In response to comment by hangedman on Tomatoes
Comment author: erratio 25 October 2010 07:33:01PM *  2 points [-]

The reason I started the discussion is because I think examples like "fruit" where the common usage of the word deviates from any strict definition can help us to understand language and language acquisition better.

I suggest reading up on Eleanor Rosch's prototype theory, it explains the whole categorisation thing very clearly. The basic theory is that our categories aren't Aristotelian classes, but are fuzzy, and formed from seeing exemplars of a class and extracting the most common features. It's a well-understood property of cognition and has plenty of experimental backing.

In the case of cucumbers, I'd say it fails the 'fruit' test because it lacks almost all the features I associate with fruit: it's not red/yellow, it's not sweet, I don't eat it for a snack or dessert, and it doesn't have obvious seeds or pits inside. Therefore I would look at you very oddly if you told me that it was.

In response to comment by erratio on Tomatoes
Comment author: hangedman 26 October 2010 10:27:53PM 0 points [-]

Thanks for the recommendation.

In response to comment by hangedman on Tomatoes
Comment author: Relsqui 25 October 2010 12:32:17AM 1 point [-]

Was your point, then, that you should use words in the way which is most likely to be clear and useful? If so, I agree, and would rather address it directly.

The clear and useful definition varies, of course, with context--a plant biologist and a pastry chef use the word "fruit" differently, and that's okay! The trouble arises when you have two people in conversation trying to use a word for which they have different contexts, as is the case when lay people interpret "theory" as "guess," since that's what it often means in prose. In such cases, more or different words are needed to ensure the right meaning is being interpreted.

In response to comment by Relsqui on Tomatoes
Comment author: hangedman 25 October 2010 03:28:56AM 0 points [-]

My point was that "fruit" is the flip-side of Eliezer's bird example. A bird is a feathered flying thing. What about an ostrich? What about a penguin? A fruit is the seed pod of a plant. What about eggplants? What about cucumbers? My intention wasn't to give any advice about how to pick and choose definitions or interpret words generally or in a particular context.

The reason I started the discussion is because I think examples like "fruit" where the common usage of the word deviates from any strict definition can help us to understand language and language acquisition better. But this means that we should be asking people why they don't think cucumbers are fruit, not insisting that cucumbers are fruit by definition of the word fruit.

Comment author: Vladimir_M 23 October 2010 06:08:09PM *  4 points [-]

One way in which I've observed some very smart and numerate people falling for this fallacy is when they run out of cash in bars and are forced to take money out of those rip-off ATMs that charge $3 or so per transaction. People will often take a larger amount of money than necessary, rationalizing that the rip-off isn't that bad if it's only a small percentage of the amount (I've heard this "reasoning" expressed loudly several times). This despite the fact that tomorrow they'll walk by their own bank's ATM from which they can take money without any fees, so there's absolutely no benefit from taking more money than necessary from the expensive one.

I am myself not immune to this feeling, even though I'm perfectly aware it's completely irrational. I would feel awful if I paid $3 to take out a twenty and then took $100 without a fee next day, but paying $3 to take $120 feels much less bad.

Comment author: hangedman 24 October 2010 10:31:56PM *  0 points [-]

The question is whether it's worth $3 to you at that moment to avoid a) starting a tab, b) walking to the nearest no-fee ATM, or c) not drinking for the rest of the night.

Sometimes it is and sometimes it isn't, but you're bang on that the amount of cash you get out doesn't make a difference.

In response to Tomatoes
Comment author: Relsqui 23 October 2010 09:06:08PM 8 points [-]

it's not clear why we should privilege one's experience other the other

Because in the argument as described, Lemon does have more than his experience to go on--he also has the agricultural definition. That's why we invented definitions. To resolve these arguments.

In the same way, wheat is both a grain and a vegetable.

Isn't this another clear example of prioritizing the technical definition (and, in fact, an arbitrary one of several overlapping technical definitions) over the common usage, which you appeared to be arguing against? If you tell someone you're cooking vegetables, and they come over to find you with a bowl of cream of wheat, you've been misleading, and I don't see how that's a productive use of language.

As a rule of thumb, I prioritize the precise definition unless it's misleading in the given context. When I say "the performance was so bad, they threw rotten fruit," no one will be confused if some of the projectiles were tomatoes. But I wouldn't say "I'm serving fruit and cheese" when I plan to put out tomato slices with mozzarella. It's true, but it creates a false expectation.

In response to comment by Relsqui on Tomatoes
Comment author: hangedman 24 October 2010 10:21:14PM *  0 points [-]

Because in the argument as described, Lemon does have more than his experience to go on--he also has the agricultural definition. That's why we invented definitions. To resolve these arguments.

It seems to me that introducing the definition is what starts this argument, not what resolves it. But playing along, are eggplants fruit? Green peppers? String beans? If my hypothesis is that "fruit" means "fruiting body of a plant" and my experiment is to ask people whether things that fit the definition are fruit, does the hypothesis anticipate the results of the experiment?

When I say "the performance was so bad, they threw rotten fruit," no one will be confused if some of the projectiles were tomatoes.

Do you think anyone would be confused if some of them were turnips?

If you tell someone you're cooking vegetables, and they come over to find you with a bowl of cream of wheat, you've been misleading, and I don't see how that's a productive use of language.

