that one planet alone would have life is just too much of a score counter, too much of a giveaway.

We still don't know that we're the lone planet with life. And maybe it's too much of a giveaway to you, but it means almost nothing to me besides "the conditions to create life in the universe are rare even under arrangements where it is possible". Seeming like a score counter is not evidence it is a score counter. Only observing life on Earth is not a prediction about anything, it is not an explanation of anything - it is merely information, and the fact that you're twisting that information to give you a conclusion only says something about what you want to believe.

Comment author: WalterL 13 June 2017 07:47:53PM 1 point [-]

if I flip a coin twice and get heads, and you ask me what the odds are that it'll be heads next time, it's 50/50. If you flip heads a million times and ask me what it is next time then it's 100%, because the coin doesn't have a tails side. Sufficiently improbable stuff is evidence that there's a hidden variable you aren't seeing.

Imagine the turtles from Mario getting together and talking their world over? Koopa atheists would point out that they have no proof that their world is a simulation. Koopa theists would point to the equivalent of the no aliens data point (the score counter, the time limit). None of them can get evidence of 'God', but the ones that are smart aren't the ones that reserve judgement, and say maybe it's just really double random chance that their world is setup like an entertainment game.

Comment author: denimalpaca 13 June 2017 08:31:50PM *  0 points [-]

Sufficiently improbable stuff is evidence that there's a hidden variable you aren't seeing.

Sure, but you aren't showing what that hidden variable is. You're just concluding what you think it should be. So evidence that there's something missing isn't an opportunity to inject god, it's a new point to investigate. That, and sufficiently improbable stuff becomes probable when enough of it happens. Take a real example, like someone getting pregnant. While the probability of any given sperm reaching the egg and fertilizing it is low, the sheer number of sperm makes the chance that one of them fertilizes the egg is decent.

The argument can be equally applied to why we don't see alien civilizations: intelligent life may be incredibly rare, but not infeasibly so, because the universe is so vast that that vastness creates the chance for at least one instance of life starting and evolving to a noticeably intelligent state.

Neither the sperm nor the life, then, necessitate a god for their improbability yet existence, and until one can show that a god is necessary and nothing else will suffice to explain the universe, a god should not be proclaimed the (often only possible) right conclusion.

I don't see how your Mario argument relates to the no aliens data point, specifically how the positive evidence of a score counter in any way is like the lack of evidence of alien civs.

In response to Any Christians Here?
Comment author: WalterL 13 June 2017 04:03:40PM 2 points [-]

I'm kinda close to this. I'm definitely a LW-er, posted here for years and all that. I find the 'where are all the aliens/simulation?" argument to be pretty persuasive in terms of atheism being a bust, so my general leaning is theist.

I don't have strong ideas about what the Intelligent designer might be, but I think there is/was a mind at work. I attend church, but calling myself Christian would be a stretch. It's probably the closest though.

Comment author: denimalpaca 13 June 2017 07:39:07PM 0 points [-]

I find the 'where are all the aliens/simulation?" argument to be pretty persuasive in terms of atheism being a bust

Why does this imply atheism is a bust? The only thing I can think of that would make atheism "a bust" would be direct evidence of a god(s).

In response to Any Christians Here?
Comment author: Screwtape 13 June 2017 06:01:42PM 2 points [-]

I'd consider myself a rationalist, and also a christian. I don't expect to convince any of the former to join the later (or vice versa) but to give some explanation there are three main reasons.

  1. I alieve in the christian god, probably as a result of being raised by a protestant pastor and in a small rural town where the overwhelming majority of people were some form of protestant. I spent half a decade calling myself an atheist after making the intellectual realization that the evidence wasn't pointing that way, but I still consistently behaved as though it was. At this point, I feel like it's more honest to report based on how I know I think 'under the hood' so to speak. To reverse the metaphor of the dragon in the garage; if the garage-owner keeps making predictions as though there is a dragon and keeps being surprised when those predictions turn out false, you can fault them for not properly updating but you can't fault them for inconsistency.

