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Procedural knowledge is often initially constructed out of propositional knowledge. But once procedural knowledge is had, it also incorporates things like body memory and pure automatic habit, which, when observed in oneself, are just as likely to be rationalized after the fact as they are to be antecedently planned for sound reasons. It's also easy to forget the initial propositions about a mastered procedure. I am likely to forget why I separate eggs with spoons at some point, until and unless I decide to go back to doing it by hand and get the corresponding poor results: I will just reach for the silverware drawer and set about separating eggs. (This is probably a bad example, since by mentioning in the post above my reasons for changing methods, I've cemented those reasons in my mind. However, I'm sure there are a dozen things I do automatically in the kitchen that have no cognitively occurrent relationship to the reasons I started doing them in the first place.)
But once procedural knowledge is had, it also incorporates things like body memory and pure automatic habit, which, when observed in oneself, are just as likely to be rationalized after the fact as they are to be antecedently planned for sound reasons. It's also easy to forget the initial propositions about a mastered procedure.
I've also noticed this kind of thing in my martial arts training.
For instance, often times high level black belts will be incredibly successful at a particular technique but unable to explain the procedure they use (or at least, they'll be able to explain the basic procedure but not the specific detail that makes the difference). These details are often things the practitioner has learned unconsciously, and so are not propositional knowledge for them at all. Or they may be propositions taught long ago but forgotten (except in muscle memory).
The difference between a great practitioner and a great teacher is usually the ability to spot the difference that makes a difference.
Read that as "socially-recognized principles as to how something is to be done for things that physics permits in many different ways".
Spill the salt, you must throw some over your shoulder. Step on a crack, break your mother's back. Games and rituals. When people forget they're just games, problems arise.
This tendency can be used for good, though. As long as you're aware of the weakness, why not take advantage of it? Intentional self-priming, anchoring, rituals of all kinds can be repurposed.
In my experience, this is a common position to be in. I've heard a lot of blanket statements about the problems with academic philosophy, without much evidence to back it up.
Agreed; I made the disclaimer with the intent that this comment was meant to filed under "Hmm, interesting" not "Arguments against Philosophy". I was not specifically targeting academic philosophy but old philosophy. Quick potential examples from the top of my head:
- Descartes' suggestions about the purpose of the pineal gland
- The various Greek philosophers who tried to reduce all matter into combinations of Fire/Air/Water/Earth
- Early psychology?
Anyone reading Descartes and translating "pineal gland" into something other than "pineal gland" so they can continue claiming Descartes was right is another example of the parable above. Translating "Fire/Air/Water/Earth" into "Plasma/Gas/Liquid/Solid" is doing the same thing. The Greeks were not saying "Plasma/Gas/Liquid/Solid". They were saying "Fire/Air/Water/Earth".
Actual philosophers tend to be either good philosophers who know the good old stuff from the bad old stuff, or bad philosophers who write utter nonsense. Someone who actually cares shouldn't have too much of a problem telling one from the other, even though they're both acceptable in the academy. Compare Dennett and Derrida.
Agreed. I focused on Philosophy because I have enough experience to think of potential examples. The reason I did not put them in the first comment is because I am not in a position to defend my examples and did not consider them particularly relevant to the point. Also, my experience with "bad" Philosophers is that they seem to attach Truth to specific People and then try to turn anything said by those People into Truth using method like those in the parable. Most of these bad Philosophers were encountered during the few classes I took to get a Philosophy minor. I assume that most of these people are weeded out by the time they get to upper-level classes and beyond.
So, anyway, to wrap it up, I agree with you completely. I extended my points to try bringing a little more clarification to my original comment not to argue against your comment.
Most of these bad Philosophers were encountered during the few classes I took to get a Philosophy minor.
Initially I thought you were talking about professional Philosophers, not students. This clears that up, but it would be better to refer to them as Philosophy students. Most people wouldn't call Science undergrads "Scientists".
My experience with Philosophy has been the opposite. Almost all the original writing we've read has been focused on how and why the original authors were wrong, and how modern theories address their errors. Admittedly, I've tailored my study to contain more History and Philosophy of Science than is usual, but I've found the same to be true of the standard Philosophy classes I've taken.
