Normally when someone does something high status and people’s reaction is “who does this person think he is?” the person signaled lower status somehow via other factors or past behaviors. So this "counter-signaling" is really people acting the status level others consider appropriate.

For example, blowing your nose in a job interview is a high status move, but displays inappropriate status level. The fact you're interviewing for a job is evidence your status is lower than the interviewer's - stronger evidence then your high status move.

This wasn't really meant as the thrust of the comment. I was trying to raise awareness of the difficulty of creating an absolute list of high status behaviours when people can counter signal. It means that there are always exceptions.

You can only "counter-signal" when you already have high status established, regardless by which means. If you're starting off with no pre-established status, then there exists a list of absolute high status behaviors, i.e. behaviors that are evidence of your high status.

Go out and look at people on the street and see how the high and low status people stand.

Just look at male models, they never stand straight. People here incorrectly assume the alternative to standing up straight is slouching.

The problem with trying to define a list of high status actions is that they are context dependent.

Counter-signalling means that, in a particular context, it could be higher status to perform in a manner that, in any other context, would appear low status.

Under most general circumstances though, good posture is high status (because the assumption is that they just stand like that - not that they are standing like that to make an impression). In general, people don't think as carefully as you about motivations. You are over-iterating your thinking beyond what an average person would ever consider. Go out and look at people on the street and see how the high and low status people stand.

I'm sure I can sort out a room at UCL. I'll find out whether it would be free.

UCL is particularly convenient for transport links since Euston and Kings Cross are <10mins walk and Paddington is a short tube ride away.

There are some nice little restaurants and pubs around for food/drink.

I think it's important not to conflate two separate issues.

The term 'science' is used to denote both the scientific method and also the social structure that performs science. It's critical to separate these in ones mind.

What you call "idealistic science" is the scientific method; what you call "social network" science is essentially a human construct aimed at getting science done. I think this is basically what you said.

The key point, and where I seem to disagree with you, is that these views are not mutually exclusive. I see 'social network' science as a reasonably successful mechanism to take humans, with all their failings, and end up with, at least some, 'idealistic science' as an output.

You do that by awarding people a higher status when they show a more detailed understanding of nature. I would agree that this process is subject to all kinds of market failures, but I don't think that it's as bad as you make out. And I certainly don't think that it has anything to do with why we haven't discovered quantum gravity (which, it appears, is the only discovery that would satisfy your definition of progress). There is literally no field of human endeavour that isn't defined by a search for status; 'network science' accepts this and asks how can we use our rationality to structure the game so that when we win, we win from both a individual perspective (get promoted to professor) and a team perspective (humanity gets new understanding/technology/wealth).

But this in no way calls into question 'idealistic science' since 'network science' is merely the process by which we try to attain 'idealistic science' in the real world.

[full disclosure: I am a young scientist]

I'm about to start writing up my doctoral thesis in experimental quantum computing.

If people are interested I might be able to write a few posts introducing quantum computing/quantum algorithms and many worlds over the next couple of months. I'm by no means an expert in the theory side, but I'll try to chat about it with people who are.

From a personal perspective it might help me to start the words flowing.

I summarized what was important to LW readers. I skipped through the parts of the video that most LWers would have found uninteresting (people used to posit theories with unnecessary details called "myths"? who knew?) so I could get to Deutsch's new explanation of explanation which amounts to "unnecessary details are bad" (which are equivalent to "easy-to-vary" aspects).

Yes, you may have found it interesting. It still would have been nice to know the basic form of Deutsch's point before blowing ~15 minutes listening to boring stuff just to get to something that can be restated in a few sentences.

(Modding my appreciated summary down sure helps your argument though.)

I welcome anyone else to blow 20 minutes of their life to confirm my summary.

It is assumed; it's just not clear to someone who's told that that's Deutsch's idea.

And I certainly wasn't alone in not realizing what "hard to vary" means here; Vladimir_Nesov already had a +5 comment with the term that attempted to summarize the lecture, but my comment with the fuller explanation still got modded up to 4 and some thanks. This probably wouldn't have happened if Nesov's summary, using just "hard to vary", were already clear enough.

Then why didn't you realize that the bit about "while preserving their predictions" was an essential part of Deutsch's explanation and therefore include it in your summary of his idea?

If it was hard to see why you should have included that part, then it seems to me that Deutsch's approach doesn't clarify matters.