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This is an excellent quote and belongs at the top level.
(I downvoted it here because the point you are trying to make by replying with it is approximately backwards. An intended insult which would make more sense as a compliment.)
And there you have it: symbols (or strings of symbols) have different sense in different contexts.
One of the contexts in which I found this aphorism insightful, was in certain interpretations of quantum physics.
That pretty much describes any proposition.
No it doesn't. Not all propositions are intentionally vague and deep sounding.
If you wish, substitute the word 'noise' for the word 'symbol
Were I inclined to substitute in 'noise' it would be as a contrast to 'signal'.
Men show their characters in nothing more clearly than in what they think laughable.
-- Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
There is often much hidden wisdom
No, there are intentionally vague deep sounding comments to which wisdom can be associated. You've just given multiple meanings to the same words. Those other meanings may be useful but the words themselves are nonsense.
... intentionally vague deep sounding ... (symbols) ... to which wisdom can be associated. You've just given multiple meanings to the same ... (symbols) ... Those other meanings may be useful but the ... (symbols) ... themselves are nonsense.
That pretty much describes any proposition. If you wish, substitute the word 'noise' for the word 'symbol, then the paragraph describes an utterance.
There is a good resource on semiotics here.
If you wish to advance into the infinite, explore the finite in all directions.
That sounds incredibly deep. (By which I mean it is bullshit.)
Not necessarily deep; a couple of concrete interpretations:
'Do not let what you can not do, interfere with what you can do;' and 'If you wish to discover the unknown, begin by exploring what is known.'
There is often much hidden wisdom in interpretation of aphorisms, which perhaps explains my preference for the poetic turn of phrase.
Downside is there would be a lot more bookkeeping involved, and a powerful incentive to compromise the secret ballot. Someone with a lot of "none of the above" votes saved up is obviously not a fan of the current government, and willing to stockpile resources toward an attempt to overthrow it, but has no actual elected representatives in that government. If some legislator proposed a program to monitor potential domestic terrorists with a level of scrutiny proportional to the cube of the suspect's reserved votes, who would oppose that program?
There are numerous systems of verifiable secret ballot, for example this one.
Why should those whom are not 'fans' of any current member of the ruling regime, never be offered a meaningful vote? That is the point of non expiring votes, that minorities will have representation at least some of the time. The fundamental test of any democracy, is whether the incumbent regime can be peacefully overthrown.
In response to
Rationality Quotes July 2012
If you wish to advance into the infinite, explore the finite in all directions.
-- Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
What I was thinking about when typing that was indeed a model by some geophysicists. They had found some kind of correlation between some function of solar activity and some function of seismic activity, but those functions were so unnatural-looking that I couldn't help thinking they tweaked the crap out of everything before getting a strong-enough result.
You were likely referring to some of the recent work of Vincent Courtillot. A video summarizing some of his work here.
The most interesting aspect of this work, is that Courtillot did not start out with any intention of finding correlations with climate; his field is geomagnetism. Only after noticing certain correlations between geomagnetic cycles and sun spot cycles, did suspected correlations with natural climate cycles become evident.
The only possible reason appears to be, that these behavioral clues are the only way we have of knowing of ourselves, that we lie.
Wait, what?
On what basis do you infer that this is the only possible reason?
On the basis that if one makes definite assertions, responses are more likely :-)
My question: Why is it an evolutionary advantage to betray our lies with behavioural clues? Until challenged with an alternative reason that makes any sense, my assertion remains the only possible reason.
In response to
Evolutionary psychology as "the truth-killer"
However, if we can't trust our belief-forming faculties to tell us the truth about God, why should we trust them to tell us the truth about anything, including evolutionary science? If our cognitive faculties only tell us what we need to survive, not what is true, why trust them about anything at all?
Rewrite the paragraph; but remove all unnecessary particulars and emotive words, leaving the propositions in the abstract:
... if we can't trust our beliefs ... to tell us the truth ... why should we trust them to tell us the truth ...? ... If our cognitive faculties ... only tell us what we need to survive ... not what is true ... why trust them?
The first proposition reduces to an entirely meaningless tautology. The second proposition implies that truth is something other than what we need to survive. Together, the propositions ask the question: In what contexts can we trust our beliefs?
These abstract forms of the propositions, expose the issues under discussion: What is belief? To what extent can we trust our beliefs? These issues have been the subject of much discourse and quite a number of wars, genocides, and such like; over the past few thousand years. Although there appears to be no convincing philosophical argument either way, historical and palaeontological evidence suggests that species and cultures unable to adapt, do not survive. In the human cultural context, these issues have been explored by Jared Diamond.
The evolutionary source of empathy appears to be our mirror neurons, you may follow the research from the work of V.S.Ramachandran, outlined here, and from this video.
The evolutionary advantage of mirror neurons, appears to result from the human trait toward scavenging. When following another creature to its source of food, we must imitate the other creature, whilst at the same time distinguishing ourselves from the other creature; in order to know the difference between 'something has eaten', and 'I have eaten'.
Here are a few pointers to philosophical arguments that might expose fallacies in thinking.
Beliefs may be classified into two types: - a belief that can be externally verified by experiment (science) - a belief that can not be externally verified by experiment (faith.)
The former type, are those beliefs that I must have; for example, if I do not believe the doorway is where it is (my map does not correspond to the territory), I will likely walk into the wall. These types of beliefs are necessary for my survival.
The latter type, are those beliefs that I choose to have; these beliefs express my preferences and values; for example, if I prefer to eat chicken than pork, and am offered an option, I will value a bowl of chicken more than a bowl of pork.
Preferences are contextual: if I am offered no choice, and have the option of eating pork or starving; then my preference for chicken may compromise my survival. If my preference for chicken prevents me from eating pork, and I subsequently die; my unshakeable preference for chicken will die with me.
I consider that the above illustrates that only the former type of belief will survive in the long run; which answers the question by inference.
Provided that one person feels that their preferences were freely chosen; then, what justification is there for denying another similar freedoms? If someone asks: Do you believe in God? - answer: Do you believe in a god? If their answer is in the affirmative, one can then answer in honesty: I believe that you believe in a god? This becomes a little tricky if someone asks: Do you believe there is only one God? Then one must find at least two people to respond in the affirmative, before one can answer in honesty: No (the burden of proof falls to them, if they wish to claim that these are one and the same god.)
For those of a more philosophical temperament, this paradox sometimes suffices (or failing that, invokes a perplexed expression):
For some 'thing' to exist; that 'thing' must first be recognized (there can never, therefore, be only one instance of any 'thing'.)
This works for any ideal (universal), but can be applied to the concept of 'god', as easily as the concept of 'chair' or 'unicorn'. It makes no sense to ask: Do you believe in the existence of 'chair'? For the question to have sense, one must ask in the particular; Do you believe in the existence of 'that chair'?
These are all plays on words, and I for one, have never really understood the difference: a 'believer' claims to believe in one 'unicorn', and a 'non believer' claims to not believe in another 'unicorn'. This confuses me; if pressed, I prefer to label myself 'apatheist', I really do not see that this kind of belief makes any difference either way: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apatheism
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-- Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
(re-posted on request.)