In summary, it probably varies from school to school and I don't think it's entirely fair to tar the whole field of Philosophy with the same brush.
People don't seem to vote posts up or down with the same enthusiasm as they vote on comments. Why? I do not know.
I would guess that it's because comments are shorter and tend to express a single idea. Posts tend to have a series of ideas, which means a voter is less likely to think all of them are good/worthy of an upvote.
As soon as I graduated with a CS degree I realized I should have been in philosophy the whole time.
This matches my experience. I was a CS major for a bit but ended up graduating with a degree in philosophy. It was much more relevant, even to working in computing.
Thirded. I completed half of my degree in CS before switching to Philosophy. I'm finding it significantly more stimulating. I don't think I learned anything in my CS classes that I couldn't easily have taught myself (and had more fun doing so).
Might be easier to manage comments and direct people to it if its a whole post rather than a comment in the may 09 open thread.
[Hm, the unordered list doesn't seem to be working for me. Any hints?]
Beginning of unordered list test
- Item one
- Item two
End of unordered list test
Source code:
Beginning of unordered list test
* Item one
* Item two
End of unordered list test
My guess: you're missing a blank line before your list.
Having recently received a couple of Amazon gift certificates, I'm looking for recommendations of 'rationalist' books to buy. (It's a little difficult to separate the wheat from the chaff.)
I'm looking mainly for non-fiction that would be helpful on the road to rationality. Anything from general introductory type texts to more technical or math oriented stuff. I found this OB thread which has some recommendations, but I thought that:
- this could be a useful thread for beginners (and others) here
- the ability to vote on suggestions would provide extra information
So, if you have a book to recommend, please leave a comment. If you have more than one to recommend, make them separate comments so that each can be voted up/down individually.
I reject out of hand the idea that she should deconvert in the closet and systematically lie to everyone she knows.
I had to do this until I was able to sever myself from parental support at age 20. It certainly wasn't pleasant and sometimes I still have nightmares about being discovered breaking the Sabbath (though I've told my parents long since). But if you ask me whether I would have rather remained religious, TEN THOUSAND TIMES NO!
I don't know your parents, but I know the people who will be Wednesday's. Nothing terrible will happen to Wednesday if she deconverts: she would make her parents a little sad, and they would probably try to argue her around, but they would not do her harm or kick her out of the house or otherwise mistreat her in any way, shape, or form. I do not object to deception in self-defense (or defense of others in Jews-in-the-attic-in-Nazi-Germany situations), but Wednesday will not require deceptive self-defense.
Nothing terrible will happen to Wednesday if she deconverts
The terrible thing has already happened at this stage. Telling your children that lies are true (i.e., that Mormonism is true), when they have no better way of discerning the truth than simply believing what you say, is abusive and anti-moralistic. It is fundamentally destructive of a person's ability to cope with reality.
I have never heard a story of deconversion that was painless. Everyone I know who has deconverted from a religious upbringing has undergone large amounts of internal (and often external) anguish. Even after deconverting most have not been capable of severing ties to the destructive people who doomed them to this pain in the first place.
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I think the clearer examples (of procedural knowledge) tend to be things like physical skills that we can learn to reliably perform, but without necessarily being able to articulate how it is that we perform them. In that sense it wouldn't be accurate to say it's simply a subset of propositional knowledge; it's more that the two may intersect to some extent, and the boundaries of each can move as we learn to articulate what it is that we're doing, or to think about what we're doing in propositional terms. (EDIT: or, as Alicorn suggests, forget the propositional reasons why we did things a particular way in the first place.)
The classic example of riding a bicycle comes to mind. No amount of propositional knowledge will allow you to use a bike successfully on the first go. Theory about gyroscopic effects of wheels and so forth all comes to nothing until you hop on and try (and fail, repeatedly) to ride the damn thing.
Conversely, most people never realise the propositional knowledge that in order to steer the bike left, you must turn the handle bars right (at least initially and at high speeds). But they do it unconsciously nonetheless.