Comment author: Anders_H 03 September 2015 12:49:39AM *  5 points [-]

The primary reason why Predictit can't interest anyone in arbitraging is that they don't take "netting" into account when they determine your maximum possible loss. Arbitrage therefore requires you to tie up way to much money, such that it will rarely be a worthwhile investment

At the well-functioning prediction market Intrade, you were required to cover only your maximum possible loss across a mutually exclusive set of contracts (such as a list of people of whom at most one will be elected president). In contrast, PredictIt binds up your funds based on your maximum possible loss at any given contract.

As an example: Suppose buyers are offering to buy one contract on each of 10 possible candidates, at 15 dollars per contract. In other words, there is 50 dollars of free money on the table. On Intrade, you could sell a contract on each, and bind up 100 dollars for a year. This secures you a return of 50% In contrast, on PredictIt you would have to bind up 850 dollars for a year to secure the 50 dollars; which dramatically reduces the effective return to 6%

PredictIt also has a fees structure that discourages arbitrage (by taking cuts on the profits, and calculating the profits on the basis of each individual contract).

I tried to start a discussion about this on the PredictIt forum, but the comment did not make it past moderation. The lack of arbitrage is due to the poorly designed structure of the market. Possibly their hands are tied by the CFTC, I don't think it indicates anything sinister about PredictIt.

This is almost certainly one of those cases where there really is free money lying on the street, but each contract price will have to substantially exceed the interest rate in order to make the investment worth it.

Comment author: evand 03 September 2015 02:50:16PM 0 points [-]

Even so, at the moment there are sane interest rates available if you tie up your money that way. It's not just the lack of netting; it's the lack of netting, combined with the small deposit limits, combined with the high withdrawl fees. Fix any of those, and you'd see more arbitrage (I think).

Also, they have a really dumb system where each candidate has both yes and no shares, instead of each election having shares per candidate. Which means there are more different prices than there should be, and no system-enforced rule that the sum of the probabilities = 1.

Comment author: evand 02 September 2015 11:53:53PM 6 points [-]

Truthcoin and its cousin Augur deserve a mention, even though neither is actually operational yet. (They're decentralized prediction markets on a blockchain.)

Idea Futures is still running (play money), but is functionally nearly dead and has very low liquidity. Once upon a time it was the best option for play money markets, and quite good.

Fairlay is a half-decent (though centralized) crypto market, though it's structured as a "betting market" and has no way to sell back predictions at a profit or a loss (you can place later predictions to hedge your risk equivalently, but you end up tying up a lot of money). Liquidity is bad.

BitBet runs some sort of weird time-weighted pari-mutuel system that I don't like, and has a lot of complaints about shady operations (eg very, very bad customer support that results in people losing money due to interface mistakes), but they often have actual liquidity.

As far as I can discern, the current state of things is abysmal, but I'm pretty optimistic about Truthcoin (less so about Augur in some ways, but optimistic there too).

Worth noting that PredictIt's odds should give you pause: there's money on the table betting "No" on all the presidential candidates, and I find it concerning that they can't interest anyone in arbitraging that away.

Comment author: Lumifer 02 September 2015 07:38:57PM *  7 points [-]

Bridge, the card game. Bidding is the process of two players exchanging information about the cards they hold via the very limited communications channel (bids). The play itself is also used to transfer more information about which cards remain in the hand.

I don't know if that will work as a demonstration of the Aumann's Theorem, though, bridge gets very complicated very fast :-/

Comment author: evand 02 September 2015 07:48:34PM 2 points [-]

That's an excellent practical example, though it doesn't really have the explicit probability math I was hoping for.

In particular, I like that you'll see stuff like which player thinks the partnership has the better contract flips back and forth, especially around auctions involving controls, stops, or other specific invitational questions. The concept of evaluating your hand within a window ("My hand is now very weak, given that I opened") is also explicitly reasoning about what your partner infers based on what you told them.

I think the most important thing here might be that bridge requires multiple rounds because bidding is limited bandwidth, whereas giving a full-precision probability estimate is not.

Comment author: Elo 02 September 2015 07:06:33PM *  0 points [-]

example I was thinking:

each player flips 3(? 10) coins of their own. (giving them various possibilities on what they think the whole coin-space looks like) They present their 90%, 99% confidence intervals on there being more than 4 (9) heads. Round 2 repeat. (also make statements based on what they think the state of play is ++ try to get to the answer before the other person. So make statements that can be misleading maybe?)

Not sure how easy it is to tease out that information for a human. maybe a computer could solve it. but not so much a human...

"I flipped 10 coins; My 90% confidence that there are at least 7 of each heads and tails is 90%. 99% confidence is 60%."

confidence for "at least 10 heads and 6 tails" etc.

Comment author: evand 02 September 2015 07:39:43PM 0 points [-]

Here's how that goes. I flip 3 coins. Say I get 2 heads. My probability estimate for "there are 4+ heads total" is now 4/8 (the probability that 2 or 3 of your coins are heads). For the full set of outcomes I can have, the options are: (0H, 0/8) (1H, 1/8) (2H, 4/8) (3H, 7/8). You perform the same reasoning. Then we each share our probability estimates with the other. Say that on the first round, we each share estimates of 50%. Then we can each deduce that the other saw exactly two heads, and on the second round (and forever after) both our estimates become 100%. For all possible outcomes, my first round probability tells you exactly how many heads I flipped, and vice versa; as soon as we share probabilities once, we both know the answer and agree.

