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Comment author: brazil84 14 February 2014 01:28:01PM *  0 points [-]

It's quite blunt and non-discriminating, while people have very different metabolism. I don't practice any "calorie restriction" (I just try to avoid eating too much fat/sugar), I eat as much as I feel like eating, and yet I weight like 55kg, and I know many other people eating "as much as they want" and not having any overweight problem, quite the opposite.

The difference is not so much in the metabolism as in what "as much as they want" means. When people eat ad libitum (which is a fancy way of saying "as much as they want," ) they vary quite a lot in their caloric intake. Some people engage in mild caloric restriction naturally and some don't. Of course my discussion assumes that one has conscious control over one's food intake. So "as much as they want" doesn't really enter the picture.

It just focus on "calories" without any consideration of what kind of calorie (ie, what kind of food), if they are taken regularly or not, ...

Re-read . . I pointed out that I have a basic daily diet -- not only is it reasonably consistent in terms of calories, it is also reasonably well balanced and consistent in terms of macro-nutrients. I use calorie counts to make fine adjustments.

It doesn't say anything about life quality.

I do say a little about it, but the calorie restriction I engage in doesn't have much effect on my quality of life. That's not totally true since I like being thin. On the other hand I don't like denying myself pizza and nachos every day.

I would be interested in seeing cognitive performances evaluation for someone eating "normally" and doing calorie restriction, for example. The brain is a massive calorie burner.

Well what kind of calorie restriction are you talking about -- mild, moderate, severe, or something else?

Comment author: kilobug 14 February 2014 02:02:58PM 0 points [-]

The difference is not so much in the metabolism as in what "as much as they want" means.

Not so sure about that. Comparing how much I eat with how much other people eat, and I would say I eat more than most of them. On the other hand (and much less anecdotal), there has been recent studies showing link between obesity and the kind of gut bacteria someone has.

Well what kind of calorie restriction are you talking about -- mild, moderate, severe, or something else?

Everything :) Ideally, we would have many test subjects, measure their cognitive performances initially, make them follow different kind of "calorie restriction" (none, mild, moderate, severe) for weeks or months, and then measure again their cognitive performances, and see if there is a variation.

Comment author: kilobug 14 February 2014 01:01:05PM 0 points [-]

I've three issues with such reasoning :

  1. It's quite blunt and non-discriminating, while people have very different metabolism. I don't practice any "calorie restriction" (I just try to avoid eating too much fat/sugar), I eat as much as I feel like eating, and yet I weight like 55kg, and I know many other people eating "as much as they want" and not having any overweight problem, quite the opposite.

  2. It just focus on "calories" without any consideration of what kind of calorie (ie, what kind of food), if they are taken regularly or not, ...

  3. It doesn't say anything about life quality. For myself (but it might be due to my 55kg) if I don't eat enough or didn't eat since too long, I feel tired, harder to focus, ... (minor hypoglycemia, likely). I would be interested in seeing cognitive performances evaluation for someone eating "normally" and doing calorie restriction, for example. The brain is a massive calorie burner.

Comment author: kilobug 31 January 2014 09:42:04AM 8 points [-]

Car crash is the first death cause among some demographics (15-25 years old). It's almost half of total accidental death. It's almost 2% of total death. And many more are badly wounded, often crippled for life.

So I would hardly say that humans can drive cars. At least, they can't do it safely.

I got about the opposite change; when I was a 12 years old, driving looked normal to me. Something everyone does. And then I tried to do it, and realized how a split second of inattention can wreak your life or someone's else. And I looked at statistics, of cars crash being a very significant cause of death or crippling injuries. Of people having more chance to die in a car accident between home and airport than flying in the plane. And I realized humans can't drive safely - it's just something we pretend because car crash being a daily occurrence, they don't make it to the news.

Comment author: Mark_Friedenbach 21 January 2014 08:47:09AM -1 points [-]

You are misunderstanding the argument.

Comment author: kilobug 21 January 2014 03:15:46PM 0 points [-]

More exactly I don't really understand it, because it relies on presumptions/intuitions that I don't have. My point was mostly to try to get those made more explicit so I can better understand (and then accept or refute) the argument. Sorry if that wasn't clear enough.

Comment author: kilobug 19 January 2014 11:01:26AM -1 points [-]

But what's the difference between "non-destructive upload" and "making a copy of the upload" or "making a copy of your biological body" ?

The intuition behind "Copy my mind to a machine non-destructively, and I still identify with meat-me." is flawed and non-coherent IMHO. What if you can't even tell apart "meat you" and the other one, like the other one is put in a robotic body that looks, feels, ... exactly like the flesh body ? You fall asleep, you awake, there are two "you", one flesh the other robotic, how can you even know which is which ? Both will feel they are "real you".

