Comment author: linas 07 February 2014 02:18:08AM 0 points [-]

I will come, unless I utterly space it off and forget.

Comment author: MugaSofer 06 March 2013 09:59:37AM -2 points [-]

It should either specify that if Omega predicts the human will use that kind of entropy then it gets a "Fuck you" (gets nothing in the big box, or worse) or, at best, that Omega awards that kind of randomization with a proportional payoff (ie. If behavior is determined by a fair coin then the big box contains half the money.)

Or that Omega is smart enough to predict any randomizer you have available.

Comment author: linas 09 March 2013 05:34:18AM 2 points [-]

The FAQ states that omega has/is a computer the size of the moon -- that's huge but finite. I believe its possible, with today's technology, to create a randomizer that an omega of this size cannot predict. However smart omega is, one can always create a randomizer that omega cannot break.

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Comment author: incogn 06 March 2013 08:00:34AM *  0 points [-]

I think I agree, by and large, despite the length of this post.

Whether choice and predictability are mutually exclusive depends on what choice is supposed to mean. The word is not exactly well defined in this context. In some sense, if variable > threshold then A, else B is a choice.

I am not sure where you think I am conflating. As far as I can see, perfect prediction is obviously impossible unless the system in question is deterministic. On the other hand, determinism does not guarantee that perfect prediction is practical or feasible. The computational complexity might be arbitrarily large, even if you have complete knowledge of an algorithm and its input. I can not really see the relevance to my above post.

Finally, I am myself confused as to why you want two different decision theories (CDT and EDT) instead of two different models for the two different problems conflated into the single identifier Newcomb's paradox. If you assume a perfect predictor, and thus full correlation between prediction and choice, then you have to make sure your model actually reflects that.

Let's start out with a simple matrix, P/C/1/2 are shorthands for prediction, choice, one-box, two-box.

  • P1 C1: 1000
  • P1 C2: 1001
  • P2 C1: 0
  • P2 C2: 1

If the value of P is unknown, but independent of C: Dominance principle, C=2, entirely straightforward CDT.

If, however, the value of P is completely correlated with C, then the matrix above is misleading, P and C can not be different and are really only a single variable, which should be wrapped in a single identifier. The matrix you are actually applying CDT to is the following one:

  • (P&C)1: 1000
  • (P&C)2: 1

The best choice is (P&C)=1, again by straightforward CDT.

The only failure of CDT is that it gives different, correct solutions to different, problems with a properly defined correlation of prediction and choice. The only advantage of EDT is that it is easier to cheat in this information without noticing it - even when it would be incorrect to do so. It is entirely possible to have a situation where prediction and choice are correlated, but the decision theory is not allowed to know this and must assume that they are uncorrelated. The decision theory should give the wrong answer in this case.

In response to comment by incogn on Decision Theory FAQ
Comment author: linas 09 March 2013 05:23:23AM 0 points [-]

Yes. I was confused, and perhaps added to the confusion.

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Comment author: scav 07 March 2013 11:21:03AM 1 point [-]

Newcomb's problem makes the stronger precondition that the agent is both predictable and that in fact one action has been predicted. In that specific situation, it would be hard to argue against that one action being determined and immutable, even if in general there is debate about the relationship between determinism and predictability.

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Comment author: linas 09 March 2013 04:52:52AM 0 points [-]

Hmm, the FAQ, as currently worded, does not state this. It simply implies that the agent is human, that omega has made 1000 correct predictions, and that omega has billions of sensors and a computer the size of the moon. That's large, but finite. One may assign some finite complexity to Omega -- say 100 bits per atom times the number of atoms in the moon, whatever. I believe that one may devise pseudo-random number generators that can defy this kind of compute power. The relevant point here is that Omega, while powerful, is still not "God" (infinite, infallible, all-seeing), nor is it an "oracle" (in the computer-science definition of an "oracle": viz a machine that can decide undecidable computational problems).

In response to comment by linas on Decision Theory FAQ
Comment author: wedrifid 07 March 2013 11:42:40AM 2 points [-]

I'm with incogn on this one: either there is predictability or there is choice; one cannot have both.

Either your claim is false or you are using a definition of at least one of those two words that means something different to the standard usage.

Comment author: linas 09 March 2013 04:29:24AM 0 points [-]

Huh? Can you explain? Normally, one states that a mechanical device is "predicatable": given its current state and some effort, one can discover its future state. Machines don't have the ability to choose. Normally, "choice" is something that only a system possessing free will can have. Is that not the case? Is there some other "standard usage"? Sorry, I'm a newbie here, I honestly don't know more about this subject, other than what i can deduce by my own wits.

Comment author: mfb 05 February 2012 08:30:08PM 1 point [-]

That is one point I noticed at the first scenario as well. If there is only B1, Clippy will accept it. But if Clippy knows about both bets before deciding, he will reject B1 and take B2, for an expected utility of 4.19 instead of (2+5.57)/2 = 3.78.

When offered B1, Clippy might try to predict future bets and include that in the utility calculations. I expect (but do not have anything except intuition), that a bit of risk-aversion (for B1 only) is a good strategy for a large range of "expected bet probability density functions".

Gamblers need some superlinear utility function for money (which is unlikely), have to assign a positive utility for the gained time where they don't know whether they will win (which is likely) or just act irrational (which is nearly certain).