  2. Calling myself christian has advantages for me. I live in a small rural town that's overwhelming protestant. My entire family sans two people are christian. My girlfriend's entire family is christian. All of my childhood friends are christian. I like going to church, the food at the potluck is pretty good, and everyone I know around here tithes ten percent to the best charity we can find already. Calling myself an atheist would impose social costs, wouldn't change much about my day to day life, and as mentioned in point 1 it wouldn't exactly be the truth. There are absolutely times to defy the majority, but I don't think my situation is one of those.

  3. The statistics for believers having better life outcomes seem persistent, but intellectually I'm pretty sure they're a combination of confounding and placebo. They also only seem to apply to people who sincerely hold those beliefs. That said, I'm in the right population to be affected by it, so fighting my alief probably means putting myself in a statistically worse population. Since five years of reading more atheist texts, attempting to let good arguments against my faith sink in, and trying to get my system 1 to update on failed predictions has failed to work, and since shouting my intellectual disagreement from the rooftops will mostly mean I don't get delicious pot luck every weekend and won't have the catharsis of prayer when I need it, I'm alright with accepting my faith as both an alief and a belief. I make my system 2 bets as separately as I can, and count on other parts of humanity to hopefully protect me from any black swans I'm missing.

(I'm less machiavellian about this than I come across here. This probably makes more sense if you accept that this alief is pretty firmly lodged in my head, but that everything else seems to update successfully as needed. )

Comment author: denimalpaca 13 June 2017 07:37:26PM 0 points [-]

you can fault them for not properly updating but you can't fault them for inconsistency.

They're still being inconsistent with respect to the reality they observe. Why is the self-consistency alone more important than a consistency with observation?

In response to Any Christians Here?
Comment author: Darklight 13 June 2017 04:47:45AM *  3 points [-]

I consider myself both a Christian and a rationalist, and I have read much of the sequences and mostly agree with them, albeit I somewhat disagree with the metaethics sequence and have been working on a lengthy rebuttal to it for some time. I never got around to completing it though, as I felt I needed to be especially rigorous and simply did not have the time and energy to make it sufficiently so, but the gist is that Eliezer's notion of fairness is actually much closer to what real morality is, which is a form of normative truth. In terms of moral philosophy I adhere to a form of Eudaimonic Utilitarianism, and see this as being consistent with the central principles of Christianity. Metaethically, I am a moral universalist.

Aside from that, I don't consider Christianity and rationality to be opposed, but I will emphasize that I am a very much a liberal Christian, one who is a theistic evolutionist and believes that the Bible needs to be interpreted contextually and with broad strokes, emphasizing overarching themes rather than individual cherry-picked verses. Furthermore, I tend to see no contradiction in identifying the post-Singularity Omega as being what will eventually become God, and actually find support from scriptures that call God, "the Alpha and Omega", and "I AM WHO I WILL BE" (the proper Hebrew translation of the Tetragrammaton or "Yahweh").

I also tend to rely fairly heavily on the idea that we as rational humans should be humble about our actual understanding of the universe, and that God, if such a being exists, would have perfect information and therefore be a much better judge of what is good or evil than us. I am willing to take a leap of faith to try to connect with such a being, and respect that the universe might very well be constructed in such a way as the maximize the long run good. It probably goes without saying that I also reject the Orthogonality Thesis, specifically for the special case of perfect intelligence. A perfect intelligence with perfect information would naturally see the correct morality and be motivated by the normativity of such truths to act in accordance with them.

This justifies the notion of perhaps a very basic theism. The reason why I accept the central precepts of Christianity has more to do with the teachings of Jesus being very consistent with my understanding of Eudaimonic Utilitarianism, as well as the higher order justice that I believe is preserved by Jesus' sacrifice. In short, God is ultimately responsible for everything, including sin, so sacrificing an incarnation of God (Jesus) to redeem all sentient beings is both merciful and just.

Also, I consider heaven to be central to God being a benevolent utilitarian "Goodness Maximizer". Heaven is in all likelihood some kind of complex simulation or positronium-based future utopia, and ensuring that nearly all sentient beings are (with the help of time travel) mind-uploaded to it in some form or state is very likely to bring about Eudaimonia optimization. Thus, the degree of suffering that occurs in this life on Earth, is in all likelihood justifiable as long as it leads to the eventual creation of eternal life in heaven, because eternal life in heaven = infinite happiness.

