People don't have endless time to discuss things with everyone...

You are right, many people just want to make sure they are not wasting their time, but when they come back with "if you are not an expert then your conclusion is false" I think they are showing that time was not their priority, but just to state the claim was false.

If they came back with "I prefer to talk to an expert" or "how can I believe you?" it would indicate what you say above.

Also, I simplified above with a simple claim as my starting statement. Normally a claim is below an article that already explains the issue and I may affirm that with the addition of my opinion.

For example after this article about the war on science on National Geographic:

http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2015/03/science-doubters/achenbach-text

I may just write a comment:

We have a huge bias towards intuitive conclusions rather than taking the time to understand the facts.

Then someone might write "are you a psychiatrist?". I respond "no" and they follow with a "then you don't know what you are talking about".

They are right, I think. People don't have endless time to discuss things with everyone. You put a statement on the table. Now I look at it and superficially see that it's some sort of economics statement. Now should I waste my time examining your standpoint further? Can I expect to get well founded opinions from you? Will I profit from this exchange? If I can verify that you indeed have spent a long time thinking about economics and other people have considered your economy related thinking processes good enough to give you a diploma, then I can expect to get valuable opinions from you.

It's not sure, but one has to filter out all the cranks. Asking for qualifications is one way. There are thousands of unqualified people who have their own refutations of relativity, or false proofs of P!=NP etc. Should we really give equal time to all of these people, just because they might be onto something?

You seem to look at yourself from the inside and say well I'm an honest and smart guy, why won't they listen to me? But for them you're just a random guy, nobody can see your inner qualities that you think you possess. If you want to become better than a "random guy from the street", you need to provide some evidence that you're worth listening to.

People always treat you for how you appear to the outside. It's the same fallacy that people commit when they say "I want someone to love me for who I am inside, not for any of my attributes like my body type, job, money, sense of humor, intelligence, musical talent etc., but for the inner me". There's no inner you for us. Only what you do.

I have a question about the problem of recursion here. If I observe a blue sky and I observe a group of scientific papers claiming that it is green, how much more likely is it that my observation of the sky is what is wrong than that my observation or understanding of the scientific articles are what is wrong?

Surely neurological processes are "arrangements of particles" too, though.

I think your question gets to the heart of the matter- is there a general principle to be found with regard to which patterns within conscious systems innately feel good, or isn't there? It would seem very surprising to me if there wasn't.

I see the argument, but I'll note that your comments seem to run contrary to the literature on this: see, e.g., Berridge on "Dissecting components of reward: ‘liking’, ‘wanting’, and learning", as summed up by Luke in The Neuroscience of Pleasure. In short, behavior, memory, and enjoyment ('seeking', 'learning', and 'liking' in the literature) all seem to be fairly distinct systems in the brain. If we consider a being with a substantially different cognitive architecture, whether through divergent evolution or design, it seems problematic to view behavior as the gold standard of whether it's experiencing pleasure or suffering. At this point it may be the most practical approach, but it's inherently imperfect.

My strong belief is that although there is substantial plasticity in how we interpret experiences as positive or negative, this plasticity isn't limitless. Some things will always feel painful; others will always feel pleasurable, given a not-too-highly-modified human brain. But really, I think this line of thinking is a red herring: it's not about the stimulus, it's about what's happening inside the brain, and any crisp/rigorous/universal principles will be found there.

Is valence a 'natural kind'? Does it 'carve reality at the joints'? Intuitions on this differ (here's a neat article about the lack of consensus about emotions). I don't think anger, or excitement, or grief carve reality at the joints- I think they're pretty idiosyncratic to the human emotional-cognitive architecture. But if anything about our emotions is fundamental/universal, I think it'd have to be their valence.

It does, and thank you for the reply.

How should we define "pleasure"? -- A difficult question. As you mention, it is a cloud of concepts, not a single one. It's even more difficult because there appears to be precious little driving the standardization of the word-- e.g., if I use the word 'chair' differently than others, it's obvious, people will correct me, and our usages will converge. If I use the word 'pleasure' differently than others, that won't be as obvious because it's a subjective experience, and there'll be much less convergence toward a common usage.

