We don't know enough about brain operation to conclude that sensory stimuli are necessary for ethically sensitive processes to start.
I wasn't sure if we were metaphorically talking about the foetus brain in question or a hypothetical human that's fully grown in an isolation tank. If we were talking about the former, we seem to have a fundamentally different set of ethics. With your clarification I assume we're talking about the latter, in which case I agree with you.
Saying that an undeveloped foetus brain isn't thinking because it hasn't received sensory stimuli is a different argument than saying that a fully grown brain can't think because it hasn't received sensory stimuli.
As bad as the argument is, it's a little different when the brain has never ever been outside one.
How is it a bad argument?
re: time
smart watches as mentioned.
I would actually like a device that vibrated in every 5 minute window (or other settable window of time). To remind me to re-evaluate my progress on current tasks and confirm to myself that I am doing well. Essentially as a pattern-interrupt if I am in a bad pattern. It might end up interrupting good patterns as well, but I would still be interested to experiment if it works to be on par more helpful than unhelpful.
I wonder if anyone knows of an app to make my phone do it.
Caynax hourly chime and Mindfulness bell on Android
Wait. Perhaps one of such predictions would be that we should find universal laws involving higher-level entities, while it seems that at that level, we only find ceteris paribus laws. By contrast, at the lower level, we do find universal laws. This should be evidence in favour of the reductionist thesis.
Which would indicate that I was wrong in my initial claim.
Actually when I first responded to you I was thinking about biology, psychology and such as the higher level. In this case the claim seems to make sense. However, if I understood EHeller correctly, this doesn't hold water inside the realm of modern physics. Besides, we can in principle never know if we're at the lowest level.
I think I'm communicating a little poorly. So start with atomic level physics- it's characterized by energy scales of 13.6 eV or so. Making measurements at that scale will tell you a lot about atomic level physics, but it won't tell you anything about lower level physics- there is an infinite number of of lower level physics theories that will be compatible with your atomic theory (which is why you don't need the mass of the top quark to calculate the hydrogen energy levels- conversely you can't find the mass of the top quark by measuring those levels).
So you build a more powerful microscope, now you can get to 200*10^6 eV. Now you'll start creating all sorts of subatomic particles and you can build QCD up as a theory (which is one of the infinitely many theories compatible with atomic theory). But you can't infer anything about the physics that might live at even lower levels.
So you build a yet more powerful microscope, now you can get 10^14 eV, and you start to see the second generation of quarks,etc.
At every new level you get to, there might be yet more physics below that length scale. The fundamental length scale is maybe the planck scale, and we are still 13 orders of magnitude above that.
Edit: this author is sort of a dick overall, but this was a good piece on the renormalization group- http://su3su2u1.tumblr.com/post/123586152663/renormalization-group-and-deep-learning-part-1
I think I'm the one communicating poorly since it seems I understood your first explanation, thanks for making it sure anyways and thanks for the link!
When I was wondering about successful predictions in particle physics, I was in particular thinking about Higgs boson. We needed to build a massive "microscope" to detect it, yet could predict its existence four decades ago with much lower energy scale equipment, right?
The point of RG is that "higher level" physics is independent of most "lower level" physics. There are infinitely many low level theories that could lead to a plane flying.
There are infinitely many lower level theories that could lead to quarks behaving as they do,etc. So 1. you can't deduce low level physics from high level physics (i.e. you could never figure out quarks by making careful measurements of tennis balls), and you can never know if you have truly found the lowest level theory (there might be a totally different theory if you only had the ability to probe higher energies).
This is super convenient for us- we don't need to know the mass of the top quark to figure out the hydrogen atom,etc. Also, it's a nice explanation for why the laws of physics look so simple- the laws of physics are the fixed points of renormalization group flow.
Thanks, my reality got just a bit weirder. It's almost as if someone set up a convenient playground for us, but that must be my apophenia speaking. If there are infinite possibilities of lower level theories, are successful predictions in particle physics just a matter of parsimony? Is there profuse survival bias when it comes to hyping successful predictions?
The whole point of the renormalization group is that lower level models aren't more accurate, the lower level effects average out.
The multiple levels of reality are "parallel in a peculiar way" governed by RG. It might be "more complex" but it's also the backbone of modern physics.
The whole point of the renormalization group is that lower level models aren't more accurate, the lower level effects average out.
I tried to read about RG but it went way over my head. Is the universe in principle inexplicable by lower level theories alone according to modern physics? Doesn't "averaging out" lose information? Are different levels of abstraction considered equally real by RG? Does this question even matter or is it in the realm of unobservables in the vein of Copenhagen vs MW interpretation?
EDIT: Typos.
I have been reading some of the sequences, and this entry shocked me a lot.
If the reductionist thesis is "we use multi-level models for computational reasons, but physical reality has only a single level", then what kind of evidence could support it against the thesis "we use multi-level models for computational reasons AND physical reality has multiple levels?" (let me call it 'anti-reductionist thesis' regardless of what actual anti-reductionists defend). I just can't think of how the world would be different if physical reality had multiple levels than if it had only one level.
In other words, the reductionist thesis, as it is presented here, does not lead me to anticipate differently than the anti-reductionst thesis. Accepting it just generates a floating belief, and as a result, I reject the reductionist thesis, and you should do the same.
Am I wrong? And why?
EDIT: this is now pretty much retracted, see the following thread.
If the reductionist thesis is "we use multi-level models for computational reasons, but physical reality has only a single level", then what kind of evidence could support it against the thesis "we use multi-level models for computational reasons AND physical reality has multiple levels?"
Lower level models are more accurate than abstract models, and you can observe the consequences of this on multiple levels of abstraction. Therefore if physical reality has multiple levels then they must be incompatible and parallel in a very peculiar way. This makes the idea more complex and therefore less probable than the reductionist thesis.
Tabooing reality might make things a bit clearer.
Consent seems to be an important ethical principle for many people and an FAI might well end up implementing it in some form.
True. Since people are so irrational, not to mention inconsistent and slow, it might be one of the most difficult problems of FAI. The whole concept of consent in the presence of a much more powerful mind seems pretty shaky.
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thanks. will install and try them.
Did they work? Did you try any other solutions?