Sequence index: Living Luminously
Previously in sequence: City of Lights

You can use luminosity to help you effectively change yourself into someone you'd more like to be.  Accomplish this by fixing your self-tests so they get good results.

You may find your understanding of this post significantly improved if you read the seventh story from Seven Shiny Stories.

When you have coherent models of yourself, it only makes good empirical sense to put them to the test.

Thing is, when you run a test on yourself, you know what test you're running, and what data would support which hypothesis.  All that and you're the subject generating the data, too.  It's kind of hard to have good scientific controls around this sort of experiment.

Luckily, it turns out that for this purpose they're unnecessary!  Remember, you're not just trying to determine what's going on in a static part of yourself.  You're also evaluating and changing the things you repudiate when you can.  You don't just have the chance to let knowledge of your self-observation nudge your behavior - you can outright rig your tests.

Announcing: the Less Wrong Sub-Reddit, at http://reddit.com/r/LessWrong. This Reddit is intended as a partial replacement for/complement to the Open Thread, which has gotten somewhat unwieldy and overcrowded as of late. I (Thomas McCabe) will be posting things that appear on the April Open Thread to this Reddit, to aid in starting conversation. We'll see how it goes.

This Reddit is for the discussion of Less Wrong topics that have not appeared in recent posts. If a discussion gets very long/involved, celebrate by turning it into a top-level post.

To anyone who is worried about the discussion quality devolving to Reddit level: I retain moderator power over the sub-Reddit, and can delete things and ban people from it. If this gets to be too much work for me, I will be happy to give mod power to other interested Less Wrong readers with a track record of good posts and comments.

This is purely my creation, and not that of Eliezer or the Less Wrong admins. If anything goes horribly wrong, don't blame them.

This is completely not an April Fool's joke. I want to start it now (on the first day of the month) because the Open Thread "only" has 52 comments on it.

If you don't have a Reddit account, or want to create a new account to post under your Less Wrong username, you can click "Register" in the upper-right-hand corner. It only takes fifteen seconds.

For those who don't look at the bottom of the website very often, Less Wrong is originally powered by the Reddit codebase.

Good luck, everyone, and may the best discussions win.

Edited for clarity: I'm proposing that we set up a new discussion community such that Less Wrongers have a place to talk about off-topic stuff other than Open Thread (which is hugely overcrowded). If either LW or the subreddit crashes, it should have no effect on the other.

Previously: Eliezer Yudkowsky facts, and Kevin's prediction.

A bit of silliness for the day.  Below the fold to spare those with delicate sensibilities. 

Summary: Yudkowsky's fiction emphasizes neodeconstructive rationalism, which serves as a bridge between class and sexual identity. Materialist libertarianism (in the metaphysical sense) implies quantum nonrealism, but examining the works of Vinge, Gibson, and especially Egan in this light generates the discourse of semitoic consciousness.

1. Precapitalist textual theory and neodeconstructive rationalism

In the works of Yudkowsky, a predominant concept is the concept of cultural reality. It is not enough to believe in belief; one must make beliefs pay rent  It could be said that Salamon’s model of neodeconstructive rationalism implies that class has significance, given that the premise of materialist libertarianism is invalid. Given that absence of evidence is evidence of absence, an abundance of discourses concerning Pearlean absurdity may be revealed.

The main theme of the works of Alicorn is not depatriarchialism, but postdepatriarchialism. Thus, Yvain suggests the use of neoconstructive narrative to modify culture. After all, guessing the teacher's password is merely a route to more semantic stopsigns. The defining characteristic, and subsequent dialectic, of materialist libertarianism intrinsic to Yudkowsky’s Three Worlds Collide is also evident in The Sword of Good, although in a more mythopoetical sense.

It could be said that the primary theme of Jaynes's analysis of neodeconstructive rationalism is the bridge between class and sexual identity. pjeby promotes the use of the cultural paradigm of consensus to deconstruct class divisions.

Thus, if neodeconstructive rationalism holds, we have to choose between postdialectic conceptualist theory and subcapitalist theory. But would that take place on a level greater than merely disputing definitions? Several appropriations concerning the stasis of dialectic art exist.

But the characteristic theme of the works of Bayes is a postpatriarchial reality. Hanson’s critique of materialist libertarianism holds that the establishment is meaningless. But is it really just an empty label?