Comment author: linas 09 March 2013 04:01:53AM 0 points [-]

There needs to be an exploration of addiction and rationality. Gamblers are addicted; we know some of the brain mechanisms of addiction -- some neurotransmitter A is released in brain region B, Causing C to deplete, causing a dependency on the reward that A provides. This particular neuro-chemical circuit derives great utility from the addiction, thus driving the behaviour. By this argument, perhaps one might argue that addicts are "rational", because they derive a great utility from their addiction. But is this argument faulty?

A mechanistic explanation of addiction says the addict has no control, no free will, no ability to break the cycle. But is it fair to say that a "machine has a utility function"? Or do you need to have free before you can discuss choice?

Comment author: kilobug 02 March 2013 07:03:38PM -2 points [-]

Because in my view they did not correct any mistake I made, but they're avoiding the core problem, using rhetoric tricks such as playing on words, irony, strawman or ad hominem instead. And I'm very disappointed to see the conversion go on this way, I wasn't expecting that from LW. I was expecting people to disagree with me (most people here think NVM is justified) but I was expecting a constructive discussion, not such a bashing.

Comment author: linas 06 March 2013 05:08:14AM 0 points [-]

The collision I'm seeing is that between formal, mathematical axioms, and English language usage. Its clear that Benelliot is thinking of the axiom in mathematical terms: dry, inarguable, much like the independence axioms of probability: some statements about abstract sets. This is correct-- the proper formulation of VNM is abstract, mathematical.

Kilobug is right in noting that information has value, ignorance has cost. But that doesn't subvert the axiom, as the axioms are mathematically, by definition, correct; the way they were mapped to the example was incorrect: the choices aren't truly independent.

Its also become clear that risk-aversion is essentially the same idea as "information has value": people who are risk-averse are people who value certainty. This observation alone may well be enough to 'explain' the Allais paradox: the certainty of the 'sure thing' is worth something. All that the Allais experiment does is measure the value of certainty.

In response to Decision Theory FAQ
Comment author: linas 05 March 2013 03:57:50AM -1 points [-]

The conclusion to section "11.1.3. Medical Newcomb problems" begs a question which remains unanswered: -- "So just as CDT “loses” on Newcomb’s problem, EDT will "lose” on Medical Newcomb problems (if the tickle defense fails) or will join CDT and "lose" on Newcomb’s Problem itself (if the tickle defense succeeds)."

If I was designing a self-driving car and had to provide an algorithm for what to do during an emergency, I may choose to hard-code CDT or EDT into the system, as seems appropriate. However, as an intelligent being, not a self-driving car, I am not bound to always use EDT or always use CDT: I have the option to carefully analyse the system, and, upon discovering its acausal nature (as the medical researchers do in the second study) then I should choose to use CDT; else I should use EDT.

So the real question is: "Under what circumstances should I use EDT, and when should I use CDT"? Section 11.1.3 suggests a partial answer: when the evidence shows that the system really is acausal, and maybe use EDT the rest of the time.

In response to comment by linas on Decision Theory FAQ
Comment author: linas 06 March 2013 03:33:07AM 2 points [-]

Hmm. I just got a -1 on this comment ... I thought I posed a reasonable question, and I would have thought it to even be a "commonly asked question", so why would it get a -1? Am I misunderstanding something, or am I being unclear?

In response to Decision Theory FAQ
Comment author: max_i_m 28 February 2013 09:13:57PM 2 points [-]

When reading about Transparent Newcomb's problem: Isn't this perfectly general? Suppose Omega says: I give everyone who subscribes to decision theory A $1000, and give those who subscribe to other decision theories nothing. Clearly everyone who subscribes to decision theory A "wins".

It seems that if one lives in the world with many such Omegas, and subscribing to decision theory A (vs subscribing to decision theory B) would otherwise lead to losing at most, say, $100 per day between two successive encounters with such Omegas, then one would win overall by subscribing (or self-modifying to subscribe) to A.

In other words, if subscribing to certain decision theory changes your subjective experience of the world (not sure what proper terminology for this is), which decision theory wins will depend on the world you live in. There would simply not be a "universal" winning decision theory.

Similar thing will happen with counterfactual mugging - if you expect to encounter the coin-tossing Omega again many times then you should give up your $100, and if not then not.

Comment author: linas 06 March 2013 03:27:36AM -2 points [-]

How many times in a row will you be mugged, before you realize that omega was lying to you?

In response to comment by linas on Decision Theory FAQ
Comment author: wedrifid 05 March 2013 07:34:25AM 2 points [-]

Presentation of Newcomb's problem in section 11.1.1. seems faulty. What if the human flips a coin to determine whether to one-box or two-box? (or any suitable source of entropy that is beyond the predictive powers of the super-intelligence.) What happens then?

If the FAQ left this out then it is indeed faulty. It should either specify that if Omega predicts the human will use that kind of entropy then it gets a "Fuck you" (gets nothing in the big box, or worse) or, at best, that Omega awards that kind of randomization with a proportional payoff (ie. If behavior is determined by a fair coin then the big box contains half the money.)

This is a fairly typical (even "Frequent") question so needs to be included in the problem specification. But it can just be considered a minor technical detail.

Comment author: linas 06 March 2013 03:24:01AM 0 points [-]

OK, but this can't be a "minor detail", its rather central to the nature of the problem. The back-n-forth with incogn above tries to deal with this. Put simply, either omega is able to predict, in which case EDT is right, or omega is not able to predict, in which case CDT is right.

The source of entropy need not be a fair coin: even fully deterministic systems can have a behavior so complex that predictability is untenable. Either omega can predict, and knows it can predict, or omega cannot predict, and knows that it cannot predict. The possibility that it cannot predict, yet is erroneously convinced that it can, seems ridiculous.

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