(Also, you're not using "confidence interval" in the correct manner. A confidence interval is defined over an expectation, not a posterior probability.)

I still don't see any version of this that's simpler than Finney's that actually makes use of multiple rounds, and when I fix the math on Finney's version it's decidedly not simple.

Comment author: Elo 02 September 2015 12:09:41AM 0 points [-]

Based on simple coin flip; other games:

  • Several coins;
  • scissors paper rock (and then iterated)

I am sure there are more small games that have a similar "known" problem space.

Comment author: evand 02 September 2015 06:39:12PM 0 points [-]

What change would you make that results in multiple rounds being required?

For example, if each player flips multiple coins, and then we share probability estimates for "all coins heads" or "majority of coins heads" or expectations for number of heads, in each case the first time I share my summary, I am sharing info that exactly tells the other player what information I have (and vice versa). So we will agree exactly from the second round onwards.

Comment author: polymathwannabe 01 September 2015 06:38:23PM 0 points [-]

Have several people try to guess the same number, with everyone able to see everyone's guesses and results.

Comment author: evand 01 September 2015 06:42:07PM 0 points [-]

But then everyone has the exact some information, right? I'm specifically looking for something that's like Hal Finney's game, in that the different players have different information, and communicate some different set of information (some sort of knowledge about the state of the world, like their posteriors on the joint data).

Comment author: polymathwannabe 01 September 2015 04:26:00PM 2 points [-]

How about some variation on Bulls and Cows?

Comment author: evand 01 September 2015 04:47:51PM 0 points [-]

That seems like fertile ground for exploration, but no probability / agreement variation immediately springs to mind. Did you have something specific in mind?

Comment author: evand 01 September 2015 02:59:41PM 1 point [-]

I'm looking for a good demonstration of Aumann's Agreement Theorem that I could actually conduct between two people competent in Bayesian probability. Presumably this would have a structure where each player performs some randomizing action, then they exchange information in some formal way in rounds, and eventually reach agreement.

A trivial example: each player flips a coin in secret, then they repeatedly exchange their probability estimates for a statement like "both coin flips came up heads". Unfortunately, for that case they both agree from round 2 onwards. Hal Finney has a version that seems to kinda work, but his reasoning at each step looks flawed. (As soon as I try to construct a method for generating the hints, I find that at each step when I update my estimate for my opponent's hint quality, I no longer get a bounded uniform distribution.)

So, what I'd like: a version that (with at least moderate probability) continues for multiple rounds before agreement is reached; where the information communicated is some sort of simple summary of a current estimate, not the information used to get there; where the math at each step is simple enough that the game can be played by humans with pencil and paper at a reasonable speed.

Alternate mechanisms (like players alternate communication instead of communicating current states simultaneously) are also fine.

Comment author: Eitan_Zohar 12 July 2015 05:15:57AM *  0 points [-]

People who work on drugs to cure horrible diseases don't spend 24/7 in an airtight suit in the lab, dropping samples on the floor because their hands are shaking. They go home and watch football and play card games and go to the kids' school play and stuff.

If they or their kids have the horrible disease? I think they'd react differently.

But being unable to disengage from the Big Problems and live your little ordinary life is not heroism, and it actively gets in the way of solving any of those Big Problems.

Not my Big Problems; they get solved from doing just that.

Find a meditation teacher and spend some time doing that. Practice > theory.

I'm going to have to disagree. I thought you were talking about philosophy when you mentioned "notions of personal identity and continuity, and whether this is an illusion."

Comment author: evand 14 July 2015 04:53:11PM 2 points [-]

But being unable to disengage from the Big Problems and live your little ordinary life is not heroism, and it actively gets in the way of solving any of those Big Problems.

Not my Big Problems; they get solved from doing just that.

How do you know? The question isn't whether obsessing fixes the problem; it's whether taking breaks speeds up the overall process. You don't need tons of hours to fix the problem; as you said earlier, a few minutes to explain the right insight is quite sufficient. What you actually need is the right few minutes of work, spent finding the right key insights.

Thinking longer about a problem is only helpful to the degree it produces new insights. As you've found, this can be very inefficient. If taking a break and not worrying about an unsolved problem increases the efficiency of future problem-solving even a little bit, it could well be worth it.

Comment author: Brendon_Wong 26 June 2015 12:20:36AM *  0 points [-]

The venture could be profitable, yes. Would it generate massive amounts of income? That is also possible. I did not consider a for-profit version of the idea because the project itself was supposed to be charitable in nature. I am considering starting a for-profit branch of this idea, and would be open to hearing other people's ideas and motivations. Is your motivation and other's in getting involved in a for-profit implementation of this idea to earn money?

To elaborate more on profits, the initial implementation of this idea might not be incredibly profitable because we are relying on third party virtual employment services like the aforementioned upwork.com to ensure the initial implementation (this summer!) would be a success and members would be able to find guaranteed work. Directly contracting with people and organizations wanting virtual workers is expected to be a lot more profitable.

Comment author: evand 26 June 2015 03:34:05AM 12 points [-]

To frame it from the "capitalist virtues" perspective...

If you squint a bit, your version sounds a lot like "we're going to create a lot of value for a lot of people, in a way that is neatly measured in dollars, and therefore we can't possibly make a for-profit company." That is... really weird, from where I sit.

Alternate perspective: if you're creating a lot of value for a lot of people, but you can't extract any of it to compensate yourself for the infrastructure you build and the risks you take building it, are you actually really sure you're creating as much value as you thought you were?

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