Comment author: Emile 24 November 2013 01:16:27PM *  5 points [-]

I recently started using Habit RPG, which is a sort of gamified todolist where you get gold and XP for doing your tasks and not doing what you disapprove of.

Previously I had been mostly using Wunderlist (I also tried Remember The Milk, but found the features too limited), and so far Habit RPG looks better than Wunderlist on some aspects (more fine-grained control of the kind of tasks you put in it, regular vs. one-off vs. habits), and of course has an extra fun aspect.

Anybody else been trying it? (I saw it mentioned a few times on LW) Anybody else want to try?

Comment author: kremlin 24 November 2013 02:12:35PM 1 point [-]

You and I were talking about this in IRC. I remember expressing a concern about HabitRPG that, while it does genuinely motivate me at the moment, I'm not sure what's going to happen when it ends: when I've upgraded all my items, when I've collected all the pets, etc etc. If I just start over, the new game will likely motivate me significantly less than the first time around. And more than likely I just plain won't want to start over.

I've been trying to think of ways around this gamification problem, because it plays a part in nearly every attempt at gamification I've seen. I think that, for one aspect of gamification -- motivating yourself to learn new things -- there is a way that at least sort of overcomes the 'what happens when it ends?' problem:

Skill Trees. Like This . Maybe a website, or application, that starts with just the bare-bones code for creating skill trees, and you can create an account and add a skill tree to your account from a list of existing searchable skill trees, or you can create your own skill tree if you can't find one that's appropriate for you and that will allow other people with similar goals to add your skill tree system to their account, etc.

Comment author: shminux 19 April 2012 07:56:10PM 2 points [-]

And, subordinate to those three, the point that Occam's Razor applies to code not RAM (so to speak). Worth mentioning since I think that's the part that went over shminux's head.

You are right, it did the first time I tried to honestly estimate the complexity of QM (I wish someone else bother to do it numerically, as well). However, even when removing the necessary boundary conditions and grid storage (they take up lots of RAM), one still ends up with the code that evolves the Schroediger equation (complicated) and applies the Born postulate (trivial) for any interpretation.

Comment author: kremlin 02 September 2013 06:49:57PM 1 point [-]

But collapse interpretations require additional non-local algorithms, which to me seem to be, by necessity, incredibly complicated

Comment author: kremlin 18 March 2013 07:58:25AM 1 point [-]

If we assume that (a) future discounting is potentially rational, and that (b) to be rational, the relative weightings we give to March 30 and March 31 should be the same whether it's March 29 or Jan 1, does it follow that rational future discounting would involve exponential decay? Like, a half-life?

For example, assuming the half life is a month, a day a month from now has half the weighting of today, and a month from that has half the weighting of that, and so on?

Comment author: asparisi 14 February 2013 05:47:00PM 1 point [-]

I tend to think this is the wrong question.

Here's roughly what happens: there are various signals (light, air waves, particulates in the air) that humans have the capacity to detect and translate into neural states which can then be acted on. This is useful because the generation, presence, and redirection of these signals is affected by other objects in the world. So a human can not only detect objects that generate these signals, it can also detect how other objects around it are affected by these signals, granting information that the human brain can then act upon.

All of this is occurring in reality: the brain's neural firings, the signals and their detection, the objects that generate and are affected by the signals. There is no "outside reality" that the human is looking in from.

If you break it down into other questions, you get sensible answers:

"Does the human brain have the capacity to gain information from the ball without a medium?" No.

"Is the human brain's information about the ball physically co-located with some area of the brain itself?" Sure.

"Is the signal detected by the sense-organs co-located with some area of the brain itself?" Potentially at certain points of interaction, but not for its entire history, no.

"What about the neural activity?" That's co-located with the brain.

"So are you trying to say you are only 'Directly acquainted' with the signal at the point where it interacts with your sense-organ?" I don't think calling it 'directly acquainted' picks out any particular property. If you are asking if it is co-located with some portion of my brain, the answer is no. If you are asking if it is causing a physical reaction in some sensory organ, the answer is yes.

Comment author: kremlin 15 February 2013 06:03:02PM 0 points [-]

'Breaking it down into other questions' is exactly what needed to be done. I agree. And once it is broken down, the question is dissolved.

Comment author: lukeprog 13 February 2013 10:09:43AM 7 points [-]

You should link to an article that explains in more detail what direct and indirect realism are. Like, say, to Wikipedia or the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Comment author: kremlin 13 February 2013 12:55:56PM 2 points [-]

You're absolutely right. Done.

Realism : Direct or Indirect?

3 kremlin 13 February 2013 09:40AM

Stanford Encyclopedia : Perception
Wikipedia : Direct and Indirect Realism

On various philosophy forums I've participated on, there have been arguments between those who call themselves 'direct realists' and those who call themselves 'indirect realists'. The question is apparently about perception. Do we experience reality directly, or do we experience it indirectly?