But I'd say that in practice, these problems tend to work themselves out, at least enough for my purposes. E.g., if I say "think of pure, unadulterated agony" to a room of 10000 people, I think the vast majority would arrive at fairly similar thoughts. Likewise, if I asked 10000 people to think of "pure, unadulterated bliss… the happiest moment in your life", I think most would arrive at thoughts which share certain attributes, and none (<.01%) would invert answers to these two questions.

I find this "we know it when we see it" definitional approach completely philosophically unsatisfying, but it seems to work well enough for my purposes, which is to find mathematical commonalities across brain-states people identify as 'pleasurable', and different mathematical commonalities across brain-states people identify as 'painful'.

I see what you mean by "the meaning of a word is hardly ever accurately given by any necessary-and-sufficient conditions that can be stated explicitly in a reasonable amount of space, because that just isn't the way human minds work." On the other hand, all words are imperfect and we need to talk about this somehow. How about this: (1) what are the characteristic mathematics of (i.e., found disproportionally in) self-identified pleasurable brain states?

I understand the type of criticism generally, but could you say more about this specific case?

I'm curious if the objection stems from some mismatch of abstraction layers, or just the habit of not speaking about certain topics in certain terms.

There's also a linguistic issue here. The English "and" doesn't simply mean mathematical set theoretical conjunction in everyday speech. Indeed, without using words like "given" or "suppose" or a long phrase such as "if we already know that", we can't easily linguistically differentiate between P(Y | X) and P(Y, X).

"How likely is it that X happens and then Y happens?", "How likely is it that Y happens after X happened?", "How likely is it that event Y would follow event X?". All these are ambiguous in everyday speech. We aren't sure whether X has hypothetically already been observed or it's a free variable, too.

In both cases, the tradeoff is the same - drive fifteen minutes to save twenty bucks - but people were much more willing to do it for the cheap item, because $20 was a higher percentage of its total cost. With the $2000 TV, the $20 vanishes into the total cost like a drop in the ocean and seems insignificant.

Evaluating cost savings as a percentage actually makes a certain amount of sense when evaluating policies rather than acts. Cheaper purchases tend to be much more frequent: you probably buy many more shirts than you do big-screen TVs, so expending the effort to find the cheapest source of shirts and evaluate whether it's worthwhile to go out of your way to buy them will save you several times $20 over the lifetime of the policy, whereas the TV is effectively a one-time decision which will only save you $20 total. True, the 15 minute drive time is per-purchase rather than per-policy, but 1) the cost is not just the drive time, but also the effort to research options and the cognitive load of picking and option, which are one-time costs, and 2) a general policy of thriftiness for small, frequent purchases can have a substantial effect on your overall financial situation, but indulging in overpayment for convenience on the odd big one-time purchase is an affordable luxury.

On a different note, another factor to take into account when evaluating commuting times is the possibility of changing jobs. When I bought my house, I specifically looked for a short commute time, but not just to my then-current workplace. I also took into account commute times to other places I might end up working if I changed jobs (other campuses of companies in the area which employ large numbers of people in my field, especially places which employ friends of mine who could refer my for positions). By over-optimizing for my then-current job, I felt I would have increased my risk exposure if I lost my job or became unhappy with it, as well as reducing my ability to take advantage of new opportunities if another employer could make more productive use of me and cut me in on the additional value created.

One mistake I did make in buying a house was very badly underestimating the cost in time, effort, and cash to make repairs and improvements to a house purchased in poor condition. In hindsight, I think I made the right tradeoffs, in that after spending the money I wound up with a house that will suit my needs better and for a longer period of time than I could have afforded by paying the additional cost to buy a house that was already in good condition (this includes the substantial benefit of being able to customize aspects of the house to my desires as I made repairs and improvements), but this was a happy accident despite the major misevaluations I made when planning the purchase.

I'm ashamed to admit this, but I haven't worked with programming on a deep enough level to be comfortable with your analogy. The one thing I think it's missing (and I haven't done a very good job explaining this) is the process of learning/introspection and the distinction between "adding to a body of propositional knowledge" and "triggering the 'learning' subroutine in the mind", which causes the central confusion.