Using personal preference or personal intuitions as priors instead of some objective measure along the lines of Solomonoff Induction

Solomonoff Induction is uncomputable, and even if you use a computable approximation, you can't calculate it because no-one's written a program to do that AFAIK.

So if you are trying to work out which hypothesis is simpler, how do you do that? You use your personal intuition.

Mathematical Platonism

I actually think this is plausible. The argument goes: can you imagine 2+2 equalling 3? Maybe this is a personal intuition thing, but it does feel like maths is discovered not invented. If I decided that the derivative of sin(X) is x^5, and used this maths to design an airplane, it wouldn't fly. The maths exists whether I want it to or not. In physics, the equation for the electron produced two results, and one was thrown away until the positron was discovered - the existence of the positron, which is a real, physical thing, could have been predicted by the mathematics.

This is the 'unreasonable effectiveness or mathematics'. If maths describes physics perfectly, and the electrons exist, then why don't the equations for the electrons exist to the same extent?

Now, if you buy this argument, and if chairs, tables and morality can be described in terms of maths, then maybe the platonic form of a chair exists, and maybe moral realism exists? Admittedly, this generalisation is a lot more dubious, for one thing there are probably a very large number of moral systems and chairs which can be mathematically described, so this argument is less 'there exists a perfect platonic form of a chair' and more 'there are an infinite number of platonic chairs'.

The existence of non-physical minds

One argument is to go for broke and argue that the physical world does not exist at all. We know the mental world exists, because we have experiences, so the simplest explanation is that only the mental world exists and the physical world is an illusion. This then leads to libertarian free will.

(I don't actually buy this argument, I'm just explaining it.)

Not looking at the world in a probabilistic way

Because its higher status to believe in something 110%, even if this is gibberish? Because having unreasonable faith is good psychosomatically?

You underestimate the power of the dark side epistemology.

Not looking at the world in a probabilistic way

Your post has only one instance of naming a probability and that's not 100%.

You say thinks like "The only thing I can think of is that people who support using intuitions like this say". There you speak about people having an identity that consists of them using an intuition a certain way. Not that they are using the intuition to 80% in a certain way but that they generally use them in a certain way.

But this just seems totally ludicrous to me. If we trust cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, etc., and if those fields give us perfectly plausible reasons for why we might intuitively feel this way / talk this way, even if it didn't reflect the truth

In a similar way you can argue that you don't have any evidence that you aren't a Bolzmann brain and therefore shouldn't act as if you are sure that you aren't. You always have to use thinking tools that aren't perfect.

I think you might make progress if you look at trying to understand the epistemology and ontology that you are actually using instead of focusing on the epistemology and ontology you think one should use.

Which is weird because, if you take seriously the ethnic-IQ correlation (which I don't), Asians show an higher-than-westerners average IQ.

Why are there many LWers from, say, Europe, but not China?

In defense of Luke, when I've spent the time to read through philosophy books by strong-naturalist academic philosophers, they've often devoted page-counts easily equivalent in length to "Philosophy: a diseased discipline" to carefully, charitably, academically, verbosely tearing non-naturalist philosophy a new asshole. Luke's post has tended to be a breath of fresh air that I reread after reading any philosophy paper that doesn't come from a strongly naturalist perspective.

It sincerely worries me that the academics in philosophy who do really excellent work, work that does apply to the real world-that-is-made-of-atoms, work that does map-the-territory, have to spend large amounts of effort just beating down obviously bad beliefs over and over again. You should be able to shoot down a bad idea once, preferably in the peer-review phase, and not have to fight it again and again like a bad zombie.

(Examples of obviously bad ideas: p-zombies, Platonism, Bayesian epistemology (the latter two may require explanation).)

Now, to signal fairness even where I'm blatantly opinionated, plenty of people on LW are indeed irritatingly "men of one idea", that usually being some variation on AIXI. And in fact, plenty of people on LW hold philosophical opinions I consider obviously bad, like mathematical Platonism.

But the answer to those bad things hasn't usually been "more philosophy", as if any philosophy is good philosophy, but instead more naturalism, investing more effort to accommodate conceptual theorizing to the world-that-is-made-of-atoms.

Since significant portions of academic philosophy (for instance, Thomas Nagel) are instead devoted to the view - one that I once expected to be contrarian but which I now find depressingly common - that science and naturalism are wrong, or that they are unjustified, or that they are necessarily incapable of answering some-or-another important question - having one page on a contrarian intellectual-hipsters' website devoted to ragging on these ought-to-be-contrarian views is a bit of a relief.

What makes a good primary care physician and how do I go about finding one?

That's probably the most useful and least controversial part of it.

I suppose modal logics of belief.

Linear algebra, function optimization, probability theory.

:)