When I was first initiated to the conversation, I immediately took the indirect side -- There is a ball, photons bounce off the ball, the frequency of those photons is changed by some properties of the ball, the photons hit my retina activating light-sensitive cells, those cells send signals to my brain communicating that they were activated, the signals make it to the visual cortex and...you know...some stuff happens, and I experience the sight of a ball.

So, my first thought in the conversation about Indirect vs Direct realism was that there was a lot of stuff in between the ball and my experience of it, so, it must be indirect.

But then I found that direct realists don't actually disagree about any part of that sequence of events I described above. For them as well, at least the few that have bothered to respond, photons bounce off a ball, interact with our retinas, send signals to the brain, etc. The physical process is apparently the same for both sides of the debate.

And when two sides vehemently disagree on something, and then when the question is broken down into easy, answerable questions you find that they actually agree on every relevant question, that tends to be a pretty good hint that it's a wrong question.

So, is this a wrong question? Is this just a debate about definitions? Is it a semantic argument, or is there a meaningful difference between Direct and Indirect Realism? In the paraphrased words of Eliezer, "Is there any way-the-world-could-be—any state of affairs—that corresponds to Direct Realism being true, or Indirect Realism being true?"

In response to Reductionism
Comment author: Nominull3 16 March 2008 03:38:43PM 4 points [-]

I'm surprised that this point is controversial enough that Eliezer felt the need to make a post about it, and even more surprised that he's catching heat in the comments for it. This "reductionism" is something I believe down to the bone, to the extent that I have trouble conceptualizing the world where it is false.

In response to comment by Nominull3 on Reductionism
Comment author: kremlin 04 February 2013 10:09:39AM 5 points [-]

After talking to some non-reductionists, I've come to this idea about what it would mean for reductionism to be false:

I'm sure you're familiar with Conway's Game of Life? If not, go check it out for a bit. All the rules for the system are on the pixel level -- this is the lowest, fundamental level. Everything that happens in conway's game of life is reducible to the rules regarding individual pixels and their color (white or black), and we know this because we have access to the source code of Conway's Game, and it is in fact true that those are the only rules.

For Conways' Game to be non-reductionistic, what you'd have to find in the source code is a set of rules that override the pixel-level rules in the case of high-level objects in the game. Eg "When you see this sort of pixel configuration, override the normal rules and instead make the relevant pixels follow this high-level law where necessary."

Something like that.

It's an overriding of low-level laws when they would otherwise have contradicted high-level laws.

In response to Truly Part Of You
Comment author: Nominull2 21 November 2007 02:40:19AM 31 points [-]

I make it a habit to learn as little as possible by rote, and just derive what I need when I need it. This means my knowledge is already heavily compressed, so if you start plucking out pieces of it at random, it becomes unrecoverable fairly quickly. As near as I can tell, my knowledge rarely vanishes for no good reason, though, so I have not really found this to be a handicap.

Comment author: kremlin 27 December 2012 07:10:18AM -1 points [-]

I don't think you've understood the article. The idea of the article is that if you're able to derive it, then yes, you can regenerate it. That's what 'regenerate' means.

Comment author: RobinHanson 02 January 2008 06:11:42PM 28 points [-]

You say don't try to use game theory to figure out how to best "make a difference" but admit you will have virtually no influence in this election and instead just vote for the person you like best, among the candidates listed on the ballot. But why not continue with this logic, and "write-in" the person in the world you like best? Why not write them in even if write-ins aren't officially allowed in this election? Why not skip the official elections and make up your own polling place to vote at? Why not just declare your vote for them in a blog post?

Comment author: kremlin 07 November 2012 02:04:20PM 2 points [-]

I think I can explain the reasoning:

Assume Elizier has sway over, say, 5,000 votes -- what he posts on this blog will effect the voting behavior of 5,000 people. If he uses that sway to say "vote for the person in the world you like best," you get 5,000 unheard votes for random people. If he uses that sway to say "vote for a relatively popular candidate (at least popular enough to be on the ballot) who's not a nincompoop," you get 5,000 votes for non-nincompoops.

If the goal is to "send a message," as is said in the post, I'd argue that the 5,000 votes for non-nincompoops will be heard more than the 5,000 votes for random people. The random people votes will go unheard -- not a very good message.

Comment author: kremlin 13 October 2012 09:24:07PM 1 point [-]

I drew loads when I was a kid, and I must have been about 10 or 11 when I realized, had a moment of epiphany really, some of the stuff in the "How you probably draw / how you should draw" section.

I was looking at the cover of the Toy Story VHS and trying to copy it. I remember specifically I was drawing Woody's face, his right cheek to be exact (must have been this photo), and I stopped myself when I realized that what I was about to do was a result of me drawing not what I really saw, but what I thought I should see given my mental model of a face. I think I was about to draw his right cheek too wide or something like that.

That was the first time I ever truly and deeply grasped that concept. I take a certain joy in knowing that I learned it independently.

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