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In response to Feedback on LW 2.0
Comment author: gworley 02 October 2017 08:38:16PM 1 point [-]

Interesting. I realize comments here may be selected for disliking the new site, so I'll just chime in that I'm pretty happy with LW 2.0 so far. I want it to be faster, but otherwise I'm pretty happy with its greater vibrancy and more scalable post promotion scheme.

[Link] Cognitive Empathy and Emotional Labor

0 gworley 26 September 2017 08:36PM
Comment author: gworley 20 September 2017 02:03:33AM 1 point [-]

I never thought about it this way but it does seem to serve the same function. As far as I know it wasn't deliberate but it did likely happen independently for the reason you reference.

[Link] Is Feedback Suffering?

1 gworley 09 September 2017 10:20PM
Comment author: gworley 04 September 2017 03:25:26AM 0 points [-]

I don't really follow why it should be that beliefs are necessarily voluntary.

Maybe it's a matter of what we each think "belief" means. Can you be a bit more precise? My conception is somewhere in the range of experience of an experience that gives a correspondence between the experienced experience and expected other experiences. Basically that to believe is to expect or make a prediction about future experience and a belief is a reification of the experience of believing. In this sense I don't really see why belief couldn't also be involuntary, for some vague sense of "voluntary" like "feels like I made a choice" since "voluntary" seems a bit of a confused term itself unless you have a firm sense of causality and intention/will.

Comment author: gworley 29 August 2017 05:32:31PM 1 point [-]

This seems to me to be failing to account for the fact that we are not in fact totally blindfolded and know that we live in what appears to be a time prior to simulation. Your alternative scenario that contradicts (iii) seems to be making a bet on information that seems directly contradictory to what we know at the current time (that is, there are no simulations we know about yet). The problem isn't purely one of numbers, but one of where we perceive ourselves to be living now.

I do happen to agree that indifference is probably the most useful response to the simulation argument, though it sounds like probably for different reasons.

In response to P: 0 <= P <= 1
Comment author: gworley 28 August 2017 07:06:57PM 1 point [-]

My phenomenological leanings are well known, and even I am epistemically troubled at the idea of assigning probability 1 to the proposition that my experience of my own existence implies my existence. I am willing to go further a say I can't even assign probability 1 to the proposition that because I experience then experience must exist.

I've not quite worked out how I might explain this precisely, but it seems I should not be willing to be completely certain because even my experience of experience-in-itself is experience and lacking an outside view of my own ontology I have no way to completely verify that experience as I experience it is what it appears to be. To be fair I'm not sure I can meaningfully place a number on this uncertainty, but to give it up for certainty seems to say something stronger about my belief in experience than I can justify giving it since I do not have access to what we call the metaphysical. This is to say existence may be something quite different from what we think it is from our experience of it and we may not even be able to meaningfully say experience exists in a way utterly incomprehensible from the inside of experience.

I can at best say I am forced to operate as-if I were certain about such basic propositions because I lack the ability to know how uncertain I might be or if I uncertainty is even a meaningful construct in this context and so the only way forward is to assume certainty of existence, but in doing this I am admitting the fallacy of my reasoning and so should concede some non-zero probability that I am entirely fairly to experience experience in a coherent way.

Comment author: ChristianKl 22 August 2017 03:40:48PM 0 points [-]

That comment is surprising to me. I didn't understand the Hegelian dialectic about talking to internal parts. Which authors do describe the Hegelian dialectic as part work?

Comment author: gworley 22 August 2017 06:26:55PM 0 points [-]

I'm not aware of anyone describing dialectic in that way. I would instead say that the double crux seems to me a more highly specified version of the dialectical method with specific instructions on how to carry it out. To be fair this is arguably a useful invention since it's helping people carry out dialectics in a particular way at least rather than not at all.

In response to Emotional labour
Comment author: gworley 22 August 2017 01:54:00AM 2 points [-]

I've also noticed this pattern and don't have a great name for it, and perhaps no one will be surprised that I am willing to categorize this behavior in correlation with psychological development.

Kids often start off doing something like 2 (let's call it 0) but in a way that's very much not empathetic. Kids are then develop, often in this case it seems to be with directed training, towards 1. Adults then stay at 1 unless they find problems with it and learn to do 2. The difficulty seems to be that it's hard to learn to do 2 without accidentally doing 0 or still doing 1 but wrapping it up in 2-style language. I suspect this reflects the complexity demands of 2 for cognitive empathy, specifically the ability to build a sufficiently complex ontology of other people that it is able to make reasonable enough predictions about the behavior of others when imposing emotional demands on them that your behavior does not end up producing outcomes that violate your preferences.

For me 1 is the kind of stuff I'm trying to "forget" in my own life so I can be filled with 2, or more properly not the 2 cluster necessarily but whatever is both compassionate and satisfies my preferences. I think the 1 strategy makes a lot of sense though if you both want to not hurt other people/make them do emotional labor and don't have strongly predictive models of other people. Learning the 2 stuff fully requires developing fairly complex cognitive empathy.

I think it's also worth pointing out here because I can easily see the objection being raised that this is not a male-only pattern. Although 2 stuff is more emphasized to girls than boys in Western society and girls are encouraged to feel affective empathy while boys are encouraged to not, the development of cognitive empathy seems a different skill that may be aided by affective empathy making confusion salient but does not actually play much of a role in success at 2. What 1 looks like in male-typed and female-typed behavior is slightly different but in both cases lacks the complex ontology of others' minds necessary for 2, with female-typed behavior being perhaps more prone to masquerading as 2 and male-typed behavior more prone to being obvious not 2.

Comment author: cousin_it 20 August 2017 06:46:26AM *  4 points [-]

Yeah, your take seems right, and agrees with Wikipedia and SEP.

Though I'm not sure it's worth your time to correct Eliezer's mistakes so painstakingly. He made lots of them. The biggest ones were probably betting against academia and betting against neural networks. His attractiveness as a writer comes in part from overconfidence, but in the real world a couple big mistakes from overconfidence can wipe out all most of your wins from it.

Comment author: gworley 22 August 2017 01:18:00AM 2 points [-]

I disagree. Performing this sort of work is part of engaging with the ideas. It's maybe not that interesting to you now, sure, but I've written similar things in the past in the process of building my understanding of ideas.

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