There are countless similar thought experiments in which this view leads to contradictions/impossible answers. IMHO the only way to resolve them is accept that continuity of personal identity is at software level, not as hardware level.

Comment author: byrnema 13 January 2014 05:28:41PM *  2 points [-]

It's neutral from a point of pleasure vs suffering for the dead person

It forgets opportunity costs. Dying deprive the person of all the future experience (s)he could have, so of a huge amount of pleasure (and potentially suffering too).

I feel like being revived in the future would be a new project I am not yet emotionally committed to.

I think I would be / will be very motivated to extend my life, but when it comes to expending effort to "come back", I realize I feel some relief with just letting my identity go.

The main reason behind this is that what gives my life value are my social connections, without them I am just another 'I', no different than any other. It seems just as well that there be another, independent birth than my own revival. One reason I feel this way is from reading books -- being the 'I' in the story always feels the same.

This would all of course change if my family was signing up.

Comment author: kilobug 15 January 2014 10:01:38AM 0 points [-]

The main reason behind this is that what gives my life value are my social connections, without them I am just another 'I', no different than any other.

I think you're going too far when saying it's "no different than any other", but I agree with the core idea - being revived without any of my social connections in an alien world would indeed significantly change "who I am". And it's one of the main reason for which while I do see some attraction in cryonics, I didn't do any serious move in that direction. It would be all different if a significant part of my family or close friends would sign too.

Comment author: kilobug 13 January 2014 03:44:07PM 1 point [-]

I'm also on the fence and wondering if cryonics are worth it (especially since I'm in France where there is no real option for it, so in addition to costs it would likely mean changing country), but I think you made two flaws in your (otherwise interesting) reasoning :

It's neutral from a point of pleasure vs suffering for the dead person

It forgets opportunity costs. Dying deprive the person of all the future experience (s)he could have, so of a huge amount of pleasure (and potentially suffering too).

So: my death feels bad, but not infinitely bad. Obvious thing to do: assign a monetary value.

Same as above : it depends a lot of expected pleasure vs suffering of your remaining life. Life of an horribly suffering last stage cancer patient, or of a last stage Alzheimer disease patient has much less value than life of someone expecting decades of healthy life. Cyronics believers think that if it works, they'll get "eternal" life, or least, thousands and thousands of healthy life. That gives to life a much higher value than the one it has in our current world (forgetting cryonics).

Comment author: kilobug 28 December 2013 11:18:07AM 7 points [-]

Our belief about the long-term future value of a single BTC is spread out across a range whose 90% confidence interval is something like [$10, $100,000] for 1BTC.

Do we really ? My own view is quite the opposite - a kinda reverse bell curve, with two possible outcomes :

  1. Bitcoin dies, either because the crypto behind it is broken (due to mathematical progress or Moore's law) or because it gets replaced by other, "second generation" cryptocurrencies, or because states successfully fight it, or any other reason - and then it'll have a very low value, maybe even less than $1 for a BTC.

  2. Bitcoin survives, and then, because it's inherently deflationary (fixed monetary mass for an always growing amount of real world wealth) there is no limit to how high the value of single BTC can grow.

But maybe it depends what exactly "long-term" is ?

Comment author: BlindIdiotPoster 19 December 2013 01:55:30AM 1 point [-]

What leads people to even suspect that unicorns are sentient?

Comment author: kilobug 19 December 2013 09:09:07AM 1 point [-]
  1. Sentient is not a binary thing, but a more fuzzy ones. The sentience of apes or newborn for example is hard to quantify in a binary way.

  2. Many magical creatures have a higher level of sentience than mere animals. Some are fully sentient like centaurs or acromentulas, some are half sentient like phoenix. Even magical owls or cats tend to be more sentient than their mundane counter-parts.

So it really seems from 1. and 2. that the level of sentience of unicorns has to be carefully evaluated, to be able to figure out if the harm done to them would be worth a "temporary cursed" life, it depends of the values of the three parameters : how sentient they are, how "temporary" it is and how "cursed" it is.

Comment author: brazil84 15 December 2013 07:51:13PM -1 points [-]

Probably a stupid question, but wasn't Draco was out of the picture already?

Comment author: kilobug 16 December 2013 11:28:54AM 1 point [-]

He went back after the negociations between Harry and Malfoy and the enforcement of "eductional decrees" to make Hogwarts safer, re-read chapters 97 and 98.

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