2. Expressions of futility

“Sexual identity is part of the stasis of language,” says Vinge. Thus, Dennett states that we have to choose between Sartreist absurdity and capitalist libertarianism; taw's critique brings this into sharp focus. If neodeconstructive rationalism holds, the works of Yudkowsky are modernistic.

“Culture is used in the service of the status quo,” says Dennett; however, according to Crowe, it is not so much culture that is used in the service of the status quo, but rather the failure, and therefore the defining characteristic, of culture. But the subject is interpolated into a materialist libertarianism that includes art as a whole. Pearl holds that we have to choose between Humean qualitative post praxis and the neodialectic paradigm of consensus.

In the works of Yudkowsky, a predominant concept is the distinction between figure and ground; the generalized anti-zombie principle stands in tension with the tragedy of group selectionism It could be said that Blake uses the term neodeconstructive rationalism to denote the role of the participant as artist. The main theme of Hanson's analysis of materialist libertarianism is the economy, and eventually the stasis, of semiotic society.

But the primary theme of the works of Egan is not constructivism as such, but neoconstructivism. Sarkar states that the works of Egan are postmodern.

In a sense, Hanson uses the term 'materialist libertarianism' to denote the role of the writer as artist. Quantum non-realism implies that sexuality is used to marginalize minorities, but only if culture is distinct from language.

3. Yudkowsky and neodeconstructive rationalism

In the works of Yudkowsky, a predominant concept is the concept of timeless control. However, MichaelVassar suggests the use of materialist libertarianism to analyse and modify narrativity. The characteristic theme of the works of Gibson is the role of the writer as observer.

Therefore, in Virtual Light, Gibson deconstructs the conscious sorites paradox; in All Tomorrow’s Parties, however, he analyses the moral void. It could be said that the subject is contextualised into a neodeconstructive rationalism that includes art as a whole. Any number of situationisms concerning Bayesian rationality may be discovered.

Sequence index: Living Luminously
Previously in sequence: Highlights and Shadows
Next in Sequence: Lampshading

Pretending to be multiple agents is a useful way to represent your psychology and uncover hidden complexities.

You may find your understanding of this post significantly improved if you read the sixth story from Seven Shiny Stories.

When grappling with the complex web of traits and patterns that is you, you are reasonably likely to find yourself less than completely uniform.  You might have several competing perspectives, possess the ability to code-switch between different styles of thought, or even believe outright contradictions.  It's bound to make it harder to think about yourself when you find this kind of convolution.

Unfortunately, we don't have the vocabulary or even the mental architecture to easily think of or describe ourselves (nor other people) as containing such multitudes.  The closest we come in typical conversation more resembles descriptions of superficial, vague ambivalence ("I'm sorta happy about it, but kind of sad at the same time!  Weird!") than the sort of deep-level muddle and conflict that can occupy a brain.  The models of the human psyche that have come closest to approximating this mess are what I call "multi-agent models".  (Note: I have no idea how what I am about to describe interacts with actual psychiatric conditions involving multiple personalities, voices in one's head, or other potentially similar-sounding phenomena.  I describe multi-agent models as employed by psychiatrically singular persons.)

Multi-agent models have been around for a long time: in Plato's Republic, he talks about appetite (itself imperfectly self-consistent), spirit, and reason, forming a tripartite soul.  He discusses their functions as though each has its own agency and could perceive, desire, plan, and act given the chance (plus the possibility of one forcing down the other two to rule the soul unopposed).  Not too far off in structure is the Freudian id/superego/ego model.  The notion of the multi-agent self even appears in fiction (warning: TV Tropes).  It appears to be a surprisingly prevalent and natural method for conceptualizing the complicated mind of the average human being.  Of course, talking about it as something to do rather than as a way to push your psychological theories or your notion of the ideal city structure or a dramatization of a moral conflict makes you sound like an insane person.  Bear with me - I have data on the usefulness of the practice from more than one outside source.

Sequence index: Living Luminously
Previously in sequence: The ABC's of Luminosity
Next in sequence: The Spotlight

You should pay attention to key mental events, on a regular and frequent basis, because important thoughts can happen very briefly or very occasionally and you need to catch them.