As to the likelihood of a God actually existing, I posit that with Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, a benevolent God is more likely than not going to exist somewhere. And such a God would be powerful and benevolent enough to be able to and also want to expand to all universes across the multiverse in order to establish as heaven maximally inclusively as possible, if not also create the multiverse via time travel.

As to evidence for the existence of a God... were you aware that the ratio of sizes between the Sun and the Moon just happen to be exactly right for there to be total solar eclipses? And that this peculiar coincidence was pivotal to allowing Einstein's Theory of Relativity to be proven in 1919? How about the odd fact that the universe seems to be filled with giant burning beacons called stars, that simultaneously provide billions of years of light energy, and basically flag the locations of potentially habitable worlds for future colonization? These may seem like trivial coincidences to you, but I see them as rather too convenient to be random developments, given the space of all possible universe configurations. They are not essential to sapient life, and so they do not meet the criteria for the Anthropic Principle either.

Anyways, this is getting way beyond the original scope or point of this post, which was just to point out that Christian rationalist Lesswrongers do exist more or less. I'm pretty sure I'm well in the minority though.

Comment author: denimalpaca 13 June 2017 05:40:46PM 1 point [-]

Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, a benevolent God is more likely than not going to exist somewhere.

I would urge you to go learn about QM more. I'm not going to assume what you do/don't know, but from what I've learned about QM there is no argument for or against any god.

were you aware that the ratio of sizes between the Sun and the Moon just happen to be exactly right for there to be total solar eclipses?

This also has to due with the distance between the moon and the earth and the earth and the sun. Either or both could be different sizes, and you'd still get a full eclipse if they were at different distances. Although the first test of general relativity was done in 1919, it was found later that the test done was bad, and later results from better replications actually provided good enough evidence. This is discussed in Stephen Hawking's A Brief History of Time.

and basically flag the locations of potentially habitable worlds for future colonization?

There are far more stars than habitable worlds. If you're going to be consistent with assigning probabilities, then by looking at the probability of a habitable planet orbiting a star, you should conclude that it is unlikely a creator set up the universe to make it easy or even possible to hop planets.

They are not essential to sapient life, and so they do not meet the criteria for the Anthropic Principle either.

Right, the sizes of the moon and sun are arbitrary. We could easily live on a planet with no moon, and have found other ways to test General Relativity. No appeal to any form of the Anthropic Principle is needed. And again with the assertion about habitable planets: the anthropic principle (weak) would only imply that to see other inhabitable planets, there must be an inhabitable planet from which someone is observing.

So you didn't provide any evidence for any god; you just committed a logical fallacy of the argument from ignorance. The way I view the universe, everything you state is still valid. I see the universe as a period of asymmetry, where complexity is allowed to clump together, but it clumps in regular ways defined by rules we can discover and interpret.

Comment author: denimalpaca 10 June 2017 06:43:40PM 1 point [-]

I think you wrote some interesting stuff. As for your question on a meta-epistemy, I think what you said about general approaches mostly holds in this case. Maybe there's a specific way to classify sub-epistemies, but it's probably better to have some general rules of thumb that weed out the definitely wrong candidates, and let other ideas get debated on. To save community time, if that's really a concern, a group could employ a back-off scheme where ideas that have solid rebuttals get less and less time in the debate space.

I don't know that defining sub-epistemies is so important. You give a distinction between math and theoretical computer science, but unless you're in those fields the distinction is near meaningless. So maybe it's more important to define these sub-epistemies as your relation to them increases.

Comment author: DragonGod 08 June 2017 08:49:31PM 0 points [-]

The negation of the event is that you did not get a cookie, not that you do not get a cookie. The negation of an event is that it did not happen. Either an event occurs or does not—it goes without saying that both an event and its negation cannot occur.

Comment author: denimalpaca 09 June 2017 03:44:57PM 0 points [-]

Even changing "do" to "did", my counter example holds.

Event A: At 1pm I get a cookie and I'm happy. At 10pm, I reflect on my day and am happy for the cookie I ate.

Event (not) A: At 1pm I do not get a cookie. I am not sad, because I did not expect a cookie. At 10pm, I reflect on my day and I'm happy for having eaten so healthy the entire day.

In either case, I end up happy. Not getting a cookie doesn't make me unhappy. Happiness is not a zero sum game.

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