29

'#29 would be less wrong if you update for the realisation that Hinduism isn't a religion (it's a collection of similar religions). Also atheism, from the outside is a belief system which has tenants, position on deity and deity principles, and often recommends moral and ethical behaviour values based on anthrological position in relation to humans, authority and diety (or lack thereof). Futhermore these tenants are debated, expounded, tested, philosophised about and recorded in document. Often there is also demands and improperly qualified examination (based on wild-claims and popular brands of god/religion) that rely on faith and false assumption. ("creation of the brand of 'sky daddy') . That atheism is a natural vs. a revealed religion does not stop it being a religion "just because atheists say so" (because they don't like religion").

Who gets to set the value of God, for the test anyway?? For me the value of God "Is that which creates the whole of being". (ie universe/multiverse, with time being merely one dimension of many). All other values are other peoples' variants or "commercial brands". :. theism is the only sane choice, with further knowledge and exploration avilable from there. Atheism would require refutation of creation, or of all forms of existance (even illusionary ones). Consensus agreement on belief doesn't make it any truer (or falser) - and all tests must be done in context to the Information under examination. ie All atheist arguments re: god seem to rotate around a strawman assumption of God (eg like disproving drink is good for you by picking CocaCola is the only True Drink). And then they go on to build a Jengo of arguments and assumptions to prove their beliefs are correct - where they refuse to test their assumptions as they assume its Disputing Definitions (where if a possible assumption is occur it is likely to be less wrong to test it's case, and note the contexts)

Blarg... okay this one is tripping me up. There are two parts to this comment. The first part is quasi-math; the other is not. It is very much a brain dump and I have not edited it thoroughly.

EDIT: I think I managed to get it cleared up and responded with a second comment. FYI.

Let B(X) mean belief in X where belief is defined as a predictor of reality so that reality contains event X. Using "There is a dragon in my garage" as X we get:

• B("There is a dragon in my garage.")
• B("There is not a dragon in my garage.")

I think it is okay to write the latter as:

• B(~X) where X is "There is a dragon in my garage."

So far okay and both can be verified. The problem comes when X is "There is an unverifiable dragon in my garage."

• B("There is an unverifiable dragon in my garage.")
• B("There is not an unverifiable dragon in my garage.")

Both of these are unverifiable, but the latter is okay because it matches reality? As in, we see no unverifiable dragon so the ~X is... what, the default? This confuses me. Perhaps my notation is wrong. Is it better to write:

• B(X)
• ~B(X)

If B(X) is belief in X, B(~X) != ~B(X). This way we can throw out the unverifiable belief without creating a second unverifiable belief. All of this makes sense to me. Am I still on track with the intent of the post? This implies that B(X) and B(~X) are equally unverifiable when X is unverifiable.

Next is belief in belief:

• B(B(X))

Of which I think you are arguing that B(B(X)) does not imply B(X). But are you also saying that B(X) implies B(B(X))? And this is how people can continue to believe in something unverifiable?

I feel like I am drifting far away from the purpose of this post. Where did I misstep?

Here is my second attempt, this time with no math:

Carl Sagan used this parable to illustrate the classic moral that poor hypotheses need to do fast footwork to avoid falsification. But I tell this parable to make a different point: The claimant must have an accurate model of the situation somewhere in his mind, because he can anticipate, in advance, exactly which experimental results he'll need to excuse.

Would there be any experimental results that he wouldn't need to excuse? Is there some form of invisiodragonometer that beeps when he goes into his garage? Would the scenario change any if the subject was genuinely surprised when no sounds of breathing were heard and the oxygen levels remained the same and still offered up excuses of inaudible and non-breathing? How would the typical believer in atoms defend their existence if we wandered into the garage and complained about no breathing sounds?

I can think of simple answers to all of these questions, but it makes me think less of the usefulness of your conclusion. When I think of unverifiable beliefs I think of examples where people will spend their whole life looking for physical proof and are constantly disappointed when they do not find it. These people don't have an accurate model of the situation in their mind. The example of invisible dragons still applies to these people while your claim that they dodge in advance does not seem to apply.

So... again, I feel like I am missing some key point here.

[I]f you believe in belief, you cannot admit to yourself that you only believe in belief, because it is virtuous to believe, not to believe in belief, and so if you only believe in belief, instead of believing, you are not virtuous. Nobody will admit to themselves, "I don't believe the Ultimate Cosmic Sky is blue and green, but I believe I ought to believe it" - not unless they are unusually capable of acknowledging their own lack of virtue. People don't believe in belief in belief, they just believe in belief.

I can think of examples where someone fully admits that they believe it would be better to believe X but as hard as they try and as much as they want to, they cannot. These people are often guilt ridden and have horrible, conflicting desires, but it doesn't take much imagination to think of someone who simply states the belief in belief X without emotion but admits to not believing X. At least, I can hear myself saying these words given the right circumstances.

Believing in belief of belief seems like something else entirely unrelated to dragons in garages or unverifiable beleifs. This, again, makes me feel as if I am missing a crucial piece of understanding throughout all of this. If I had to potshot at the missing pieces I would aim toward the definitions of belief. Specifically, what you are calling beliefs aside from predictors of reality. (And even there, I do not know if I have a correct translation.)

I do not know if you have any desire to discuss this subject with me. Perhaps someone else who knows the material is willing? I sincerely apologize if these types of responses are frustrating. This is how I ask for help. If there is a better way to ask I am all ears.