You may find your understanding of this post significantly improved if you read the third story from Seven Shiny Stories.

Luminosity is hard and you are complicated.  You can't meditate on yourself for ten minutes over a smoothie and then announce your self-transparency.  You have to keep working at it over a long period of time, not least because some effects don't work over the short term.  If your affect varies with the seasons, or with major life events, then you'll need to keep up the first phase of work through a full year or a major life event, and it turns out those don't happen every alternate Thursday.  Additionally, you can't cobble together the best quality models from snippets of introspection that are each five seconds long; extended strings of cognition are important, too, and can take quite a long time to unravel fully.

Sadly, looking at what you are thinking inevitably changes it.  With enough introspection, this wouldn't influence your accuracy about your overall self - there's no reason in principle why you couldn't spend all your waking hours noting your own thoughts and forming meta-thoughts in real time - but practically speaking that's not going to happen.  Therefore, some of your data will have to come from memory.  To minimize the error introduction that comes of retrieving things from storage, it's best to arrange to reflect on very recent thoughts.  It may be worth your while to set up an external reminder system to periodically prompt you to look inward, both in the moment and retrospectively over the last brief segment of time.  This can be a specifically purposed system (i.e. set a timer to go off every half hour or so), or you can tie it to convenient promptings from the world as-is, like being asked "What's up?" or "Penny for your thoughts".

Less Wrong readers are familiar with the idea you can and should put a price on life. Unfortunately the Big Lie that you can't and shouldn't has big consequences in the current health care debate. Here's some articles on it:

Yvain's blog post here (HT: Vladimir Nesov).
Peter Singer's article on rationing health care here.
Wikipedia here.
Experts and policy makers who debate this issue here.

For those new to Less Wrong, here's the crux of Peter Singer's reasoning as to why you can put a price on life:

Sometimes in an argument, an older opponent might claim that perhaps as I grow older, my opinions will change, or that I'll come around on the topic.  Implicit in this claim is the assumption that age or quantity of experience is a proxy for legitimate authority.  In and of itself, such "life experience" is necessary for an informed rational worldview, but it is not sufficient.

The claim that more "life experience" will completely reverse an opinion indicates that the person making such a claim believes that opinions from others are based primarily on accumulating anecdotes, perhaps derived from extensive availability bias.  It actually is a pretty decent assumption that other people aren't Bayesian, because for the most part, they aren't.  Many can confirm this, including Haidt, Kahneman, and Tversky.

When an opponent appeals to more "life experience," it's a last resort, and it's a conversation halter.  This tactic is used when an opponent is cornered.  The claim is nearly an outright acknowledgment of moving to exit the realm of rational debate.  Why stick to rational discourse when you can shift to trading anecdotes?  It levels the playing field, because anecdotes, while Bayesian evidence, are easily abused, especially for complex moral, social, and political claims.  As rhetoric, this is frustratingly effective, but it's logically rude.

Although it might be rude and rhetorically weak, it would be authoritatively appropriate for a Bayesian to be condescending to a non-Bayesian in an argument.  Conversely, it can be downright maddening for a non-Bayesian to be condescending to a Bayesian, because the non-Bayesian lacks the epistemological authority to warrant such condescension.  E.T. Jaynes wrote in Probability Theory about the arrogance of the uninformed, "The semiliterate on the next bar stool will tell you with absolute, arrogant assurance just how to solve the world's problems; while the scholar who has spent a lifetime studying their causes is not at all sure how to do this."

Currently, the comment for which I've received the most positive karma by a factor of four is a joke about institutionalized ass-rape. A secondhand joke, effectively a quote with no source cited. Furthermore, the comment had, at best, tangential relevance to the subject of discussion. If anyone were to provide a detailed explanation of why they voted as they did, I predict that I would be appreciative.

Based on this evidence, which priors need to be adjusted? Discuss.

I've been asked to start a thread in order to continue a debate I started in the comments of an otherwise-unrelated post. I started to write a post on that topic, found myself introducing my work by way of explanation, and then realized that this was a sub-topic all its own which is of substantial relevance to at least one of the replies to my comments in that post -- and a much better topic for a first-ever post/thread .

So I'm going to write that introductory post first, and then start another thread specifically on the topic under debate.