devi

Please see my comment on the grandparent.

I agree with Jessica's general characterization that this is better understood as multi-causal rather than the direct cause of actions by one person.

However, this likely understates the magnitudes of differences in underlying traits across cities, owing to people anchoring on the people who they know when answering the questions rather than anchoring on the national population

I think this is a major problem. This is mainly based on taking a brief look at this study a while back and being very suspicious of it explicitly contradicting so many of my models (eg South America having lower Extraversion than North America and East Asia being the least Conscientious region)

The causal chain feels like a post-justification and not what actually goes on in the child's brain. I expect this to be computed using a vaguer sense of similarity that often ends up agreeing with causal chains (at least good enough in domains with good feedback loops). I agree that causal chains are more useful models of how you should think explicitly about things, but it seems to me that the purpose of these diagrams is to give a memorable symbol for the bug described here (use case: recognize and remember the applicability of the technique).

Great! Thanks!

I just remembered that I still haven't finished this. I saved my survey response partway through, but I don't think I ever submitted it. Will it still be counted, and if not, could you give people with saved survey responses the opportunity to submit them?

I realize this is my fault, and understand if you don't want to do anything extra to fix it.

I wasn't only referring to wanting to live where there are a lot of people. I was also referring to wanting to live near to very similar/nice people and far from very dissimilar/annoying people. I think the latter, together with the expected ability to scale things down, would make people want to live in smaller, more selected, communities. Even if they were in the middle of nowhere.

Where people want to live depends on where other people live. It's possible to move away from bad Nash equilibria by cooperation.

Yes, robust cooperation is not much to us if its cooperation between the paperclip maximizer and the pencilhead minimizer. But if there are a hundred shards that make up human values, and tens of thousands of people running AI's trying to maximize the values they see fit. It's actually not unreasonable to assume that the outcome, while not exactly what we hoped for, is comparable to incomplete solutions that err on the side of (1) instead.

After having written this I notice that I'm confused and conflating: (a) incomplete solutions in the sense of there not being enough time to do what should be done, and (b) incomplete solutions in the sense of it being actually (provably?) impossible to implement what we right now consider essential parts of the solution. Has anyone got thoughts on (a) vs (b)?