But I wouldn't say "I'm serving fruit and cheese" when I plan to put out tomato slices with mozzarella. It's true, but it creates a false expectation.

These are much more clever ways of making my point. There are exceptions, I think -- I'd prefer if people stopped using "theory" to mean "guess" -- but in many cases, it would only be confusing if people used a particular definition of a word to decide their usage.

Comment author: hangedman 23 October 2010 08:03:22PM *  2 points [-]

There was an article in Scientific American a few years ago about the Traveler's Dilemma and how human beings make more money than the Nash Equilibrium tells them to. Edit: Wikipedia summary

It occurred to me that the percentage fallacy might explain why people give high numbers in this version -- the Nash equilibrium is pocket change compared to the max payoff. The same is true for the reward for undercutting; you might not be so motivated to low-ball if your reward for doing so is 2% of the max payoff.

It would be interesting to see an experiment where the payoff for giving the low estimate varied. If you were playing the game with a $10 bonus for lowballing, would you give the Nash equilibrium of $10? Or would you maybe go for the $40s or $50s hoping the other person would go even higher? My guess would be that as the reward for undercutting as a percentage of the max reward increases people get more and more vicious, and at some percentage people will default to the Nash equilibrium.

Tomatoes

1 hangedman 23 October 2010 06:50PM

Are tomatoes fruits or vegetables?

I've been reading Eliezer's criticisms of Aristotelian classes as a model for the meaning of words.  It occurred to me that this little chestnut is a good illustration of the problem.  The best part about this example is that almost everyone has argued either on one side or the other at some point in their lives.  One would think that the English speaking world could come to some consensus on such a simple, trivial problem, but still the argument rages on.  Fruit or vegetable?

In my experience, the argument is usually started by the fruit advocate (we'll call him Lemon).  "It's the fruiting body of the plant," he says.  "It contains the seeds."  He argues that the tomato is, by definition, a fruit.

Bean has never thought of tomatoes as fruits, but when her belief is challenged by Lemon, she's not entirely sure how to respond.  She hesitates, then starts slowly -- "All the things I call fruits are sweet," she says.  "Not that tomatoes are bitter, but they're certainly not sweet enough to be fruits."  Bean is proposing a stricter definition -- fruits are sweet fruiting bodies of plants.  But does Bean really think that's the difference between a fruit and a vegetable?

Not really.  Bean learned what these words mean by talking to other people about fruits, vegetables, and tomatoes, and through her cooking and eating.  There was never any moment when she said to herself, "Aha!  a tomato is not a fruit!"  This belief is a result of countless minute inferences made over the course of Bean's gustatory life.  The definition she proposes is an ad hoc defense of her belief that tomatoes are not fruits, not a real reason.

Bean's real mistake was to think that she needed to defend her belief that tomatoes are not fruits.  Tomatoes are what they are regardless of how they're classified, and most people classify them as fruit or vegetable long before they learn anything about Aristotelian classes or membership tests.  The classification is made as the result of a long history of silent inferences from the way parents and peers use those words.  The first English dictionary was written in 1604, several hundred years after both "fruit" and "vegetable" had entered the English vocabulary (right about the same time as "tomato," actually).  Before that, Lemon couldn't point to a definition to make his case. He could only rely on his experiences with usage just as Bean does in her rebuttal, and it's not clear why we should privilege one's experience other the other.  The meaning of the word is prior to the definition.

There is a simple solution to the tomato problem, by the way.  "Vegetable" is any edible plant matter and "fruit" is a subclass of "vegetable."  All fruits are vegetables, and so tomatoes are both.  In the same way, wheat is both a grain and a vegetable.  The distinction is made only for convenience -- consider the fact that before electric guitars were invented, there were no "acoustic guitars" -- only "guitars."  It's not false to describe an acoustic guitar as a guitar, merely imprecise.  This points to what I think is a common phenomenon in spoken language which leads to errors in reasoning: a distinction is made between a subclass B and superclass A with the understanding that x in B -> x in A; later, the distinction is maintained but the understanding of the interconnection is lost so that A and B are considered distinct categories -- x in A xor x in B.  Can anyone think of any other examples of this kind of error?

Comment author: hangedman 13 October 2010 09:41:31PM 5 points [-]

Hi LW,

My name's Dan LaVine. I forget exactly how I got linked here, but I haven't been able to stop following internal links since.

I'm not an expert in anything, but I have a relatively broad/shallow education across mathematics and the sciences and a keen interest in philosophical problems (not quite as much interest in traditional approaches to the problems). My tentative explorations of these problems are broadly commensurate with a lot of the material I've read on this site so far. Maybe that means I'm exposing myself to confirmation bias, but so far I haven't found anywhere else where these ideas or the objections to them are developed to the degree they are here.

My aim in considering philosophical problems is to try to understand the relationship between my phenomenal experience and whatever causes it may have. Of course, it's possible that my phenomenal experience is uncaused, but I'm going to try to exhaust alternative hypotheses before resigning myself to an entirely senseless universe. Which is how I wind up as a rationalist -- I can certainly consider such possibilities as the impossibility of knowledge, that I might be a Boltzmann brain, that I live in the Matrix, etc., but I can't see any way to prove or provide evidence of these things, and if I take the truth of any of them as foundational to my thinking, it's hard to see what I could build on top of them.

Looking forward to reading a whole lot more here. Hopefully, I'll be able to contribute at least a little bit to the discussion as well.