exapted

How should one reply to the argument that there is no prior probability for the outcome to some quantum event that that already happened and splits the world into two worlds, each with a different outcome to some test (say, a "quantum coin toss")? The idea is that if you merely sever the quantum event and consider different outcomes to the test (say, your quantum coin landed heads), and consider that the outcome could have been different (your quantum coin could have landed tails), there is no way to really determine who would be "you."... (read more)

I have read about the argument that the Self-Indication Assumption (SIA) cancels the Doomsday Argument (DA), and I think that the argument fails to take into account the fact that it is not more likely that an observer of a particular birth rank will have existed given the general hypothesis that there will have been many observers in her reference class than given the general hypothesis that there will have been few observers in her reference class, as long as there will have been at least as many as would be necessary for anyone with her birth rank to ex... (read more)